The Value of Relationships in Real Estate Investment Trusts by WONG WOEI CHYUAN










WONG WOEI CHYUAN 







A THESIS SUBMITTED 
 
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
                                           DEPARTMENT OF REAL ESTATE 













I am grateful to my thesis supervisors, Prof Ong Seow Eng and Assoc Prof Joseph Ooi Thian 
Leong for their guidance and support throughout the Ph.D. program. Both of them are good 
researchers cum great teachers. They have shown me the beauty of research and exposed me to 
quality research through their superb supervision and real estate conferences organized by 
American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association (AREUEA) and American Real Estate 
Society (ARES). I also benefited from the comments/suggestions from my thesis committee 
member, Prof David. H. Downs.   
I am thankful to Prof Nur Adiana Hiau Abdullah who encourages me to develop a niche 
in property research and make me apply a Ph.D. degree from NUS. During years at NUS, I 
enjoyed sharing ideas and developing my research by conversing with graduate students; in 
particular, I thank Radheshyam Chamarajanagara Gopinath, Zhao Daxuan, Omokolade Ayodeji 
Akinsomi, Wei Yuan, Li Qing and Zhang Huiming. Financial sponsorship from my employer, 
Universiti Utara Malaysia is highly appreciated.  I owe to Tang Boon Guan and my sister Wong 
Huey Ling for their willingness to become my financial guarantors knowing that my employer 
would chase after them if I failed to complete my Ph.D. degree on time! 
Finally, I thank my family, particularly my wife, Lum Li Peng (林怡杏), who bears with 
me the twists and turns of these graduate student years in Singapore. This thesis is, therefore, 






   
II 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
                                Page 
Acknowledgements I 
Summary V 
List of Tables VII 
List of Figures VIII 
Chapter One Introduction   1 
 1.1 The Economics of Relationships 1 
 1.2 The Costs and Benefits of Relationships 3 
  1.2.1 Firm-Bank Relationship 3 
  1.2.2 Firm-Sponsor Relationship 4 
 1.3 Problem Statement 5 
 1.4 The Scope of the Study 7 
 1.5 Research Objectives 7 
 1.6 Research Contributions 9 
 1.7 Organization of the Thesis 10 
  
Chapter Two Can Bank Lines of Credit Protect REITs against a Credit Crisis? 
 2.1   Introduction  11 
 2.2   Literature Review                            15 
 2.3   Research Design and Data  18 
  2.3.1  Research Hypotheses  18 
  2.3.2  Sample  21 
 2.4  Results  25 
  2.4.1  Time Trend Analysis 25 
  2.4.2  Determinants of Credit Line (versus Spot loans) 
Utilization 
27 
  2.4.3  Drawdowns on Credit Lines 33 
 2.5 How Committed are the Loan Commitments? 38 
  2.5.1 Who Can Drawdown in a Credit Crisis? 39 
  2.5.2 Who Can Increase their Credit Capacity? 41 
  2.5.3 REIT Cash Holdings in a Credit Crisis 45 
 2.6  Conclusions 48 
  




 3.1  Introduction  50 
 3.2  Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 53 
 3.3  Data and Summary Statistics  57 
  3.3.1  Sample and Data Collection 57 
  3.3.2  Summary Statistics 58 
 3.4   Results and Methods  64 
  3.4.1  Univariate Analysis Results  64 
  3.4.2  2SLS Estimations Results 66 
            3.4.2.1  Joint decisions of underpricing and 
                          sponsor ownership 
          3.4.2.2  The Determinants of Underpricing  
          3.4.2.3  The Determinants of Sponsor  
                          Ownership 
           
 
 
  3.4.3 OLS Estimations Results 73 
 3.5  Robustness tests 75 
  3.5.1  Further Tests on Signaling Hypothesis 75 
  3.5.2 Wealth Gain From Retaining IPO Shares 79 
 3.6  Conclusions 82 
  
Chapter Four Related Party Transactions, Wealth Expropriation and Firm Valuation: 
Evidence from REITs 
 4.1  Introduction  83 
 4.2  Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 86 
 4.3  Data and Research Design  90 
  4.3.1 Data  90 
  4.3.2 Research Design  92 
 4.4  Estimations Results  95 
  4.4.1  Univariate Analysis   95 
  4.4.2  The Wealth Effects of RPTs 97 
  4.4.3. Further Test to Pipeline Story 101 
  4.4.4. Corporate Governance Mechanism 104 




 4.5 How do Investors Price ‘Pipeline Story’ of RPTs into 110 
   
IV 
 
the Stock Pricing of IPOs? 
        
 4.6 Conclusions 113 
    
Chapter Five Conclusions and Recommendations  
 5.1  Background 114 
 5.2  Summary of Main Findings 114 
 5.3  Practical Implications 115 
 5.4  Limitations and Future Research 117 
Bibliography   119 
























The value of relationships has been the subject of intense discussion in recent years. Although 
numerous studies have examined the costs and benefits of relationships, the specific sources of 
the value of relationships are ambiguous. In this study, we investigate the value of relationships in 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). We conduct three separate empirical studies that cover 
the following aspects of relationships: (a) the insurance value of relationship banking; (b) the 
value of sponsor backing at the time of an IPO; and (c) the value of firm-sponsor business 
relationships (related party transactions) after an IPO. 
The major findings of this dissertation are as follows. The first essay examines a precise 
source of added value in relationship banking, namely, the insurance value of relationship 
banking in protecting firms against credit crises. Consistent with previous literature, we use the 
existence of bank lines of credit as the evidence of the formalization of a banking relationship. 
We empirically test the ability of individual REITs to drawdown on established lines of credit 
during a credit crisis. We find that bank lines of credit indeed insulate REITs from market-wide 
rationing and firm-level credit risk deterioration. The insurance value is, however, qualified for 
smaller and more risky firms, implying that the insurance value of bank lines of credit is not equal 
for all firms. Smaller and more risky firms are more likely to be rationed in a credit crisis. We 
also establish the importance of bank lines of credit in liquidity management and the investment 
funding of REITs. 
The second essay tests the value of sponsors backing in REIT IPOs in relation to the 
numbers of shares that sponsors retain at the time of an IPO and the reputation of the sponsor. 
Consistent with the signaling hypothesis, we find a positive relationship between sponsor 
ownership and underpricing, indicating that quality REITs use both the number of shares retained 
by the sponsor and the level of underpricing to signal their quality type. Importantly, we establish 
   
VI 
 
that these quality signals are determined jointly, which represents a new finding in the literature. 
Further tests reveal that IPOs that are backed by quality sponsors tend to exhibit superior long-
term performance. Our results also support the commitment hypothesis that developers that spin-
off REITs tend to hold more shares at the time of IPO, possibly to compensate investors for the 
potential moral hazard problems post-IPO. 
The third essay focuses on the firm-sponsor relationship post-IPO in terms of related 
party transactions (RPTs). We examine the dollar value of RPTs and their impact on firm 
valuation. REITs with high RPT activity are assumed to have closer relationships with their 
sponsors. Our analysis shows that RPTs have a positive impact on firm value, with the benefits 
flowing primarily from related party acquisitions. The positive effect of related party acquisitions 
is however qualified during a financial crisis. Moreover, our results suggest that the investors are 
fully aware of the risk associated with these RPTs. Specifically, IPOs with higher dollar value of 
RPTs in the first year after IPO tend to be priced at a discount at the IPO (underpricing). 
Overall, this thesis demonstrates the value of firm-bank and firm-sponsor relationships in 
the context of REITs. The first essay reveals the insurance value of banking relationships in 
protecting REITs against credit crises, although this protection may not valid for small or risky 
firms. The second and third essays shed light on the value of a close relationship with an IPO 
sponsor in signaling the value of a firm at the time of the IPO, and in channeling value-enhancing 
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“Business is not just doing deals; business is having great products, doing great engineering, and 
providing tremendous service to customers. Finally, business is a cobweb of human relationships.” 
                                                            Henry Ross Perot 
                                                                                  American businessman  
 
1.1 The Economics of Relationships 
The increasing turbulence in the marketplace has led to the emergence of a new paradigm in the 
business world that focuses on relationships rather than transaction orientated business strategies. 
Firms consistently strive to build close relationships with their stakeholders to create a 
competitive edge over their competitors. Every day events support the view that relationships can 
alter economic behavior. For example, realtors recognize that the sale price of a particular land 
depends on the relationship between the seller and the buyers. Family and friends trade at 
different levels and terms than do strangers. At the firm level, preferential offers in business 
arrangement are made when a relationship exists.     
Evidence that relationship matter made economists to rethink whether self-interest is 
economic agents’ sole motive. The main framework adopted by the economists to explain why 
self-interested agents manage to cooperate in a long term relationship is the theories of repeated 
games. Formally, repeated games refer to a class of models where the same set of agents 
repeatedly play the same game, called the ‘stage game’, over a long (typically, infinite) time 
horizon. In contrast to the situation where agents only interact once, any mutually beneficial 
outcome can be sustained as equilibrium when agents interact repeatedly and frequently. This is 
because the value of future interaction serves as the rewards and penalties to discipline the agents’
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current behavior.1 Long-term relationships are therefore recognized as one of the ways to achieve 
market efficiency besides market competition and writing of a formal contract to bind the 
economic agents (Michihiro, 2006). 
The formation of long-term relationship had led to the writing of informal or relational 
contracts featuring informal agreements and unwritten codes of conduct that powerfully affects 
the behavior of economy agents. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) who developed a repeated-
game models to model the relational contracts argue that relational contracts help circumvent 
difficulties in formal contracting. Unlike a formal contract that must be verified ex-post by the 
third party, a relational contract allows the parties the parties to utilize their detailed knowledge of 
their specific situation and to adapt to new information as it becomes available.   
My goal in this thesis is to explore two types of relational contracts formed between firm 
and its stakeholders, namely, the bank and the IPO sponsors. The main reason to focus on these 
relational contracts is the existence of soft-information, i.e. information that is not available to the 
public and cannot be directly verified by anyone other than agent who produces it (Stein, 2002), 
generated through repeated interaction and personal contact between the firm and its bank and 
IPO sponsors.  
According to Berger and Udell (1995), bank lines of credit are an attractive vehicle for 
studying the firm-bank relationship because they represent a formalization of banking 
relationships. Besides financing firms’ investment needs, bank lines of credit represent a 
commitment to providing working capital financing and provide insurance against unfavorable 
changes in the cost and/or availability of credit from the capital market (James and Smith, 2000). 
The firm-sponsor relationship, on the other hand, originates from a sponsor selling assets in a 
private company for public listing. Public firms typically capitalize on the strength and reputation 
                                                             
1  See Samuelson (2005) for an account of how diamond handlers, who, despite having constant 
opportunities to steal or tamper with diamonds, refrain from doing so. This is because the handlers are 
involved in a relationship where opportunistic behavior could have adverse future consequences, even if it 
is currently unexposed.  
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of the sponsor by carrying the sponsor’s brand name. Sponsors continue to be involved in the 
business decisions of public firms after the funding of IPOs through having a seat on the board of 
directors, retaining equity ownership in the public firm, and/or providing advisory services to the 
public firm for a fee. To show their commitment, a sponsor may enter into a pipeline support 
agreement that gives a REIT first-preference rights to the disposed properties owned by the 
sponsor. 
 
1.2 The Costs and Benefits of Relationships 
This section provides a brief survey of the costs and benefits of firm-bank and firm-sponsor 
relationships. 2  From an economic point of view, the value of a relationship is determined by its 
costs and benefits. If the costs exceed the benefits for either party, there is no economic reason to 
maintain the relationship.  
 
1.2.1  Firm-Bank Relationship 
Research has shown that a strong firm-bank relationship can alleviate the problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard that arise from asymmetric information. The main reason banks are 
able to resolve the information asymmetry problem is due to their ability to access firms’ private 
information. This helps banks to set loan contracts that allow for better control of potential 
conflicts of interest. The market tends to react positively to the announcement of a new or 
renewed bank loan, which supports the value-enhancing view of banking relationships (James, 
1987; Lummer and McConnell, 1989). Studies have also documented the benefits of close bank-
firm relationships in providing firms with better credit availability (Petersen and Rajan, 1994), 
                                                             
2  The value of close relationships has been studied from a variety of perspectives. For example, 
psychologists posit that close relationships are a great source of happiness that help people live bigger and 
richer lives than they otherwise would alone (Selterman, 2010). In marketing, Richards and Jones (2008) 
outline the core benefits of customer relationship management in revenue generation and cost savings. 
Research in supply chain management shows that by having good relationships with their suppliers, firms 
are able to receive better services, which increases their competitiveness (Sheth and Sharma, 1997). 
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better terms of credit (Berger and Udell, 1995), easy renegotiation of credit terms (Berlin and 
Mester, 1992) reduced costs of financial distress (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1990), and the 
ability to smooth out loan pricing over multiple loans (Berlin and Mester, 1998).  
The literature has also documented the dark side of banking relationships, where either 
the bank or the firm may engage in opportunistic behavior at the expense of the other party. Boot 
(2000) outlines two main sources of abuse in bank relationships: soft budget constraint and hold-
up problems. Soft-budget constraint is the borrower’s moral hazard problem, where the borrower 
may exert insufficient effort in preventing a bad outcome from happening, knowing that the loan 
agreement can be easily renegotiated with the lenders. Hold-up problems refer to situations where 
firms are informationally captured by banks due to the trading of private information in the 
banking relationship. Potential valuable investment opportunities may be lost if firms avoid bank 
loans for fear of being “locked” in a relationship.    
 
1.2.2 Firm-Sponsor Relationship  
Another strand of research focuses on the value of the firm-sponsor relationship. Studies have 
examined the influence or role of venture capital sponsors (Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991; Lin and Smith, 1998) private equity sponsors (Katz, 2008), angel investors (Johnson 
and Sohl, 2007) and managers (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005) in IPOs. The venture capital 
literature suggests that an important way for firms to mitigate the problems of information 
asymmetries in IPOs is to develop relationships with reputable venture capitalists. Existing 
empirical research also shows that venture capitalists can certify the true value of a firm, thereby 
reducing the level of IPO underpricing or the cost of going public (Barry et al., 1990; Megginson 
and Weiss, 1991; Lin and Smith, 1998). In a similar vein, Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) show 
that the IPOs of firms with higher management quality are characterized by lower underpricing, 
this is consistent with the certification hypothesis. 
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In addition to quality certification, the reputation of a sponsor also serves as a key 
element in attracting funding in the presence of weak investor protection (Gomes, 2000; Gopalan, 
Nanada and Seru, 2007). In other words, the assurance provided by the sponsor substitutes for the 
underdeveloped legal and regulatory mechanisms. Firms that are backed by or connected to 
sponsors from business or family groups also have the ability to utilize the internal capital 
markets within the business groups when access to capital markets is limited (Almeida and 
Wolfenzen, 2006). Stein’s (1997) theoretical model posits that large business groups exist 
because they play a vital role in allocating scarce internal capital in the presence of information 
asymmetry.  
Despite the value adding nature of firm-sponsor relationships, there are costs attached to 
close relationships that are rooted in the sponsors’ possession of propriety information. Sponsors 
who are also controlling shareholders may behave opportunistically in expropriating the wealth of 
minority shareholders by transferring resources out of the firm through self-related transactions, 
outright fraud or theft, loan guarantees, and so on (Johnson et al., 2000b). The market may 
require assurance from the sponsor that he has not exaggerated the quality of the assets he seeks 
to sell. Models of IPO signaling (Welch, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Allen and Faulhaber, 
1989) view underpricing as a costly signal of a firm’s quality. Sponsors may be willing to bear 
the cost of signaling when the market is suspicious of their certification roles and the potential 
moral hazard issues post-IPO. Similarly, to align their interests with those of firm minority 
shareholders, sponsors may signal their quality type by retaining IPO shares to convince the 
market of their credibility. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Asymmetric information and imperfect contracting give rise to two serious problems: adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection is the problem of ‘pre-contractual opportunism’, 
where the presence of private information provides bad quality agents the opportunity to hide 
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their true quality prior to the signing of a contract. Moral hazard, on the other hand, is the 
problem of ‘post-contractual opportunism,’ where the presence of some unobservable 
(unverifiable) action provides an agent the opportunity to act contrary to the principles laid out by 
the agreement. Capital structure theory states that asymmetric information increases the costs of 
external financing, which forces firms to pass up profitable investment opportunities (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984). Arguably, financially constrained firms are more likely to suffer 
from asymmetric information due to their heavy reliance on external financing. The models of 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993), for example, predict that 
small, informationally opaque firms are disproportionately affected by the shocks to the balance 
sheets of commercial banks.  
The literature survey in the previous section showed that the close relationships 
developed with lenders or sponsors can overcome, or at least mitigate, problems arising from 
asymmetric information by lowering external financing costs and the cost of going public, and 
enabling easy renegotiation of credit contracts, and better credit terms. Despite the growing body 
of literature on the value of relationships, empirical studies are continuing to explore the precise 
source of the value generated from close relationships. The literature on banking relationships 
still does not have a clear understanding of the insurance value of the bank lines of credit that are 
believed to protect firms against credit crises. The recent global financial crisis of 2007-2008, 
which was underscored by the failure and heightening of the refinancing risks faced by 
financially constrained firms, provides a compelling reason for studying the insurance value of 
banking relationships during credit crises. Although the firm-sponsor relationship has been the 
subject of substantial investigation, the empirical research on the value of sponsors’ backing of 
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1.4 The Scope of the Study  
This thesis does not pretend to embrace the full spectrum of the value (or costs) firms can gain 
from close relationships, as this is beyond the scope of this study. Accordingly, the focus of this 
thesis is restricted to the (a) insurance value that firms enjoy from banking relationships through 
having access to bank lines of credit during credit crisis periods, (b) the value of sponsors’ 
backing at the time of IPOs, and (c) the value of the business relationships formed between firms 
and their sponsors, post-IPO. 
This study focuses on Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), which are financially 
constrained due to their mandatory dividend payout requirements.3 Ott, Riddiough and Yi (2004) 
observe that only 7% of the investments of REITs are funded by retained earnings, compared to 
70% by general firms. Building close relationships with fund providers is therefore critical for 
REITs because they have to frequently return to the capital market for funding.  
 
1.5 Research Objectives  
The main research question that this thesis attempts to answer is: What is the value of close 
relationships? The first essay focuses on the firm-bank relationship and the second and third 
essays examine the firm-sponsor relationship.  
The first essay examines the value of firm-bank relationships. As in previous literature, 
we take the existence of bank lines of credit as the evidence of the formalization of a banking 
relationship (Berger and Udell, 1995). 4  As bank lines of credit obligate banks to lend at 
predetermined terms, banks only offer bank lines of credit to borrowers that they know well and 
believe can be trusted. Bank lines of credit, which are legally binding contracts arranged to 
                                                             
3 REITs have to pay 90% of their taxable income in the form of dividends to shareholders. 
 
4 We are aware that our dataset lacks information on the strength of a banking relationship, such as the 
duration and scope of the relationship and the distance between a firm and its bank, used in the previous 
literature (Berger and Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998, Berger et al., 2005). 
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provide debt on call to borrowers at pre-specified terms, have been theorized to provide insurance 
protection against credit crises. We examine whether bank lines of credit can indeed provide 
some insurance for REITs by allowing them to access credit during times of financial difficulty. 
The research question for the first essay is “Do bank lines of credit protect REITs against credit 
crises? 
The second essay explores the value of the firm-sponsor relationship during the IPO stage. 
We focus on the sponsors of Asian REITs, who have a strong influence on the REITs during the 
pre and post-IPO periods due to the captive management structure adopted by REITs in Asia.5 
We examine the value of sponsor backing in relation to the effect of the sponsor keeping a 
portion of IPO shares and the reputation of the sponsor on IPO underpricing. The captive 
structure provides a unique laboratory in which to examine the opposing effects of sponsor 
certification and signaling on the costs of going public. While the certification role of sponsors 
implies a lower cost of going public, concerns over agency issues may force sponsors to use 
underpricing as a tool to signal their good quality. The research question for the second essay is 
“Do IPO sponsors provide quality certification or signal the firm value of REITs during IPOs?” 
The third essay explores the value of the firm-sponsor relationship post-IPO by focusing 
on firms’ related party transactions (RPTs). The sponsors continue to maintain a business 
relationship with the REITs by serving as advisors to REITs for a fee and providing REITs with a 
pipeline of properties for future acquisitions. These RPTs can be beneficial to the REITs, due to 
the strict rules on corporate governance that mitigate the concerns of abusive RPTs. Besides, 
industry observers generally view positively the aggressive growth strategies pursued by REIT 
managers that boost the portfolio’s overall yield. One avenue for managers to do so is through 
related party acquisitions. The potential benefits of RPTs in the REIT sector are nevertheless 
clouded by the anecdotal evidence of the abusive RPTs that led to the collapse of large 
                                                             
5 Asian REITs are structured as captive REITs where an independent asset management firm wholly owned 
by the sponsor is set up to externally manage the REIT.  
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corporations, such as Enron and WorldCom, in the US. Hence, whether RPTs in the REIT sector 
are beneficial or abusive is still an empirical question. Therefore, the research question for the 
third essay is, “Are related party transactions detrimental to shareholder value?” 
 
1.6  Research Contributions 
The first essay of this thesis contributes to the current relationship banking literature by 
examining the insurance value of banking relationships through access to bank lines of credit. 
The study presented in this essay sheds light on the effectiveness of bank lines of credit in 
protecting firms from market-wide credit rationing and from the firm-level deterioration of credit 
worthiness. Unlike prior studies, which employ macro-level data, we control for cross-sectional 
differences in the credit risk of individual firms across three separate credit crunch events 
between 1992 and 2007. The panel nature of the data allows us to examine the independent 
impact of each credit crunch and the increase in firm credit risk on the usage of bank lines of 
credit. To the best of my knowledge, the first essay of this dissertation represents the first 
comprehensive empirical study of the insurance value of bank lines of credit in the context of 
REITs. 
The second essay extends the IPO literature by exploring the value of sponsor backing in 
relation to Asian REIT IPOs. Despite the economic importance of IPO sponsors, none of the 
REIT studies control for the commitment and reputation of the sponsor when examining the 
pricing of IPO shares. A higher number of shares retained by the sponsor indicates their 
willingness to maintain a long-term relationship with the REIT after the public listing. Moreover, 
the sponsors who maintain IPO shares also signal their confidence in the REIT’s long-term 
performance to the market. This essay also contributes to the literature in terms of methodology 
by jointly modeling the pricing decision and the quantity of shares held by the sponsor using a 
2SLS simultaneous estimation, with underpricing and the proportion of shares retained by the 
sponsor as the two dependent variables. To the best of my knowledge, the second essay of this 
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thesis is the first study to examine the role of REIT sponsors in the pricing and performance of 
IPO shares. 
The third essay contributes to the literature on related party transactions (RPTs) in two 
ways. First, in contrast to prior studies, which focus on the expropriation of wealth through the 
RPTs of controlling individuals, this essay focuses on the RPTs of the sponsors of Asian REITs 
who are also the majority shareholders of the REITs. The higher concentration of sponsor 
ownership in Asian REITs raises concerns over the expropriation of the wealth of minority 
shareholders by the sponsor. Second, the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 provides an 
opportunity to test the impact of RPTs on firm value during crisis and non-crisis periods. 
Arguably, firms are more prone to expropriation through RPTs during crisis periods. To the best 
of my knowledge, the third essay of this thesis is the first study to examine the occurrence and 
economic impact of RPTs within the REIT context.  
 
1.7 Organization of the Thesis  
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter Two presents the first essay, titled Can Bank Lines of 
Credit Protect REITs against a Credit Crisis? This chapter explores a unique value of banking 
relationships, that is, the insurance value of bank lines of credit in protecting REITs against credit 
crises. The value of sponsor backing at the time of an IPO is examined in Chapter Three, in the 
essay entitled Sponsor Backing in Asian REIT IPOs. Chapter Four presents the third essay, 
entitled Related Party Transactions, Wealth Expropriation and Firm Valuation: Evidence from 
REITs. This chapter investigates the value (or cost) of firm-sponsor business relationships by 
examining the incidence of related party transactions and their economic impact on firm 
performance. The final chapter concludes the thesis, highlights the limitations of the study, and 
provides recommendations for further research. 
   





CAN BANK LINES OF CREDIT PROTECT REITS 
AGAINST A CREDIT CRISIS? 
 
 
“With origination of traditional debt capital instruments and CMBS all but dried up, and many 
banks ratcheting down their commercial real estate lending exposures, significant questions remain 
as to how REITs and large commercial real estate companies will manage over the next 12-24 
months.” 
– SNL Real Estate and SNL Center for Financial Educations’ Webminar (March 3, 2009) on 
 “The REIT Credit Crisis – Managing Through Today’s Commercial Real Estate Crisis”.  
 
2.1 Introduction  
The financial wellbeing of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), as reflected in the above 
quotation, is highly dependent on the availability of credit. They are not insulated from credit 
crunches and in the current tight credit market, a primary concern of financially constrained 
REITs is their ability to access capital and maintain adequate liquidity to refinance maturing loans 
and fund capital expenditures. Scholars have theorized that bank lines of credit can play an 
important role to insure firms against credit crunches. Unlike a term loan that is arranged as and 
when a firm needs funding from the bank, line of credit is a legally binding contract that is 
arranged in advance.1 Under a loan commitment contract, the lender agrees to extend credit at the 
borrower’s request up to some pre-specified amount over a given time period. The pre-arranged 
credit line, which functions very much like cash reserves or financial slack, permits the borrower 
to move quickly and confidentially to take advantage of investment opportunities. Furthermore, it 
is argued that the loan commitment explicitly provides insurance against credit rationing since the
                                                             
1 Note that bank lines of credit, commitment loans, or revolving credit lines are used interchangeably. 
Essentially, they are prearranged loans which allow the borrowers to draw certain amount of loans under a 
stipulated pricing with certain period. To compensate lenders, commitment loans typically carry various 
fees, such as upfront fees (collected at origination of the commitment), annual fees (collected at the 
beginning of each year), and commitment fees (collected at the end of each year and assessed on the 
average unused balance for the year). In contrast, spot loans only include upfront and annual fees (see Qi 
and Shockly, 2006).  
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 bank is precluded from denying a funding request on the basis of a decline in the capital market 
conditions. Supporting the insurance hypothesis, Sofianos, Wachtel and Melnik (1990) and 
Morgan (1994, 1998) find that the aggregate level of loan commitments (as compared to non-
commitment loans) are less susceptible to changes in the credit market conditions. 
A limitation in earlier studies using macro-level data is the inability to control for the 
credit risk of individual firms, which may decline in varying degrees following adverse 
developments in the credit market. This is an important consideration since most loan 
commitment contracts contain “materially adverse change” (MAC) clauses which may hamper 
the ability of firms, particularly those who are in breach of the financial covenants, to draw down 
on their established credit lines. Sufi (2009) recently observes that firms in violation of a 
covenant in their credit lines losses access to about 15 to 30% of their credit lines capacity. In 
other words, lines of credit are poor liquidity substitute for certain firms. Finding that more 
stressed banks disbursed fewer funds to existing commercial borrowers under pre-committed 
formal lines of credit, Huang (2009) contends that credit lines only provide contingent and partial 
insurance for some borrowers during the subprime mortgage crisis. 
Thus, an important question to investigate is whether firms can actually draw down on 
their lines of credit when they need them most, particularly in a tight credit market or when they 
suffered a dramatic decline in their credit quality. In this study, we examine the effectiveness of 
bank lines of credit in protecting firms from market-wide credit rationing and from firm-level 
deterioration of credit worthiness. Concentrating on the insurance roles of loan commitments, two 
insurance-related hypotheses are tested: The first hypothesis relates to protection against credit 
rationing at the macro-level due to tightness in the capital market, whilst the second hypothesis 
relates to protection against credit risk at the firm-level due to decline in the credit quality of 
individual firms. To provide a more direct test on the effectiveness of the insurance shield 
purportedly offered by bank lines of credit, we concentrate our investigation on the ability of 
firms to draw down on existing credit lines. In practice, most borrowers do not utilize the full 
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credit line at origination as this would defeat the purpose of using credit lines as a hedge against 
future financial flexibility. The empirical evidence on utilization of loan commitments at the 
corporate level is scant with prior studies concentrating largely on the origination of credit lines.2   
We employ a panel data set which facilitates a dynamic analysis of the credit line 
utilization decisions of a cross-section of financially constrained firms over time. This 
complements prior studies which examined the aggregate amount of credit lines issued over time. 
Specifically, our data set covers 8,267 firm-quarter observations covering 273 REITs publicly 
traded between 1992 and 2007. The panel nature of the data is advantageous in allowing an 
examination on the switching role of loan commitments in differing market conditions. In a 
normal credit market, loan commitments may play a more significant role as a short-term source 
of bridging finance for new investments. However, in a tight credit market, loan commitments 
may function more as a hedging instrument against refinancing risks.  
The current study focuses on REITs because the theory suggests that bank lines of credit 
play a more important role in the financial management of financially constrained firms. Most 
REITs have low financial reserves because they are required to disburse at least 90% of their net 
income as dividends. Their sensitivity to credit market illiquidity is further exacerbated by the 
fact that real estate investment, which is the principal activity of REITs, requires huge capital 
commitments. REITs are, therefore, more vulnerable to the under-investment problem 
highlighted by Myers (1984) and their performance are highly susceptible to the availability and 
cost of credit.3 The data indeed underlined the significant role loan commitments played in the 
                                                             
2 An exception is Agarwal, Ambrose and Liu (2006) who study the utilization rate of consumer credit lines. 
There are, however, a number of important differences that exist between consumer credit lines and 
corporate credit lines. Besides involving smaller amount, consumer credit lines do not have upfront 
commitment fees, which are common in business credit lines. Furthermore, unlike business credit line that 
is unsecured, consumer credit line is collateralized by the borrower’s principal residence.  
 
3 Ott, Riddigiouh and Yi (2005) observe that only 7% of REITs’ investments are funded by retained 
earnings, as compared to 70% be general firms. Another sector that is highly dependent on the availability 
of bank credit is the homebuilding industry. In a recent study, Ambrose and Peek (2008) find that a 
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liquidity management of REITs: Used lines of credit represent 18.0% of the sector’s total debt. At 
any time, 41.5% of the lines of credit are drawn down, leaving an unutilized float of 58.5%. The 
size of the unused portion is approximately 8.9% of the total assets of the sector. Scaling the 
unused credit balance by the sum of unused lines and cash, bank liquidity represents 73.8% of 
total liquidity available to REITs, which is much higher than the 45% registered by general firms 
(Sufi, 2009).4   
The empirical tests are carried out in three stages. In the first part, we analyze the credit 
utilization of the REIT sector at the aggregate level using a vector autoregression (VAR) model. 
Second, fixed-effects panel regressions as well as discrete choice logistic regressions are 
employed to study the impact of credit crisis on the utilization of credit lines by individual REITs 
over the sample period. Next, focusing our attention on smaller and riskier REITs, we test 
whether they would be able to enjoy the same insurance protection afforded by bank lines of 
credit to larger and less risky firms. To preview our results, the empirical evidence supports the 
insurance hypothesis. Loan commitment is indeed an important avenue for REITs to hedge 
against credit rationing during a capital crunch or against a fall in credit quality. The regression 
results show that REITs use more loan commitments as compared to spot loans in tight capital 
markets. Their reliance on loan commitments also increases after a decline in their credit 
worthiness. The logistic regression modeling the probability of individual REITs increasing their 
loan commitments also yield results consistent with the insurance-related hypotheses of credit 
lines. We also observe that REITs seek to extend their credit limit when they expect a future 
decline in their credit quality. However, the effectiveness of the insurance protection is qualified 
in the case of small and risky firms which may not get to establish credit lines or expand existing 
ones in the first place. Furthermore, even if they succeed, their ability to draw down on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
sustained decline in the large private homebuilders’ market share from 1988 to 1993 corresponded with a 
reduction of lending activities by the local banks.  
4 Our preliminary inspection of credit lines utilization and size of credit lines do not reveal any systematic 
pattern across different types of REITs.  
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establishing the credit lines subsequently may still be restricted in a credit crisis. Other 
supplementary results of the empirical tests reinforce the importance of bank lines of credit in 
liquidity management and investment funding of REITs. REITs that have more cash holdings are 
less likely to utilize their loan commitments, whilst REITs undertaking new investments are 
likely to draw down on their credit lines.  
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 2.2, we present a review of the 
literature. In Section 2.3, we outline our research design and data. In Section 2.4, we discuss the 
empirical results. In Section 2.5, we examine the effectiveness of the insurance protection across 
different firms. Section 2.6 concludes.  
 
2.2 Literature Review  
Data reported by the Federal Reserve in May 2008 shows that commitment loans constitute 75.4% 
of all commercial and industrial loans issued by commercial banks over the past eleven years. 
The remaining one-quarter of the loans are issued as spot loan contracts. Although they may cost 
more in the form of an up-front commitment fee as well as a non-usage fee, credit lines are 
generally perceived as being more flexible and convenient than spot loans. Numerous theories 
have been developed to explain the popularity of loan commitments, both from the viewpoints of 
the lenders (supply) and the borrowers (demand).  
From the suppliers’ perspective, one major strand in the banking literature postulates that 
loan commitments help to resolve adverse selection (Thakor and Udell, 1987; Shockley and 
Thakor, 1997) and moral hazard problems (Boot, Thakor and Udell, 1987) associated with 
commercial loans issued in the spot market. Capital structure theories prescribe that high interest 
rate associated with debt motivates borrowers to select high risk projects (asset substitution 
problem) or reduce their level of effort (moral hazard problem). Boot, Thakor and Udell’s (1987) 
model shows that loan commitments can resolve this dilemma since a borrower will only draw 
down on his credit line if the current spot rate is higher than the interest rate pre-fixed in the loan 
Chapter Two  Bank Lines of Credit 
16 
 
commitment contract. The interest concession would also mitigate any potential underinvestment 
problem. Other “supply-based” reasoning in favor of loan commitments include the commercial 
banks gaining credibility by honoring promises made under the credit lines (Boot, Thakor and 
Udell, 1991), managing uncertain loan demands more efficiently (Greenbaum, Kanatas and 
Venezia, 1991), and enjoying cost advantages over other financial institutions (Gatev and Strahan, 
2006).  
From the borrowers’ perspective, loan commitments are essentially viewed as an 
insurance policy against credit tightening, which could result from either a dramatic deterioration 
in the borrower’s own credit worthiness (Campbell, 1978; James, 1981; Thakor, Hong and 
Greenbaum, 1981; Hawkins, 1982; Thakor, 1982) or a credit crunch in the capital market 
(Blackwell and Santomero, 1982; Melnik and Plaut, 1986; Sofianos, Wachtel, and Melnik, 1990; 
Avery and Berger, 1991; Berger and Udell, 1992; Morgan, 1994, 1998). For example, Thakor, 
Hong and Greenbaum (1981) model credit lines as a put option with the face value of the credit 
lines as the striking price. Borrower has financial incentive to borrow from spot market when 
their credit quality improves (option is out-of-money) and switch to credit lines for a lower rate 
when their credit quality deteriorates (option is in-the-money). In practice, loan commitment 
contracts normally contain a “material adverse change” (MAC) clause - under which banks can 
revoke or change the terms of the credit lines. Although the presence of the MAC clause 
theoretically reduces a firm’s protection against future credit deterioration, Melnik and Plaut 
(1986), Ergungor (2000) and Sufi (2009) noted that lenders seldom invoke the MAC clause due 
to high legal and reputation costs. 
Empirically, the results using macro-level data are mixed. Whilst Berger and Udell (1992) 
failed to find any empirical support for the insurance hypothesis, Morgan (1998) observes that 
tight credit policy slows the growth of spot loan but has no impact on the growth of loan 
commitments at the aggregate level. Sofianos, Wachtel and Melnik (1990) similarly find that 
monetary policy has a significant impact on spot loans, but not on loan commitments.  In a recent 
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study on bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) 
document an increase in drawdowns of revolving credit facilities, and many of these drawdowns 
were undertaken by low credit quality firms concerned about their access to funding. They also 
noted that many firms which drew down their credit lines interestingly kept the proceeds in low-
yielding cash, which leads to a “negative carry”. The authors, nevertheless, justified that such 
actions may still be viewed as rational given the borrowers’ concern on the future ability of the 
banks to honor their loan commitments. In a parallel study, Huang (2009) finds that more stressed 
banks disbursed fewer funds to existing commercial borrowers under precommitted formal lines 
of credit. Observing that the impacts were concentrated on smaller, riskier, and shorter-
relationship borrowers, the author suggests that credit lines provided only contingent and partial 
insurance for some borrowers during the crisis. Thus, he contended that loan commitments may 
not be as committed as they seem and credit lines are not perfect substitute for cash holding, 
particularly in a credit crisis. An important question to ask is “can bank lines of credit protect 
financially constrained REITs against a credit crisis?” 
To our knowledge, the insurance role of credit line has not been tested explicitly in the 
context of REITs. The closest studies to ours are recent studies by Hardin and Hill (2011) and 
Case, Hardin and Wu (2012) who provide descriptive evidence on REITs’ credit lines utilization 
patterns during financial crisis 2008-2009. Although they did not focus on the insurance role of 
credit line, these studies show that credit lines utilization increases during the 2008 and 2009 
financial crisis. In another study, Riddiough and Wu (2009) conclude that constraints on retention 
of cash flow distort REITs’ investment decisions. Observing that REITs manage their liquidity 
through dividend policy and access to short-term bank finance, especially bank lines of credit, 
they conclude that REITs use bank lines of credit as a substitute for cash. Hardin et al. (2009) and 
Hill, Kelly and Hardin (2012) have also examined the substitutability between credit lines and 
cash holding. The above studies focus on the liquidity role of bank lines of credit where cash and 
credit lines are viewed as substitutes. Within this theoretical framework, the relative speed and 
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flexibility offered by credit lines enables firms to take advantage of investment opportunities that 
would disappear if they had to obtain approval from spot-market loans (Martin and Santomero, 
1997).  
In contrast, our current study examines the question of whether REITs are able draw 
down on their credit lines in a credit crisis, either due to a decline in their credit standing or a 
tightening of credit in the capital markets. The ability of individual REITs to drawdown on 
established credit lines during a credit crisis will determine whether they are insulated from 
market-wide rationing and or firm-level credit risk deterioration. For the insurance protection to 
be valid, their credit line utilization should be related positively to such events.  
 
2.3 Research Design and Data  
2.3.1 Research Hypotheses  
The option model of credit lines (Thakor, Hong and Greenbaum, 1981) predicts that firms will 
use more loan commitments when their credit quality deteriorates because the put option is in-
the-money. On the other hand, they will issue more spot loan when their credit quality improves 
because the put option is out-of-money. Ergungor (2000) theorizes that the choice of spot loans 
versus credit lines is conditional on credit market liquidity and predicts that borrowers will opt for 
credit lines over spot loans during tight credit markets.  
In sum, the main implication of the insurance story is that the credit utilization rate would 
increase, vis-à-vis the spot loan, following a decline in the borrower’s credit quality. And at the 
macro-level, the demand for loan commitments is expected to be inversely correlated with the 
level of credit liquidity in the capital market. This leads to our two hypotheses pertaining to the 
drawdown of credit lines: 
 
Hypothesis 1: REITs are more likely to draw down on their credit lines during a tight 
credit market. 




Hypothesis 2: The credit line utilization rate is inversely related to changes in the 
REIT’s credit quality in the preceding period.  
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that REITs will draw down their bank lines of credit in a tight 
credit market. We follow Gatev and Strahan (2006) in using the paper-bill spread, which is 
defined as the difference between interest rate on 3-month commercial paper of high-grade (Aa) 
nonfinancial borrowers and the 3-month treasury-bill, as a proxy for market liquidity. Figure 2.1 
charts the paper-bill spread between 1992:Q1 to 2007:Q4. There are three distinct peaks in which 
the spread were close to or exceeded 100 basis points, namely 1998:Q3, 2001:Q3, and 2007:Q3. 
The first peak in 1998 coincided with the Long-term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund 
debacle; the second peak in 2001 corresponded with market uncertainties following the 911 
terrorism attack and the burst of the dot.com bubble; whilst the latest peak from 2007 onwards is 
associated with the credit crunch following the subprime crisis. Since we are interested in the role 
of loan commitments during periods where rationing is occurring in the capital markets, a time-
varying binary variable, Credit Crunch, is created.5 Based on Hypothesis 1, we predict this 














                                                             
5 The variable “Credit crunch” equals unity if the paper-bill spread is within the top 10% percentile of 
observations; zero, otherwise. The conclusions do not change materially when the 25% top percentile are 
used as the cut-off points. If any, the results become even stronger.   
 




Figure 2.1: Paper-bill spread during 1992Q1-2007Q4 
This chart tracks the paper-bill spread from 1992:Q1 to 2007:Q4. The paper-bill spread is defined as the 





Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms will use more credit lines following a credit quality 
decline. Credit quality is represented by the firms’ earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization (EBITDA) coverage ratio, which is frequently relied upon by lenders and rating 
agencies to evaluate a firm’s credit worthiness and repayment capacity. A high EBITDA 
coverage means a high credit quality REIT.6 We measure the ex-post change in credit quality as 
the difference in the individual REIT’s credit quality (∆Credit Quality t-2,t-1), and predict that it 




                                                             
6 In addition to EBITDA coverage, we also employed other measures of credit quality, such as return on 
assets and EBITDA scaled by total assets. As the results are not materially different, we do not report them 
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2.3.2 Sample  
The study period covers 64 quarters from 1992:Q1 to 2007:Q4. The length of the study period 
enables us to consider the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the credit limits and utilization 
of REITs as well as the shifting roles of lines of credit in different market conditions.  
Quarterly data on the financial characteristics of the individual REITs, such as firm size, 
growth opportunities, profitability and leverage ratio, are extracted from SNL database. From the 
same database, we also collected data on whether the REIT has access to a line of credit and if so, 
the used and unused portion of the line of credit. Information on the individual firm’s loan 
commitments and utilizations are supplemented by the individual REIT’s quarterly (10-Q) and 
annual (10-K) filings to the SEC. Data on the macroeconomic variables are obtained from 
Datastream and Federal Reserve database.   
After omitting observations with missing values and outliers,7 the unbalanced panel data 
consists of 8,267 firm-quarter observations covering 273 REITs publicly traded between 1992:Q1 
and 2007:Q4. Out of these, 10.4% of the observations did not have any established line of credit. 
The summary statistics in Table 2.1 indicate that REITs without credit lines are typically smaller, 
less profitable, have lower growth opportunity, and have limited access to the public debt market. 
Conversely, REITs with established lines of credit tend to be larger, are more profitable, have 
more growth opportunity, and have better access to public debt market.8 The cash holdings of 
REITs with credit lines are also lower at 2% of their total assets, as opposed to 6% of total assets 
for REITs without credit lines. The F-test indicates that the differences in the means across the 
two groups are statistically significant.  
                                                             
7 Consistent with Riddiough and Wu (2009), we adopt the following filters to omit observations with 
extreme values: Market-to-book ratio less than zero or more than 5.0; change in net real estate investments 
below -100% or above 300%; used lines of credit-total assets ratio less than zero or more than 2.0; lines of 
credit-total asset less than zero or more than 2.0; and cash holdings exceeding 50% of total assets. We also 
omit return on asset with value of less than -100% and more than 100%.  
 
8 These results are consistent with a recent study by Hardin and Wu (2010) who show that REITs with 
banking relationships are more likely to obtain long-term debt ratings and subsequently issue public debt. 
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of REITs with and without bank lines of credit 
This table compares the firm characteristics of 7,409 firm-quarters with establised bank lines of credit 
against the corresponding financial characteristics of 858 firm-quarters without any established line of 
credit. The unbalanced panel data covers 273 REITs over a 15-year period (Q1:1992 - Q4:2007). Asset 
growth rate refers to the 5-year compound annual growth rate of the individual REITs’ total assets.  
 






Firm size     
  Market  capitalization (US$ million) 1,227.8 121.1 *** 
  Total assets (US$ million) 1,902.9 206.1 *** 
  Listed at NYSE (0,1) 0.90 0.36 *** 
Growth Opportunity    
  Market-to-book ratio 1.25 1.09 *** 
  Asset growth (%) 22.39 8.59 *** 
Profitability    
  EBIT/total assets 0.07 0.06 *** 
  EBITDA/total assets 0.10 0.08 *** 
  ROA (%) 3.74 3.01 *** 
Debt Capacity    
  Debt/total assets 0.49 0.32 *** 
  Spot/total assets  0.40 0.31 *** 
  S&P rating (0,1) 0.33 0.02 *** 
  Cash/total assets 0.02 0.06 *** 
No of Observation 7,409 858  
 
*** The figures reported in the first and second columns are statistically distinct at the 1 per cent level 
using the mean comparison test with equal variances.  
 
The summary statistics of total loan commitments as well as the used and unused portion 
of the line of credit for the sample of 8,267 firm-quarter observations are reported in Table 2.2. It 
highlights the importance of credit lines in the debt policy and liquidity management of REITs. 
Bank credit lines, on the whole, represent large amounts of used and unused debt capacity of 
REITs. On average, the data shows that total line of credit represents 16.3% of total assets; the 
unused portion represents 8.9 % of total assets and the used portion represents 7.4%. As a 
proportion of the outstanding debt balances, used lines of credit represent 18.0%. Thus, any study 
on the capital structure on REITs should also consider the role of loan commitments.  
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Table 2.2: The importance of bank lines of credit to REITs 
This table reports several measures to assess the importance of bank lines of credit in the debt policy and 
financial management of an unbalanced panel of 273 REITs from Q1:1992 to Q4:2007. The reported 
figures represent the mean and median values for the full sample, as well as sub-samples by having a 
corporate credit rating, and by having debt outstanding. 
 
Panel A Full sample 
Firms without 
credit rating  
Firms with 
credit rating  
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Established line of credit (0,1) 0.896 1.000 0.855 1.000 0.995 1.000 
Line of credit/total assets 0.163 0.146 0.172 0.154 0.141 0.136 
   Unused line of credit/total assets 0.089 0.072 0.090 0.069 0.085 0.075 
   Used line of credit/total assets 0.074 0.051 0.081 0.054 0.056 0.048 
   Used line of credit/total debts* 0.180 0.110 0.208 0.121 0.115 0.096 
Non-commitment bank loans/total assets 0.396 0.414 0.435 0.458 0.376 0.372 
Line of credit/total liquidity 0.797 0.944 0.753 0.939 0.901     0.955 
Unused line of credit/unused liquidity 0.738 0.887 0.692 0.868 0.850 0.918 
Utilization rate of lines of credit#  0.415 0.426 0.434 0.458 0.376 0.372 
Number of Observations 8,267 5,835 2,432 




Firms without  
any outstanding debt  
 Mean Median 
Established line of credit (0,1) 0.208 0.000 
Line of credit/total assets 0.034 0.000 
Line of credit/total liquidity 0.140 0.000 
Number of Observations 337 
 
The statistics reported in the last two columns of Table 2.2 indicate that bank lines of 
credit remain an important part of debt policy for firms that have access to public debt. 
Specifically, bank loan commitments represent 14.1% of total assets and 11.5% of total debt 
employed by REITs that have access to public debt. Furthermore, Panel B of Table 2.2 shows that 
20.8% of the firm-quarters that have no debt outstanding still have access to lines of credit and 
the average size of their lines of credit represents 3.4% of total assets. 
To highlight the importance of lines of credit in corporate liquidity management of 
REITs, two additional measures of liquidity are reported. The first measure is the total line of 
credit limit scaled by the sum of total lines of credit and cash. The second measure is the unused 
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line of credit balance scaled by the sum of unused lines and cash. 9 By either measure, bank 
liquidity represents, respectively, 79.7% and 73.8% of total liquidity available to REITs, which is 
significantly higher than 51% and 45% for general firms (Sufi, 2009). This confirms that bank 
credit line is an important instrument in the corporate liquidity management of REITs. Figure 2.2, 
nevertheless, shows that since 1998Q3, the proportion of bank lines of credit over total debts has 
declined, corresponding to an increased popularity of public debts with REITs. Wu, for example, 
(2005) reported that public debts overtook equity financing as a source of financing for REITs 
during the period 1999-2003. Following the recent dissipation of capital from the public debt 
market, it is anticipated that credit lines of credit will regain their prominence.    
 
Figure 2.2: Commitment loans and non-commitment loans by REITs (1992:Q1-2007:Q4)  
This chart tracks the commitment loans and non-commitment loans employed by the REIT sector from 
1992:Q1 to 2007:Q4. Commitment loans refer to the utilized portion of credit lines scaled by total assets. 
Non-commitment loans refer to outstanding debts that are issued in the spot market, which is also scaled by 
total assets. The reported figures are median values.  
 
 
Note that the last row of Table 2.2 (Panel A) reports the utilization rate of lines of credit 
established by REITs. This refers to the percentage of a firm’s committed credit line that was 
actually drawn down in a given quarter. On average, 41.5% of the established bank credit lines 
                                                             
9 The first measure takes into account mechanical endogeneity concerns that certain types of firms 
consistently draw down heavily on existing lines of credit, whilst the second measure captures the fraction 
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are drawn down at any point in time. This leaves an unutilized float of 58.5%. In comparison, 
Martin and Santomero (1997) reported that non-REIT firms utilize 65% of their credit lines, 
indicating that they maintain a smaller unutilized float as compared to REITs. This observation 
further strengthened our argument that lines of credit play a more important role in the case of 
financially constrained REITs.  
 
2.4  Results  
2.4.1 Time Trend Analysis  
In Figure 2.3, we chart the utilization rate of credit lines against the corresponding movements in 
the paper-bill spread. The insurance role of bank lines of credit prescribes that unutilized 
commitment protects the firms from credit rationing in a market-wide liquidity crunch. Thus, a 
positive relationship between utilization rate and the paper-bill spread is expected. The general 
pattern in Figure 2.3 indeed suggests that the aggregate demand for loan commitments of the 
REIT sector is correlated with liquidity in the credit market. At the end of the study period, the 
aggregate credit line utilization of the REIT sector increased from 23% (2006:Q4) to 33% 
(2007:Q4). This coincided with a tight credit market following the sub-prime mortgage market 
crisis, which caused the paper-bill spread to rise from 35bs (2007:Q2) to 128bs in 2007:Q4. 
Similarly in 1998, the credit lines usage went up from 40% (1998:Q1) to 57% (1998:Q3) when 
the market experienced another credit crunch. However, the anticipated upward pattern in the 
utilization rate during the 2001:Q3 credit crunch was not evident probably because the adverse 






                                                             
10 Greenspan (2008), for instance, reported that the US economy rebounded fairly quickly and the jobless 
rate stabilized at their pre-911 level by end 2001. 
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Figure 2.3: Utilization rate of credit lines by REITs (1992:Q1-2007:Q4)  
This chart tracks the credit utilization rate of REITs from 1992:Q1 to 2007:Q4. Credit utilization rate refers 
to the median percentage of the REIT sector’s committed line of credit that was actually drawn down. The 
second line in the chart represents the paper-bill spread, which refers to the difference in yield between a 3-
month Aa commercial paper and the corresponding yield on a 3-month treasury-bill. The left vertical axis is 
the reference point to paper-bill spread movement while the right vertical axis serve as reference point for 
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where dTime is the time trend while u is the error term. The insurance hypothesis implies a 
positive causality between paper-bill spread and credit utilization rate. The results presented in 
Table 2.3 indeed show the expected positive coefficient for paper-bill spread, but it is not 
statistically significant. This suggests that, at the aggregate level, credit lines may not be 
                                                             
11 Vector autoregression (VAR) is a technique for examining dynamic interactions among a set of variables 
without imposing any prior restrictions on the specification. All the variables in a system suggested by 
economic theory are regressed on lagged values of both themselves and the other variables in the system. 
See Sofianos, Wachtel and Melnik (1990) who estimated a VAR model to examine the impact of loan 
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completely effective in shielding REITs from the effects of capital rationing during a tight credit 
market.12  In the next section, we will examine the credit line utilization rate of REITs at the firm 
level to get a better understanding on when and who can really exercise the option to draw down 
their lines of credit after origination. 
 
Table 2.3: OLS estimation of single equation in the unrestricted VAR model  
The VAR model on credit line utilization was estimated using quarterly data for period 2Q1992 to 2007Q4. 
T-statistics values are reported in parentheses, whist *** refer to statistical significance at 1%.  
 




Paper-bill spread t-1  4.850 
 (1.130) 
Utilization t-1 0.632*** 
 (6.328) 
Time trend 0.016 
 (0.217) 
Overall R2 0.44 
Number of Observations 63 
 
 
2.4.2 Determinants of Credit Line (versus Spot Loans) Utilization 
The dependent variable in our regression models is the individual REIT’s outstanding loan 
commitments scaled by total debt in the particular period. Conditional on debt funding being 
employed in the REIT’s capital structure, this is synonymous with the firm’s choice between spot 
loans versus commitment loans. The explanatory variables included in our estimation models are 
motivated by the two research hypotheses and prior studies as outlined earlier. In particular, the 
two main research hypotheses are formulated to examine the effectiveness of bank lines of credit 
                                                             
12 Prior to running the VAR model, we carried out the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to check the 
unit root for the two time-series. Furthermore, the lag length of one was chosen based on the Akaike (AIC) 
and Schwarz (SBC) criterion. Nevertheless, we also reestimated the VAR model using alternative lag 
length and scaling the credit line drawdown by total assets. In all the estimates, the coefficient for paper-bill 
spread is statistically insignificant. The test results are not reported here for brevity reason but can be 
obtained from the author upon request.    
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in shielding REITs from firstly, a market-wide credit rationing, and secondly, a credit squeeze at 
the firm-level due to deterioration in credit quality.  
On the premise that credit lines and cash are substitutes, a negative relation between the 
REITs’ cash holding and the likelihood of drawing down on existing credit lines is predicted. 
Cash holding is represented by the sum of cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets of the 
individual REITs. Additional variables are incorporated into the regression models to control for 
firm size, age, leverage, credit quality and growth opportunities. Firm size is represented by the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets, whilst age is represented by the natural logarithm of 
the years since the IPO date of the individual firms. Leverage is measured by the debt-equity ratio 
of the firm. Credit quality is represented by the firm’s interest coverage ratio. Growth 
opportunities are represented by the market-to-book value (M/B) ratio of the individual REITs.13 
The regression models also control for likely positively influence of the stock market 
performance, which is represented by the S&P 500 index’s returns over the preceding two 
quarters. We also control for interest rate volatility, which is represented by the standard 
deviation of 7-year government bond yield over the past twelve months. Based on option pricing 
theory, the option value associated with a credit line should be more valuable in a more volatile 
interest rate environment (see Thakor, Hong and Greenbaum, 1981).   
To recap, the definition and summary statistics of the dependent and explanatory 
variables are summarized in Table 2.4. The pair-wise correlation matrix of the explanatory 
variables is reported in Table 2.5. The magnitude of the variance-inflating factors (VIF) of 1.09 -





                                                             
13  In addition to M/B ratio, we also used the compound annual growth rate of the individual REIT over the 
preceding 5 years as well as net increase in the individual REIT’s real estate investment holding in the next 
period (scaled by total assets). Again, the estimation results are robust to the different measures used to 
represent growth opportunities. 
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Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of variables  
The descriptive statistics are based on a final sample of 7,188 firm-quarters.  
 
Variables  Definition  Mean  Std.Dev. Minimum Maximium 
Dependent Variables      
Loan commitment ratio t Outstanding loan commitments 
scaled by total debt.  
0.176 0.215 0.000 1.000 
Firm Characteristics       
∆Credit quality t-1, t Change in EBITDA coverage  -0.070 2.018 -31.630 31.380 
Credit quality t-1 Measured as EBITDA without 
capitalized interest scaled by interest 
expenses 
3.840 3.989 -36.000 49.260 
Size t-1 The natural logarithm of total assets  5.883 0.595 3.719 7.419 
Leverage t-1 Total debt scaled by total equity 2.008 4.551 0.000 96.640 
Growth opportunity t-1 (Total assets-total equity+ market 
capitalization)/Total assets 
1.215 0.306 0.323 3.676 
Cash holding t-1 Cash and cash equivalent scaled by 
total assets 
0.020 0.036 0.000 0.470 
Age t-1 The natural logarithm 1+ year since 
IPO 
0.897 0.394 0.000 1.681 
Macroeconomic Factors      
Paper-bill spread t Non-financial 3-month Aaa CP rate 
minus 3-month T-bill rate 
0.263 0.331 -0.400 1.500 
Interest volatility t Standard deviation of 7-year 
government bond yield over the 
preceding 12 mths. 
0.387 0.147 0.173 0.802 
Stock market return t Price appreciation of the S&P 500 
index over the last two quarters 
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Table 2.5: Pearson Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables  
This table presents a matrix of the pair-wise correlations of the explanatory variables in the regression models. Definitions of the variables are given in Table 3. 






quality t-1, t 
Credit 
quality t 
Size t Leverage t Growth 
opportunity t  
Cash 
holding t 






∆Credit quality t-1,t 1.000         1.136 
Credit quality t 0.285 1.000        1.300 
Size t -0.005 -0.115 1.000       1.190 
Leverage t 0.002 -0.130 0.088 1.000      1.087 
Growth opportunity t 0.012 0.139 0.096 0.134 1.000     1.205 
Cash holding t 0.032 0.112 -0.271 -0.002 0.042 1.000    1.064 
Age t 0.015 -0.039 0.169 0.009 0.127 -0.081 1.000   1.087 
Paper-bill spread t -0.002 -0.009 0.008 0.002 -0.092 -0.040 -0.009 1.000  1.100 
Interest  volatility t -0.012 0.052 -0.276 -0.031 -0.153 0.008 -0.220 0.100 1.000 1.235 
Stock market return t -0.006 0.035 -0.097 -0.024 0.075 -0.007 -0.107 -0.191 -0.208 1.136 
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The direction and strength of relationships between the explanatory variables and the dependent 
variable are determined using fixed-effects regression models.14 Table 2.6 reports the estimation 
results. Model 1, the base model, shows strong evidence that is consistent with the insurance role 
of lines of credit. In particular, we observe a positive and statistically significant coefficient for 
Credit Crunch, suggesting that REITs use more loan commitments in a tight capital markets. The 
results also show a negative and statistically significant coefficient for ∆Credit Qualityt-2,t-1, 
implying that REITs utilize more loan commitments after experiencing a decline in their credit 
worthiness. We find that the likelihood of using commitment loans is increasing with the quality 
of the borrower, as reflected the coefficients for firm size, credit quality and leverage. Firm age, 
however, have negative coefficients, which could be explained by the limited access of younger 















                                                             
14 Table 2.1 shows distinct differences between REITs with and without credit lines. Thus, credit line 
utilization is conditional on the individuals having access to bank credit in the first place. To control for the 
possibility of sample selection bias, we follow Agarwal, Ambrose and Liu (2006) in estimating the models 
using a two-stage Heckman selection procedure. The first stage involves the estimation of a probit model 
on the firm’s accessibility to credit line with the following explanatory variables: firm credit quality, size, 
leverage, growth opportunity, cash holding, age, and property-type dummies. The second stage introduces 
an additional selection variable, the inverse Mills ratio, as an explanatory variable to the main estimation 
equation. The results, not reported but available on request, are robust and do not alter the conclusions on 
the insurance role of credit lines in the context of REITs.   
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Table 2.6: Determinants of REIT’s credit lines utilization 
The table presents the estimation results of two-way (firm and quarter fixed effects) panel regression 
models to identify the determinants of credit lines utilization (vis-à-vis spot loans) by REITs between 1992 
and 2007. The dependent variable is defined as the individual REIT’s outstanding loan commitments scaled 
by total debt in the particular time period. The total number of observations is 7,297 firm-quarters. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses, whilst ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively.  
 
 
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2 
   
Constant  0.161*** 0.162*** 
 (2.65) (2.66) 
∆Credit quality t-2, t-1 -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-6.24) (-6.24) 
Credit quality t-1 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (8.36) (8.35) 
Size t-1 0.023** 0.023** 
 (2.10) (2.10) 
Leverage t-1 -0.001* -0.001* 
 (-1.88) (-1.88) 
Growth opportunity t-1 -0.024** -0.024** 
 (-2.08) (-2.07) 
Cash holding t-1 -0.653*** -0.654*** 
 (-9.13) (-9.13) 
Age t-1 -0.158*** -0.158*** 
 (-9.48) (-9.47) 
Interest  volatility t 0.036** 0.036** 
 (2.21) (2.20) 
Stock market return t 0.068*** 0.067*** 
 (3.36) (3.27) 
Credit crunch t 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (3.26) (3.27) 
∆Interest rate t-1  0.006 
  (0.45) 
R2 0.10 0.10 
Number of Obs 7,297 7,297 
 
In Model 2, we test the effectiveness of bank lines of credit to insure REITs against 
interest rate risk by incorporating interest rate change (∆Interest Ratet-1,t). The sign and statistical 
significance for the other explanatory variables are robust to the introduction of the new variable. 
The coefficient for the new variable is, however, not significant. This is consistent with Thakor 
(1982) who argue that credit lines do not provides firms any hedging benefits against fluctuation 
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in interest rate because credit lines, unlike fixed-rate loans, are typically quoted as a mark-up over 
a market interest rate.15  
 
2.4.3 Drawdowns on Credit Lines  
A drawback of the analysis in the previous section is that whilst the dependent variable is 
cumulative of the firm’s decisions over a number of years, the independent variables, particularly 
characteristics of the individual firms, are more contemporary in nature. On the basis that the 
marginal financing approach is more appropriate to test theories that rely on time-variation in 
firm characteristics (see Denis and Mihov, 2003, Ooi, Ong and Li, 2010), we employ an 
incremental approach to link actual credit lines utilization decisions with the firm’s characteristics 
prior to a material credit line utilization event.  
The incremental technique requires identification of specific incidents where individual 
REITs actually increased their loan commitments, which we did using the following criterion: 
First, the sum involved must be more than US$5 million, and second, the increased loan 
commitment must constitute at least 1% of total assets.16  Observations that passed this filter will 
be classified as having materially increased their credit utilization [1], whilst those that did not 
passed the test will be classified as the base group [0]. Using this filter, we managed to identify 
2,524 events where the loan commitment was increased materially between 1992 and 2007. This 
represented 29.3% of the firm-quarter observations, and their distribution over the study period is 







                                                             
15 Qi and Shockly (2006), similarly, observe that for both commitment and spot loans, firms consistently 
mark-up interest rates over a market-wide interest rate, such as LIBOR or prime rate. 
 
16 The regression results are robust to alternative cut-off points, namely US$10 million, US$20 million, and 
5% of total assets, used to identify “material increase” in credit line utilization.    
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Figure 2.4: Number of material loan commitment increases by REITs during 1992-2007.  
This chart plots the number of incidents where the outstanding loan commitments of individual REITs 
increased materially between 1992 and 2007. Only credit limit increases that involved more than US$5 
million and constituted at least 1% of the REIT’s total assets are classified as material events. In total, 





We employ the logistic regression model, which is suitable when the dependent variable 
involves a choice between two discrete alternatives, to determine which factors influence REITs’ 
decision (and timing) to draw down on their credit lines. In addition to the set of variables defined 
earlier in Table 2.4, we also include a set of property-type dummy variables on the right-hand 
side of the logistic models. Model 3 is the base model, whilst Model 4 includes the current credit 
line utilization rate as an additional control variable. This variable is expected to be negatively 
related to the likelihood of REITs raising additional loan commitment in the current period. 
Table 2.7 presents the estimation results of logistic regression models on the probability of 
individual REITs increasing their loan commitment. The sign and statistical significance for the 
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Table 2.7: Likelihood of REITs drawing down their Lines of Credit 
The table presents the estimation results of logistic regression on the probability of increase in credit lines 
utilization. The dependent variable is a binary variable equals to one if the REIT’s credit utilization 
increases materially. A material event refers to a net increase of more than US$ 5 million in the outstanding 
loan commitment of individual REITs. The sum involved must also be at least 1% of total assets. The 
independent variables are defined in Table 4. The unbalanced panel data covers 7,269 firm-quarter 
observations from 1992:Q1 to 2007:Q4. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses with the standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
  Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 
 Explanatory Variables  
    
Constant -3.960*** -1.976*** -2.396*** 
 (-11.14) (-5.10) (-5.96) 
∆Credit quality t-1, t -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.067*** 
 (-5.79) (-5.69) (-4.46) 
Credit quality t 0.009 -0.007 -0.010 
 (1.12) (-0.86) (-1.16) 
Size t 0.525*** 0.375*** 0.396*** 
 (10.53) (7.15) (7.33) 
Leverage t -0.034*** -0.025** -0.023** 
 (-2.93) (-2.42) (-2.26) 
Growth opportunity t 0.616*** 0.326*** 0.293*** 
 (6.33) (3.17) (2.78) 
Cash holding t -28.648*** -31.995*** -33.440*** 
 (-13.56) (-13.21) (-12.98) 
Age t -0.580*** -0.562*** -0.401*** 
 (-7.42) (-7.04) (-4.91) 
Interest  volatility t 0.327 0.463** 0.557*** 
 (1.59) (2.22) (2.63) 
Stock market return t 1.465*** 1.491*** 1.209*** 
 (4.83) (4.82) (3.87) 
Credit crunch t 0.154* 0.144* 0.150* 
 (1.92) (1.74) (1.79) 
Credit utilization rate t-1  -1.707*** -1.633*** 
  (-17.91) (-17.04) 
Net Investment t   3.211*** 
   (7.73) 
    
Property type dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.11 0.13 
Number of Obs 7,368 7,269 7,269 
    
  
The estimation results for our three key variables yield the same results as the static 
regressions in Table 2.6. Consistent with the insurance hypothesis that REITs experiencing a 
credit quality decline are more likely to draw down on the line of credits, we find a negative and 
Chapter Two  Bank Lines of Credit 
36 
 
statistically significant coefficient for ∆ Credit Quality t-1,t .17 Furthermore, the coefficient for 
Credit Crunch is positive and weakly significant. This is consistent with the prediction that 
REITs are more likely to draw down on their credit lines during a tight credit market.  
The evidence also indicates that REITs with more cash holdings are less likely to increase 
their loan commitment, whilst firms with high growth opportunities are more likely to drawdown 
on their credit lines. These observations support the liquidity role of bank lines of credit. Other 
firm characteristics that have significant influence on the likelihood of REITs drawing down their 
credit lines are firm age, size and leverage ratio. A negative and significant coefficient for firm 
age implies that younger firms are more dependent on loan commitments. Due to their short track 
record, they have limited access to public debt and hence, need to rely more on relationship-
banking. After controlling for firm age and other attributes, small-sized and highly leveraged 
REITs have lower propensity to draw down on their credit lines. These results imply that not all 
REITs have equal access to loan commitments, an issue which we will examine further in the 
next section. 
The results of Model 3 and Model 4 show that, all else being equal, REITs have a higher 
propensity to issue loan commitments in a rising stock market and when they have more growth 
opportunity. Since these two variables may be positively related to investment activities, we re-
estimate the logistic models with the inclusion of another explanatory variable, namely net 
investment activity of the firm in the same quarter. This serves as a check to ensure that our 
earlier results are not bias due to a missing variable. The results, reported under Model 5, show 
that the earlier findings, particularly the signs and statistical significance of the variables pinning 
                                                             
17 To test whether managers who may have inside information about firm quality and thus would increase 
usage prior to the release of information about a decline in quality, we also include the future credit change 
(∆ Credit quality t, t+2 ) in one of the regressions. Whilst the prior results are robust to the inclusion of the 
extra variable, the coefficient for the new variable is not statistically significant. Thus, we find no evidence 
that credit usage is a signal of future credit deterioration. Nevertheless, in the subsequent tests, we do 
observe that REITs do plan ahead by expanding their credit limit when they expect a future decline in their 
credit quality.   
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the two research hypotheses are robust. Thus, the credit line’s insurance and liquidity roles 
remain intact after controlling for investment activities undertaken by the individual firms. 
The coefficient for the new variable, Net Investment, is also statistically significant and 
positive. This implies that REITs that engaged in new investments in the same quarter are likely 
to draw down on credit lines. It reinforces the importance of loan commitments in supporting the 
growth and expansion of the REIT sector as observed by Riddiough and Wu (2009).18 Brown and 
Riddiough (2003) further posit that REITs employ credit lines to finance their investment and 
subsequently refinance the credit lines with public debt, which has longer maturity. To examine 
the dynamic relationship, Figure 2.5 tracks the credit utilization rate before and after a material 
acquisition event.19 The observed pattern of credit line utilization around an acquisition event 
again underscores the importance bank lines of credit play in supporting REITs’ investment 
activities. Interestingly, the chart shows the median utilization rate increasing dramatically to 52% 
on the event quarter (from 29.4% in the preceding quarter). Thereafter, the utilization rate 
declined gradually over the next four quarters before settling at around 40%, which is close to the 
long-term median utilization rate of 42%. It is likely that the recapitalization is conducted with 
the purpose of restoring the unused portion of the lines of credit and preserving financial 
flexibility to support future acquisitions. The post-event downward trend is consistent with 
Brown and Riddiough’s (2003) “bridging finance” story. Thus, REITs appear to employ lines of 
credit to take advantage of acquisition opportunities, and then refinance them with long-term 
bond or equity at appropriate time.  
 
                                                             
18 Campbell et al (2008), similarly, find REITs tend to establish new credit facilities in years when they 
have relatively large amounts of investments. They contend that REITs employ credit facilities to correct 
temporary shortfalls in funding caused by large investment needs. 
 
19 We identify an acquisition activity through the quarterly change in net real estate investment activity of 
individual REITs. Scaling the amount against total assets, an acquisition event is only classified as material 
if the ratio is equal to or bigger than 0.10. To avoid any confounding effects, only events that do not have 
any other material acquisitions one-year before and after the event are included. 
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Figure 2.5: Credit line utilization rate of REITs surrounding a material acquisition event.  
This chart tracks the credit line utilization rate surrounding a material acquisition event. An acquisition 
activity is identified by the quarterly change in the individual REIT’s net real estate investment activity 
scaled by total assets. An acquisition is only classified as material if the ratio is equal or bigger than 0.10. 
To avoid any confounding effects, only events that do not have any other material acquisitions one-year 




2.5 How Committed are the Loan Commitments?  
So far, the results of both the static and logistic regressions consistently support the insurance role 
of bank lines of credit. In particular, REITs drawdown on their credit lines even after they have 
experienced credit deterioration at the firm-level. This is consistent with the notion that although 
MAC clauses are included in loan commitment agreements, banks seldom invoke them (Ergungor, 
2000; Sufi, 2009). Nevertheless, we find some evidence in the earlier regressions suggesting that 
certain REITs may not be able draw down on their established credit lines; implying that the 
firms may not have equal access to loan commitments. To investigate this further, we introduce a 
set of interaction variables to examine the extent to which credit crisis, if it occurs, affects REITs 
differently. In particular, do some REITs enjoy the insurance protection associated with loan 
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2.5.1 Who Can Drawdown in a Credit Crisis?  
Firstly, we investigate the effectiveness of the insurance protection available for REITs of 
different sizes using interactive variables on change in credit quality (∆ Credit Quality). Ranking 
the REITs in our sample according to their size, and categorizing those in the bottom 25 
percentile as “Small Firms”, we then multiply this variable with “∆ Credit Quality” to isolate the 
insurance value of credit lines for small firms. The results, as reported under Model 6 in Table 
2.8, do not show any apparent differences. However, when the same variable is interacted against 
“Credit Crunch”, the results are revealing. The coefficient for the interactive variable “Small 
Firms*Credit Crunch” shows a strong negative sign. Unlike their larger counterparts, smaller 
REITs may not be able to drawdown their credit lines in an illiquid capital market. In other words, 
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Table 2.8: The effect of firm size and credit quality on REITs’ utilization of credit lines  
The table presents the estimation results of logistic model on the probability of REITs increasing their 
credit lines utilization. The dependent variable is a binary variable equals to one if the REIT’s credit 
utilization increases materially (defined as a net increase of more than US$ 5 million in the outstanding 
loan commitment of individual REITs and the sum involved must also be at least 1% of total assets). The 
right-hand side variables are defined in Table 4. In addition, the two proxies for the insurance hypotheses 
(∆Credit quality t-1, t and Credit cruncht) are interacted with Small firms and Low credit quality (REITs in 
the bottom 25 percentiles). The unbalanced panel data covers 7,269 firm-quarters from 1992:Q1 to 
2007:Q4. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses with the standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
 Explanatory Variables  
    
Constant -2.167*** -2.328*** -2.113*** 
 (-5.36) (-5.79) (-5.22) 
∆ Credit quality t-1, t -0.076*** -0.078*** -0.090*** 
 (-3.85) (-4.44) (-4.01) 
Credit quality t -0.010 -0.014 -0.013 
 (-1.15) (-1.59) (-1.53) 
Size t 0.355*** 0.392*** 0.353*** 
 (6.50) (7.25) (6.44) 
Leverage t -0.023** -0.020** -0.020** 
 (-2.27) (-2.06) (-2.07) 
Growth opportunity t 0.299*** 0.271*** 0.279*** 
 (2.84) (2.57) (2.64) 
Cash holding t -33.440*** -33.290*** -33.417*** 
 (-12.97) (-12.85) (-12.89) 
Age t -0.390*** -0.398*** -0.387*** 
 (-4.78) (-4.87) (-4.74) 
Interest  volatility t 0.570*** 0.541** 0.553*** 
 (2.68) (2.54) (2.59) 
Stock market return t 1.223*** 1.179*** 1.191*** 
 (3.90) (3.76) (3.79) 
Credit crunch t 0.227*** 0.248*** 0.317*** 
 (2.60) (2.69) (3.33) 
Credit utilization rate t-1 -1.644*** -1.638*** -1.649*** 
 (-17.11) (-17.08) (-17.16) 
Net Investment t 3.239*** 3.221*** 3.246*** 
 (7.91) (7.77) (7.94) 
Small firms*∆Credit quality t-1, t  0.031  0.037 
 (1.12)  (1.26) 
Small firms*Credit crunch t -1.032***  -0.988*** 
 (2.77)  (-2.68) 
Low credit quality*∆Credit quality t-1, t  0.091** 0.091** 
  (2.03) (2.17) 
Low credit quality * Credit crunch t   -0.461** -0.434** 
  (-2.32) (-2.17) 
    
Property type dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Number of Obs 7,269 7,269 7,269 
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In Model 7, we repeated the interactive tests using credit quality instead of firm size. As we had 
done previously, we first sort the REITs according to their credit quality, and categorized those in 
the bottom 25 percentile as “Low Credit”. These two variables are then interacted against 
“∆Credit Quality” and “Credit Crunch”. The estimation results for the interactive effects are 
stronger. Again, we find evidence that low credit quality REITs have problems drawing down on 
their credit lines in a tight credit market because they are more likely to breach the financial 
covenants attached to the credit lines. In addition, we find a strong positive coefficient for the 
interactive variable “Low Credit*∆Credit Quality”. When interpreted together with the 
coefficient for ∆Credit Quality, the results suggest that whilst most REITs may be able to call on 
their credit lines following a credit decline, this may not apply for REITs with low credit standing. 
Thus, banks may selectively invoke the MAC clause on some borrowers, particularly those with 
higher default risk.   
Model 8 in Table 2.8 include all the four interactive variables in the same logistic model. 
The results are essentially the same as those in Model 6 and Model 7. Overall, the regression 
results in Table 2.8 qualify the insurance coverage credit lines can offer to REITs against a credit 
crisis at both the firm- and market-level. Whilst large firms with high credit quality can still draw 
down on their lines of credit in bad times, risky firms may not be able to do so when capital is in 
shortage and expensive. Thus, the insurance role of loan commitments is not equal to all firms.  
 
2.5.2 Who can Increase their Credit Capacity?  
We now focus our attention on events where the credit lines of individual REITs are expanded. 
Our objective is to determine whether risky firms can actually get to increase their credit limit 
when facing a credit crisis. The main implication of the insurance story is that firms facing future 
credit risk, either at firm-specific level or at the broad market level, will try to hedge their 
position by arranging credit lines in advance. If the insurance hypothesis is correct, one could 
expect to see deterioration in the credit quality of borrowers following the issuance of credit lines. 
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Whilst the theory predicts that firms will be motivated to establish more lines of credit when they 
expect a worsening of the credit situation moving forward, the suppliers may be less willing to 
issue new or extend existing credit lines to them. Consequently, the relationship depends on the 
interaction between the two opposite forces.  
Concentrating on the marginal decisions of REITs to increase their credit limit, we 
identify 1,086 material lines of credit issuance events between 1992 and 2007.20 They represent 
12.1% of the total observations. As before, a logistic regression on the probability of the 
individual REITs increasing their credit limit is estimated. We include the utilization rate of credit 
line as an additional control variable and predict that it would have a positively related to credit 
lines expansion events. In addition, the credit quality of individual REITs is tracked to measure 
the ex-ante future change in credit quality, which we define as the difference in firm’s quarterly 
interest coverage ratio at (t+2) period minus (t) period to represent forward changes in the credit 
quality of the individual firms (∆Credit Qualityt,t+2). We predict REITs which anticipate problem 
raising funds in the near future due an expected decline in their credit quality would seek to 
preserve their financial flexibility by maintaining a higher unutilized float or by expanding their 
credit limit in the current period.  
The estimation results are presented in Table 2.9. The coefficient for ∆Credit Qualityt,t+2 
is negative and statistically significant, implying that REITs plan ahead by expanding their credit 
limit when they expect a future decline in their credit quality. This is consistent with the 
insurance hypothesis that firms will try to insure against a possible future deterioration in their 
credit quality by expanding their credit limit and retaining a higher unutilized credit float to 
                                                             
20 The following set of criterion was employed: The sum involved must be more than $5million and the 
increased credit limit must constitute at least 1% of total assets. Firm-quarters that passed this filter will be 
classified as having materially increased their credit limit [1], whilst those that did not passed the test will 
be classified as the base group [0].  
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preserve their financial flexibility.21 REITs are also more likely to increase their credit limit when 
the general stock market is doing well. In addition, newer firms with higher growth opportunities 
are also more inclined to increase their credit limit. Overall, these results are consistent with 
Agarwal, Ambrose and Liu’s (2006) contention that borrowers with high expectations of future 
credit demand would utilize a smaller percentage of total credit availability, all else being equal. 
This is because borrowers who value the flexibility afforded by ready access to credit will 
preserve the option for future credit by retaining that option to increase their credit line utilization. 
Underlining the importance of credit line as a corporate liquidity tool for REITs, we also observe 






























                                                             
21 This means that within a cross-section of firms, REITs expecting a future decline in their credit quality 
will place a higher value on credit line. REITs expecting a future increase in their credit quality, on the 
other hand, will place a lesser emphasis on credit line. Naturally, the presumption here is that managers 
could actually pre-empt their future credit quality deterioration.  
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Table 2.9: Probability of REITs’ expanding their lines of credit 
The table presents the estimation results of logistic regression on the probability of REITs expanding credit 
limits. The dependent variable is a binary variable equals to one if the REIT’s credit limit increases 
materially, which refers to a net increase of more than $ 5 million in the credit limit and the sum involved 
must also be at least 1% of total assets. The independent variables are defined in Table 4. The unbalanced 
panel data covers 6,722 firm-quarter observations from 1992:Q1 to 2007:Q4. Z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses with the standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * refer to statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
  Model 9 Model 10 
 Explanatory Variables Dependent Variable: Increase Credit Limit, [1,0] 
   
Constant  -3.623*** -3.968*** 
 (-7.15) (-7.52) 
∆ Credit quality t-1, t -0.006 0.028 
 (-0.42) (1.25) 
Credit quality t  0.014 0.011 
 (1.21) (0.96) 
Size t  0.236*** 0.220*** 
 (3.48) (3.13) 
Leverage t  -0.060* -0.053* 
 (-1.94) (-1.78) 
Growth opportunity t  0.667*** 0.617*** 
 (5.25) (4.67) 
Cash holding t -4.301*** -5.219*** 
 (-2.85) (-3.37) 
Age t  -0.732*** -0.503*** 
 (-6.70) (-4.60) 
Interest  volatility t 0.217 0.383 
 (0.77) (1.34) 
Stock market return t 1.400*** 1.101*** 
 (3.33) (2.57) 
Credit crunch t 0.022 0.160 
 (0.17) (1.11) 
Credit utilization rate t-1 0.620*** 0.772*** 
 (4.65) (5.63) 
∆ Credit quality t, t+2 -0.035** -0.031* 
 (-2.19) (-1.92) 
Net Investment t  3.100*** 
  (11.01) 
Small firms*∆Credit quality t-1, t   -0.036 
  (-1.19) 
Small firms*Credit crunch t  -0.299 
  (-1.19) 
Low credit quality*∆Credit quality t-1, t  0.015 
  (0.34) 
Low credit quality * Credit crunch t   -0.943** 
  (-2.03) 
   
Property type dummies Yes Yes 
R2 0.03 0.07 
Number of Obs 6,722 6,722 
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Interestingly, we observe that the coefficients for ∆Credit Qualityt-1,t and Credit Cruncht 
are not statistically significant. This indicates that REITs may not be able to expand their credit 
limits in a credit crisis. Furthermore, other firm characteristics that significantly impact the 
individual REIT’s propensity to raise their credit line limits are firm size, leverage, growth 
opportunity and cash holdings. Interpreting the signs of these variables collectively, they 
highlight the challenges faced by risky REITs to expand their credit limit.  
In summary, whilst credit lines can protect REITs against a credit crisis, the insurance 
protection is qualified in the sense that it may not accessible to all REITs all the time. Only those 
with low credit risk get to originate and expand their credit capacity. Furthermore, even when the 
credit lines are established, the firm’s ability to draw down is also dependent on their credit 
quality as well as the liquidity in the credit market. Thus, risky firms may not be able to rely on 
bank lines of credit to give them the necessary protection from a credit crisis. Our results are 
consistent with Huang (2009) who find that credit lines provided only contingent and partial 
insurance for some borrowers during the recent subprime mortgage crisis. Thus, credit lines are 
not perfect substitute for cash holdings.  
 
2.5.3  REIT Cash Holdings in a Credit Crisis  
In this segment, we extend the study to explore the connection between cash holdings and credit 
line usage. Table 2.10 presents the regression results for the determinants of REIT cash holdings. 
Model 11 is the base model.  Consistent with the hypothesis that credit line is a substitute for cash, 
REIT cash holdings are negatively related to credit line utilized. Similar to Hardin et al. (2009), 
we observe that larger firms hold less cash. The coefficient for stock market performance is also 
negative. Overall, these results suggest that REITs with greater access to the capital market tend 
to hold less cash. Firms with higher growth opportunity also hold more cash. The coefficients for 
Interest volatility and Credit crunch are negative, which is inconsistent with the notion that firms 
facing high cash flow uncertainty prefer to hold more cash to preserve their financial flexibility 
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(Opler et al., 1999). These results are nevertheless not surprising - as observed in Table 2.2, 
REITs rely heavily on credit line access for their liquidity management.  
 
Table 2.10: The determinants of REIT cash holdings  
The table presents the estimation results on the determinant of REIT cash holdings. The dependent variable 
is the cash holdings of individual REITs, which is defined as total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total 
assets. Models 11, 12 and 13 report the coefficient estimates from a two-way (firm and quarter fixed effects) 
panel regressions. Model 14 reports the estimation results of a two-stage least squares model where the line 
of credit use (Used line/Total assets) is instrumented with the lagged value of line of credit use. T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses, whilst ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.  
 




Model 14   
 Explanatory Variables 
Constant 0.115*** 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.101*** 
 (4.69) (4.63) (4.58) (15.74) 
Used line t/Total assets t -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.090*** 
 (-6.30) (-6.42) (-6.40) (-17.68) 
∆Credit quality t-1, t -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.04) (-0.02) (0.16) (0.76) 
Credit quality t 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.000 
 (2.32) (2.32) (2.33) (1.45) 
Size t -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** 
 (-3.29) (-3.03) (-2.98) (15.75) 
Leverage t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000** 
 (-0.82) (-0.77) (-0.75) (2.56) 
Growth opportunity t 0.007* 0.007 0.006 0.007*** 
 (1.88) (1.58) (1.55) (3.24) 
Age t 0.005 0.008 -0.008 -0.002 
 (0.96) (-1.36) (-1.38) (-1.41) 
Interest  volatility t -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** 
 (-3.84) (-3.50) (-3.56) (-5.63) 
Stock market return t -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 (-3.84) (-3.07) (-3.12) (-4.35) 
Credit crunch t -0.001* -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 (-1.67) (-3.12) (-3.54) (-3.93) 
Net Investment t -0.006* -0.004 -0.003 0.002 
 (-1.75) (-1.12) (-1.07) (0.84) 
∆Credit quality t, t+2  0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.90) (0.89) (-1.14) 
Small firms*∆Credit quality t, t+2    -0.001 -0.000 
   (-1.19) (-0.67) 
Small firms*Credit crunch t   0.004 0.002 
   (1.14) (0.59) 
Low credit quality*∆Credit quality t, t+2   0.001* 0.003*** 
   (1.75) (3.79) 
Low credit quality * Credit crunch t    -0.004 -0.001 
   (-1.28) (-0.37) 
R2 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.12 
Number of Obs 7,503 6,903 6,903 6,742 
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In an equilibrium model, risky firms may recognize that credit lines might be pulled 
during financial crisis and thus would hold greater cash holdings to offset this risk. To test this 
possibility, we incorporate expected change in the firm’s credit quality change (∆Credit quality t, 
t+2) to the base regression in Model 12. Whilst the results for the other variables are fairly robust, 
the coefficient for the new variable is not significantly different from zero indicating that REITs 
do not necessarily retain more cash to offset the risks from future deterioration in credit quality. 
To provide further insights on the liquidity management of REITs in a credit crisis, we control for 
size and credit quality by interacting our two credit crisis variables, namely ∆Credit Quality t, t+2 
and Credit Crunch, with Low Credit Quality with Small Firms.22 The estimation results using 
OLS with fixed effects as well as two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimators are reported under 
Model 13 and Model 14, respectively.23 We do not find evidence that smaller sized REITs hoard 
significantly more cash than the larger REITs during a credit crisis. Nevertheless, the coefficient 
for the interactive variable “Low credit quality*∆Credit quality t,t+2”  is positive and statistically 
significant in both models. This suggests that low credit quality REITs do not hold on to more 
cash despite facing the prospect of future credit deterioration. This observation coupled with our 
earlier results that they may not be able to draw down on their existing credit lines highlight the 
cash flow constraints faced by low credit quality REITs. Our results are robust when we control 
for potential endogeneity between cash holdings and line of credit. Model 14 also reveals that 





                                                             
22 REITs in the sample are ranked according to their size as well as credit quality, and those in the bottom 
25 percentile are classified as “Small Firms” and “Low Credit”, respectively.  
 
23 Following Hardin et al. (2009), the 2SLS regression model is estimated to control for potential 
endogeneity between cash holdings and line of credit. 
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2.6   Conclusions  
This paper examined the effectiveness of bank lines of credit in insulating REITs from a credit 
rationing at the broad market level as well as protecting them from credit risk deterioration at the 
firm level. Whilst the data covered both the origination and utilization of commitment loans by 
REITs between 1992 and 2007, our focus was primarily on the utilization of loan commitments.  
The evidence consistently shows that line of credit does insure REITs against credit 
rationing at the broad market level. Specifically, REITs are more like draw down on their credit 
line in tight credit market. We also find evidence on the effectiveness of bank credit line in 
protecting REITs from firm-level credit quality deterioration. Further tests, however, revealed 
that the insurance ability is qualified in two ways: First, not every REIT can establish or expand 
their credit lines as and when they wish. Generally, it is difficult for most firms to extend their 
credit limit in bad times, much more so for the riskier firms. Second, low credit quality firms, due 
to possible violation of financial covenants, may not be able to draw down on their existing credit 
lines to hedge against credit deterioration.  
Since loan commitment is a form of relationship loan, the current study also contributes 
to the relationship banking literature by identifying a unique source of the value of close 
relationships, that is, insurance value provided by the lenders against liquidity shocks during 
credit crises. We also provide another reason why REITs would continue to employ debt in their 
capital structure.24 The study established that credit lines play an important role in the working 
capital and liquidity management of REITs. In particular, bank line of credit acts as a substitute 
                                                             
24 Numerous authors, such as Ooi, Ong and Li (2010) and Boudry, Kallberg and Liu (2010), have 
highlighted that REITs provide a useful setting to test capital structure theories because the key drivers 
behind the traditional capital structure theories are less significant in the case of REITs. Firstly, REITs do 
not pay corporate tax; consequently, the tax benefit associated with using debt, which is central to the trade-
off models, is not so applicable in the REIT context. Secondly, equity REITs buy and hold properties, 
which are tangible and not firm-specific assets. Consequently, they are less exposed to bankruptcy and 
agency costs as compared to firms in other industries. Third, the transparent nature of REITs’ operations 
implies lower information asymmetry between the insiders and outsiders. REITs also operate under more 
stringent corporate governance and reporting rules. Fourth, due to the high distribution requirement, REIT 
managers have less discretion to engage in managerial opportunism or over-investment activities. Even 
successful REITs have to raise capital externally and are, hence, subjected to frequent monitoring and 
disciplining in the capital market. 
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for cash holding and as a financial slack for future investment opportunities. Consistent with the 
unique institutional requirement of REITs having to pay out at least 90% of their net income as 
dividends, our data confirms that the REIT sector rely more heavily on bank lines of credit as 
compared to firms operating in other sectors. Commitment loan, as a proportion of total assets, 
have declined from its peak in the late 1990s when the credit market was flushed with liquidity. It 
is anticipated that bank line of credit will take a more prominent role in the corporate financial 

























SPONSOR BACKING IN ASIAN REIT IPOS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) are a well researched and documented phenomenon in the finance 
literature.1 Underpricing, where the first day closing price is above the offer price, is viewed as an 
anomaly because it is puzzling why IPO issuers would consistently leave money-on-the-table for 
investors. Numerous theoretical models have been developed to explain the anomaly, ranging 
from information asymmetry, institutional reasons, control considerations and behavioral 
explanations.  
The two mainstream explanations for underpricing are based on adverse selection and 
signaling costs. Adverse selection-based models (Rock, 1986) postulate that IPOs must be 
underpriced to entice uninformed investors to purchase shares. Signaling-based models (Ibbotson, 
1975; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989) hypothesize that IPO 
issuers are incentivized to “leave a good taste in the investor’s mouths” because they will likely 
return to the market to sell securities. Empirical evidence in the finance and real estate literature 
supporting these models is mixed.2  
                                                             
1 See Ritter and Welch (2002) and Ljungqvist (2008) for comprehensive reviews on the IPO literature. 
 
2 Michaely and Shaw (1994) support the winner’s curse argument proposed by Rock (1986) but find little 
support for the hypothesis that high-quality IPOs “leave money on the table” to signal their quality. In 
particular, they did not observe any evidence of a higher propensity to return to the market for a seasoned 
offering for firms that were more underpriced. Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans (2000), on the other hand, find that 
REITs that underpriced IPOs more are likely to issue seasoned equity sooner, which is consistent with the 
signaling models of IPO pricing in that during the post-IPO period, the market learns the firm’s true worth 
such that good quality firms issue seasoned equity at favorable prices and recoup the loss sustained at IPO. 
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Given that underpricing is often viewed as evidence of agency costs (Gompers and 
Lerner, 1999; and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003), it is worthwhile to focus on a key player in the 
IPO process, namely the sponsor. Sponsors are pre-IPO shareholders / investors that often have
board representations and have considerable discretion in setting the offer price for the IPO firm. 
Issuers typically capitalize on the strengths and reputation of its sponsors by carrying the sponsor 
brand name. The literature has examined the influence and roles of venture capital sponsors, 
private equity fund sponsors, and managers in the IPO (Barry et al. 1990; Gompers, 1996; 
Chemmmanur and Paeglis, 2005; and Katz, 2008), but not for REIT IPOs. 
IPO sponsors are relevant for a number of reasons. First, sponsors may have private 
information not available to ordinary investors. Second, the interests of sponsors may conflict 
with that of investors in instances where sponsors are involved in the day-today management of 
the firm after their public listing. Third, the longer term strategy of the sponsor matters, that is, 
does the sponsor view the IPO as a one-off exit strategy or as a repeated-game with a focus on 
building long-term relationship with the IPO firm.  In addition, the reputation of the sponsor 
matters as well. In order to overcome these problems, the sponsor may wish to signal that the IPO 
firm is of a high quality.  
Although there are several ways to signal quality3, two options that we explore in this 
chapter are the degree of underpricing and the proportion of shares retained by the sponsor. 
Unlike prior studies that have examined the issue of underpricing in isolation, we believe that the 
pricing decision and the quantity of shares to sell are decisions made jointly by the sponsor as 
motivated by Grinblatt and Hwang (1989).4 Therefore, we model the two decisions jointly using a 
                                                             
3 Other ways to signal quality are through the reputation of the underwriters (Booth and Smith, 1986), 
auditors (Titman and Trueman, 1986), venture capitalists (Barry et al. 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991), 
management quality (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005). 
  
4 Exceptions are Michaely and Shaw (1994) who model the underpricing and the size of seasoned equity 
offerings jointly using a simultaneous equations model. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) on the other hand 
model issuer wealth losses, underpricing, and the costs of promoting the issue jointly using equation-by-
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2SLS simultaneous estimation with underpricing and proportion of shares retained as dependent 
variables.  
Apart from signaling theories that explain underpricing in IPOs, there is also a 
burgeoning venture capital literature that finds that reputable sponsors provide quality 
certification for IPO firms (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Barry, et al., 1990). The certification 
explanation posits that firms backed by high quality sponsors are underpriced less at the IPO. 
Because signaling and certification hypotheses have different predictions on the effect of 
sponsors on underpricing, these hypotheses are viewed as mutually exclusive. 
The real estate investment trusts (REIT) IPO literature is also well developed, and the 
reasons for examining REITs have been well documented (see Ling and Ryngaert, 1997; Brounen 
and Eichholt, 2002). We focus on the IPOs of Asian REITs, which are especially promising as an 
empirical laboratory for several reasons. First, unlike most general firms and US REITs, Asian 
REITs are structured as captive REITs. That is, an independent asset management company, 
wholly owned by the sponsor, is set up to manage the REIT as an external manager. As such, 
sponsors have considerable influence over financing and investment policies. The captive 
management structure also tends to invite agency problems since REIT management fees are 
often pegged to the size of the portfolio under management. This provides an incentive for the 
sponsor to expand the portfolio possibly to the detriment of shareholder value. Second, Asian 
REITs are predominately backed by large corporations (72% of the sponsors in our sample are 
publicly listed companies).5 The sponsors hold on average 19% of the IPO shares post-IPO.  
Although the substantial shareholdings and size of the Asian REIT sponsors add credence 
to their roles in certifying and signaling IPO quality, many sponsors sell assets to the REITs post-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
equation OLS estimator. Unlike ours, both these studies treat the number of shares retained by the issuers 
as exogenous with respect to underpricing. 
 
5 One of the plausible reasons for the dominance of large REIT sponsors in Asia is the absence of 
ownership limitation such as the 5-50 rule imposed on US REITs where no more than five shareholders are 
allowed to hold more than 50% share of REIT. An exception is in the Japanese REIT market where no 
more than three of the shareholders are allowed to hold more than 50% share of REIT. 
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IPO, and in so doing, create a moral hazard problem for REIT investors. This moral hazard 
problem is aggravated for sponsors that are developers. Consequently, we exploit the variation in 
sponsor reputation (measured as the size and age of the sponsor) and ownership (number of 
shares held by the sponsor post-offering) to explain how certification, signaling and moral hazard 
considerations affect the level of underpricing and firm value. 
 The key findings of our empirical research are as follows. First, we find that the degree of 
underpricing and number of shares are indeed inter-related. In particular, the fraction of shares 
retained by the sponsor has a positive impact on underpricing. Similarly, underpricing has an 
impact on the numbers of shares retained by the sponsor. This is consistent with signaling 
hypothesis proposed by Grinblatt and Hwang (1989). Moreover, we find a positive relation 
between firm value and quality signals such as underpricing, sponsor ownership and sponsor 
reputation. Second, we also find evidence supporting the adverse selection model as the presence 
of institutional investors positively and significantly affects underpricing. Third, we find strong 
evidence that the underpricing of Asian REITs is driven by strong premarket demand; that is, 
underpricing is greater for firms that experienced heavy demand during the IPO road show. 
Fourth, we find evidence that developer sponsors tend to hold more shares in the REIT at IPO, 
ostensibly to compensate investors for the potential moral hazard problems post IPO. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 3.2 we outline our literature 
review and research hypotheses. The data for Asian REIT IPOs and summary statistics are 
described in section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we discuss the empirical results. Section 3.5 provides a 
number of robustness tests and Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
The literature on the relation between sponsors and underpricing focuses on how the market 
reacts to the presence of sponsors. One view holds that reputable sponsors provide quality 
certification that reduces the asymmetry information between issuers and outsiders, thus lowering 
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the costs of going public (underpricing). The venture capital literature has shown that IPOs 
sponsored by venture capitalists incur less underpricing and lower underwriting spreads 
compared to non-venture backed IPOs. This is attributed to venture capitalists’ third party 
certification (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). The quality of monitoring or certification is also 
related to the number of shares retained by the sponsor at IPO. A higher percentage of equity 
retained by sponsors should correlate with monitoring quality (Barry, et al., 1990) and act as a 
bonding mechanism for credible certification (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). Barry, et al.’s (1990) 
monitoring hypothesis predicts that capital markets recognize high quality monitors by requiring 
a lower underpricing for issues with large sponsor ownership at IPO. Since both certification and 
monitoring by sponsors will lead to similar predictions, we refer to both roles as “certification”. 
This leads us to the following certification hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (a) Sponsor reputation is negatively related to underpricing. 
                      (b) Sponsor ownership is negatively related to underpricing. 
 
Investors may, however, discount the credibility of sponsor certification. This is 
particularly true in the context of captive REITs in Asia and the associated post-IPO moral hazard 
issues. Thus, the inherent conflict of interest attributed to the sponsor requires a higher 
underpricing. Sponsors with private information could end up being forced to signal their quality 
type by underpricing or demonstrating commitment such as share ownership to alleviate the 
concerns of agency issues. According to the signaling theory, quality firms deliberately 
underprice their IPO to distinguish themselves from other poor quality issuers (Allen and 
Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; and Welch, 1989). Grinblatt and Hwang’s (1989) 
model implies that the decisions of how much to leave on the table and how many shares to hold 
are not independent of each other since firm use both underpricing and share retention to signal 
their quality type. The signaling hypothesis yields the following predictions. 




Hypothesis 2 (a) Sponsor reputation is positively related to underpricing 
                      (b) Sponsor ownership is positively related to underpricing   
 
The implicit assumption in signaling hypothesis is that quality signals such as sponsor 
reputation, sponsor ownership and IPO underpricing are associated with firm quality. In other 
word, IPOs backed by quality sponsors and that are more underpriced tend to be quality issues. 
These assertions are backed by theoretical literature. For example, Leland and Pyle (1977) predict 
a positive relation between firm value and the fraction of shares held by the issuers. Grinblatt and 
Hwang’s (1989) model, on the other hand, predicts a positive relation between the value of the 
firm and the degree of underpricing. Existing empirical evidence generally supports the positive 
relation between firm quality and equity retained by insiders (Downes and Heinkel, 1982), firm 
quality and underwriter reputation (Carter and Manaster, 1990; and Michaely and Shaw, 1994), 
and firm quality and underpricing (Cai, Duxbury and Keasey, 2007).  
Following Gompers and Lerners (1999) and Cai, Duxbury and Keasey (2007), we use the 
success or failure of sponsors as our measure of firm value.6 Successful sponsors are defined as 
those who maintain their ownership in the REIT and their asset management company during the 
first three years after the IPO. Failed sponsors are defined as those who liquidated or disposed 
their interest in the REIT and the asset management companies during this period. Ceteris 
paribus, high quality firms-backed by reputable sponsors and with high sponsor ownership-would 
be expected to be sponsored by successful sponsors while low quality firms are backed by failed 
sponsors. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
                                                             
6 Cai, Duxbury and Keasey (2007) use the success and failure of internet-related firms during the dotcom 
periods as proxy to high and low quality firms, respectively. Firms that maintain their listing status within 
the first five years of offering are deemed as successful, while firms that delisted from the exchange are 
failed firms.  In a similar fashion, Gompers and Lerners (1999) use the incidence of liquidation in a sample 
of venture capital backed IPOs within the first five years of public listing as proxy to IPO firms’ long-run 
performance. We use three years instead due to the relative short history of REITs in Asia. 




Hypothesis 2 (c) Firm value (successful sponsors) is positively related to sponsor ownership, 
                            sponsor reputation and underpricing.   
 
Post-listing support by the sponsor is important for REITs in terms of future growth 
opportunities.7 This is particularly true in the context of Asia where REITs are known to pursue 
aggressive acquisition strategies to boost earnings and dividends (Ooi, Ong and Neo, 2011). It is 
reasonable to expect that developer sponsored REITs have greater growth opportunities given the 
pipeline and warehousing support from developer sponsors. Although such support is not unique 
to developer sponsored REITs, we expect that support from developers is superior given their 
ability to develop their own properties and their sizable portfolio of investment properties that 
may be transferred to the REIT at the appropriate time.  
The better growth opportunities enjoyed by developer sponsored REITs naturally translate 
into more post-IPO related-party transactions (RPTs) between the sponsor and the REIT. This 
raises agency concerns in that the affiliated party transactions may be detrimental to shareholder 
value. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that the scope of moral hazard is greater for managers of 
riskier firms.  To align incentives with other shareholders, riskier managers should hold higher 
ownership stakes. We therefore expect developer sponsors to hold more shares in the REIT to 
alleviate sponsor-shareholder conflicts. The above arguments lead us to the following 
commitment hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (a) Developer sponsored REITs tend to experience greater growth opportunities,  
                       hence (b) developer sponsors tend to hold more shares in the REIT. 
                                                             
7 Broadly, sponsors provides three types of support to the REIT – pipeline support, warehousing facility 
and management expertise – that are formalized into various sponsor support agreements. Pipeline support 
involves the provision of first-preference right to information and negotiation of the disposed properties 
owned by the sponsor or related companies. Warehousing facility involves the temporary acquisition of 
properties by the sponsor when the REIT is not able to immediately acquire the properties for reasons such 
as financial constraints, properties that are still under development and issues related low vacancy rate. 
Sponsors can also provide fee-based management expertise to the REIT 
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3.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
3.3.1 Sample and Data Collection  
Our sample consists of Asian REIT IPOs from 2001 to 2008. The sample includes Japan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia REITs with a total market capitalization of US$52.9 billion 
as of end of June 2009. This sample represents over 94% of the total listed REITs in Asia based 
on market value in the corresponding period. We exclude South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand 
REIT markets from our study due to the closed-end and finite-live (South Korea) structure of 
these markets. The final sample comprises 78 IPOs after excluding three IPOs 
(CapitaCommercial Trust, K-REIT Asia, and Ascott Residence REIT) that represent shares spin-
off from their holding company. 
To obtain the identity of the sponsor (sometimes referred to as the advisor), we examine 
the prospectus and the first financial reports of each REIT. We define a pre-IPO shareholder as a 
sponsor if (a) it is so identified in the prospectus notes, or (b) it holds shares in the asset 
management company.8 Such a definition is consistent with the REIT institutional background in 
Asia where the asset management company is usually a wholly-owned subsidiary of the sponsor. 
We collect information about the aggregate stock ownership by the REIT sponsor from first fiscal 
financial reports (6 months from IPO date, on average).9 We define the main sponsor as the 
sponsor with the largest shareholdings in the asset management company. Following the venture 
capital literature (Barry, et al., 1990), we use two proxies for sponsor reputation: sponsor size, 
                                                             
8 This sponsor definition does not differentiate between sponsors and advisors even though there are a few 
isolated instances where advisors are not sponsors. However, because these advisors hold large stakes in 
the REIT, we classify them as sponsors.  The results are robust when we use main sponsor ownership in the 
REIT instead of aggregating all shares owned by all the sponsors / advisors.  
 
9 Our decision to use first fiscal report ownership data is due to the language constraint in extracting Japan 
REIT (JREIT) ownership data on IPO date. We expect that the first fiscal ownership data is a close proxy 
to ownership structure on IPO date due to locked-up provisions imposed on issuers by underwriters in 
Asian stock markets. Firm management and pre-IPO shareholders (sponsors) are often not allowed to 
dispose their shares in the aftermarket for a period of time after the IPO (typically 180 days). Inspection of 
non-JREIT sample where we have both ownership data at and post IPO show that the correlation for these 
variables is 0.90 (significant at less than 1% level). Moreover, tracking of JREITs ownership data over time 
reveals that sponsor ownership does not change during the first two fiscal periods (1 year). 
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which measures the main sponsor’s total shareholders’ fund during IPO year; and sponsor age, 
defined as the number of calendar years between the IPO and main sponsor’s founding year.  
 
3.3.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1 reports the Asian REIT IPO activity from 2001 to 2008. IPO activity increased 
significantly in 2005 and 2006 with 21 and 26 offerings, respectively. The pace of new issues 
slowed following the global financial crisis in 2007 and 2008. There were no REIT IPOs in 2009. 
The 78 IPOs raised nearly US$26.1 billion during the period. At US$16.5 billion, total proceeds 
raised during the peak periods in 2005-2006 are comparable to the US REIT IPO boom periods 
(1993-1994) of US$14.3 billion (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997).  
 
Table 3.1: Asian REIT IPOs issued during 2001-2008 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total IPO 2 6 5 7 21 26 13 1 
Partitioned by country 
      
 
 Japan  2 4 4 5 13 12 2 0 
Singapore REIT  -- 2 1 2 2 8 5 1 
Hong Kong REIT  -- -- -- -- 3 2 2 0 
Malaysia REIT  -- -- -- -- 3 4 4 0 
Total amount raised 
 (in USD millions) 1,122 1,380 1,850 2,336* 8,217 8,261* 2,775 192 
* excluding three Singapore REIT IPOs which were spun-off from their parent companies with IPO shares 
offered to parent’s shareholders (Capital Commercial Trust, 2004; K-REIT, 2006; and Ascott Residence 
Trust, 2006) 
 
Table 3.2 shows the average initial-day returns for the full sample and disaggregated by country 
of origin. The initial return is measured as the percentage difference between the offer price and 
the closing price at the end of the first day of trading. On average, Asian REITs are underpriced 
by 3.1% (t-statistics=2.19). Ling and Ryngaert (1997) reported underpricing of 3.6% among US 
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics on initial-day returns  
 
Sample  Sample  Mean  Std.dev t-stat Median  Minimum  Maximum  
 
Size  return 
  
return return return 
Full sample 78 0.031** 0.127 2.189 0.010 -0.160 0.590 
Partitioned by country 
       Japan (JREIT) 42 0.015 0.096 0.983 0.003 -0.111 0.416 
Singapore REIT (SREIT) 18 0.054 0.181 1.274 0.020 -0.150 0.590 
Hong Kong REIT (HREIT)  7 0.027 0.137 0.518 0.004 -0.157 0.204 
Malaysia REIT (MREIT) 11 0.061* 0.125 1.637 0.040 -0.110 0.344 
** and * indicates significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively.  
 
The characteristics of the IPO firms together with their definitions are presented in Table 3.3 and 
Table 3.4 respectively. The pair-wise correlation matrix for selected characteristics that we used 
as explanatory variables in OLS regressions in the next section is reported in Table 3.5. The 
magnitude of the coefficients suggests that the independent variables are not highly collinear. 
Table 3.3 shows that the sponsors in our sample have an average size of US$5.4 billion. 
Over 72% are publicly listed, suggesting that the sponsors are well established. At 19.4% post-
IPO sponsor equity ownership in the REIT is substantial compared to venture capital sponsor 
post-IPO holdings of 24.6%, 26.3% and 23.4% as reported by Barry, et al. (1990), Megginson 
and Weiss (1991), and Gompers and Lerner (1999), respectively. Over 92% (0.178/0.194) of the 
sponsor ownership is held by the main sponsor, indicating that REIT sponsors typically take 
concentrated equity positions in the IPO. Over half of the IPOs are sponsored by developers, 
underscoring the importance of the REIT structure as an exit vehicle for developers. 
Our sample of REIT IPOs tends to be larger than their US counterparts. The mean issue 
size for Asian REIT IPOs of US$318 million is substantially larger than the US$176 million and 
US$190 million issue size reported by Ling and Ryngaert (1997) and Highfield, Roskelley and 
Steele (2008) respectively, as well as those in Europe (Brounen and Eichholtz, 2002). 
Underwriters reputation is captured by lead underwriter’s market share measure as the ratio of 
lead underwriters’ total IPO proceeds raised in the IPO year to total IPOs proceeds raised by all 
other underwriters in the Asia Pacific region during the same period. On average, the lead 
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underwriters command a market share of 4.5%. More than 26% of the IPOs represent the First 
issue of a given property type in its country of origin. Office IPOs are the most common property 
type comprising of 22% of the total IPOs. Institutional holdings is the percentage of shares held 
by financial institutions post-IPO. For non-JREITs, we use data from the IPO prospectus since 
most of the non-JREITs do not provide data on institutional holdings in their financial reports 
post-IPO. The average institutional holdings of 45% is comparable to the 44% reported by 
Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu (2004) using a sample of US REIT IPOs during 1991-1998.  
Lag market return of 0.7% represents the cumulative stock market index returns for the 
15 days prior to the date of issue. Premarket demand is the absolute percent change in the actual 
offer price from the middle point of book-building price range which serves as proxy to 
premarket demand. The average price revision from the mid-point of 1.7% (median: 2.0%) is 
larger than those reported by Highfield, Roskelly and Steele (2008) of -2.58% (median: 0%) 
implying that Asian REIT IPOs tend to receive stronger premarket demand than US REIT IPOs. 
Premarket demand (0,1) shows that more than 70% of the IPOs (sample with book-building price 
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Table 3.3: IPO characteristics  
We define a pre-IPO shareholder as a sponsor if (a) so defined in the prospectus notes, or (b) it holds the 
shares in the asset management company. We use main sponsor’s size (shareholders’ fund) and age (years) 
as proxy to reputation. We define main sponsor as sponsor with the largest shareholdings in the asset 
management company. Sponsor ownership is the aggregate stock ownership of sponsors collected from 




Full sample (N=78) 
 
 






Sponsor reputation  
(size: million of $) 
5,414 1,165 0.5 56,095 9,977 73 
Sponsor reputation  
(age in years) 
45 33 2 177 38 74 
Listed (0,1) 0.718 1.00 0 1 0.453 78 
Sponsor ownership 0.194 0.123 0 0.709 0.183 78 
Main sponsor ownership 0.178 0.100 0 0.709 0.181 78 






Issue size (million of $) 318 243 22 2,558 331 78 
Underwriters reputation 0.045 0.042 0.001 0.172 0.033 78 
Stock volatility  0.013 0.012 0.004 0.037 0.007 78 
First issue 0.256 0 0 1 0.439 78 
Office 0.218 0 0 1 0.416 78 
Institutional holdings 0.448 0.463 0.039 0.921 0.183 78 
Lag market return 0.007 0.009 -0.106 0.210 0.052 78 
Premarket demand 0.017 0.020 -0.115 0.094 0.033 67 
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Sponsor reputation (size) Company website 
and annual 
reports 
Main sponsor’s shareholders’ fund at IPO year 
Sponsor reputation (age) Company website 
& annual reports 
Main sponsor’s age measured as the number of 
calendar years between the IPO and main 
sponsor’s founding year 
Sponsor ownership First fiscal 
financial reports 
Log (1+ aggregate stock ownership of all 
sponsors at the first fiscal period after IPO) 
Listed (0,1) Company website 
& annual reports 
Binary variable takes one if the main sponsor is a 
public listed company 
Developer IPO (0,1) Company website 
& annual reports 
Binary variable takes one for IPO sponsored by 
developer (main sponsor) 






Underpricing Bloomberg (IPO closing price-offering price)/Offering price 
Issue size Bloomberg Log ( number of shares offered*offer price) 
Stock volatility  Bloomberg The standard deviation of the stock returns from 
day 2 to day 60 after the IPO 
Underwriter reputation Bloomberg The ratio of lead underwriters’ IPO proceeds to 
total IPOs proceeds raised by all other 
underwriters in the Asia Pacific region.  
First issue (0,1) Annual reports  Binary variable takes one for first issue of REIT 
of its property type in its country of origin 





Percentage of shares held by domestics financial 
institutions at the first fiscal period after IPO 
Institutional holdings 
(non-JREITs) 
Prospectus The ratio of total shares placed to institutional 
investors to the total shares outstanding at IPO 
Lag market return Bloomberg The cumulative stock market returns ( Nikkei 225 
for JREIT, Straits Times Index for SREIT, Hang 
Seng Index for HREIT and Kuala Lumpur 
Composite Index for MREIT) 15 days prior to 
IPO 
Premarket demand Bloomberg Midpoint of offering range/offer price. The 
midpoint is measured as the high end + low end 
of offering range scaled by 2. 
Premarket demand (0,1) Bloomberg Binary variable takes one for offer price that 
priced at the upper end (maximum) of filling 
range 
Growth opportunity  Bloomberg [(market value of equity + total debts)/total 
assets] at IPO. 
Book-to-market ratio Bloomberg [book value of equity/market value of equity] at 
IPO 
Firm size Bloomberg Natural of individual REIT’s market 
capitalization at IPO date (total shares outstanding 
X closing price at the first day of trading) 
Wealth change Prospectus/ 
Bloomberg 
Sponsor ownership *(First day closing market 
price-midpoint of filling price range) 
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Table 3.5: Pearson correlation matrix of the explanatory variables  


















Sponsor reputation (size) 1.000          
Log (1+ Sponsor ownership) 0.162 1.000         
Log (Issue size) 0.230* -0.312* 1.000        
Underwriter reputation -0.010 -0.298* 0.555* 1.000       
Stock volatility 0.226 0.240* -0.001 0.080 1.000      
First issue 0.172 0.273 -0.241* -0.030 0.062 1.000     
Office (0,1) 0.094 -0.056 0.182 0.094 0.081 -0.073 1.000    
Institutional holdings 0.244* -0.197 0.106 -0.076 0.128 -0.031 0.075 1.000   
Lag market returns 0.148 0.092 -0.290* -0.162 0.048 0.288* -0.196 0.177 1.000  
Premarket demand 0.149 -0.111 0.060 0.163 0.094 -0.111 -0.013 0.097 0.034 1.000 
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3.4 Results and Methods   
Our empirical analysis focuses on three potential roles of sponsors previously discussed: 
certification, signaling and commitment. Univariate analyses are first carried out to examine the 
relationship between underpricing and its explanatory factors with a focus on sponsor reputation 
and sponsor ownership before expanding the analyses to a multivariate framework.  
 
3.4.1 Univariate Analysis Results 
In Table 3.6 we report the IPO characteristics by splitting the full sample according to whether 
the first-day return is positive (underpricing) or negative (overpricing).10 We find that IPOs that 
are underpriced tend to have higher Sponsor reputation and Sponsor ownership, which is 
consistent with signaling theory’s predictions. We use sponsor size as proxy for reputation in 
subsequent multivariate tests; however, our results are robust to using sponsor age as a proxy. 
Consistent with the winner’s curse hypothesis, underpricing is higher for IPOs that attract 
more Institutional holdings. Other controls for risk such as First issue and Office have the 
predicted signs. Similar to Ling and Ryngaert (1997), we also find that Office REIT IPOs - the 
most common property type - tend to be less underpriced because of investors’ familiarity with 
these issues. First issue of a given property type tend to be underpriced more, probably due to the 
valuation uncertainty surrounding these IPOs. Stock volatility, Issue size, Underwriter reputation, 
Lag market return do not vary between underpriced and overpriced IPOs.  
It is worth noting that we control for premarket interest in the IPO, which is captured by 
the positive price revision in the offer price.11 It is important to do so since underpricing may 
                                                             
10 The subsequent univariate and multivariate results remain unchanged after taking out two of the outliers 
(-0.16 and 0.59) that represent, respectively, the bottom and top 1% of  initial returns in the sample. 
 
11 There are two explanations to the positive relation between premarket demand and underpricing. 
Benveniste and Spindt’s (1989) model of IPO underpricing argue that partial adjustment phenomenon 
happens when the IPO final offer price do not fully reflect the positive premarket demand as the 
underwriters wish to reward institutional investors for truthfully revealing their true positive demand during 
the book-building process by offering them underpriced shares. Loughran and Ritter (2002) on the other 
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simply reflect the substantial increases in the first day closing price driven by the strong demand 
in the secondary market.12 Hanley (1993) shows that underpricing is related to the partial 
adjustment phenomenon where issues that exceed the limits of the book building offer range 
(indicating strong premarket interest) are more underpriced. The two variables constructed to 
capture the extent (Premarket demand) and existence of positive price revision (Premarket 
demand (0,1)) reveal that issues that attract greater premarket interest tend to be more 
underpriced, although the result is only statistically significant for Premarket demand (0,1).  
 
Table 3.6: IPO characteristics by initial returns. 
The IPO sample is divided according to whether the first-day return is positive or negative. Sponsor 
ownership is equal to the natural log of one plus the aggregate stock ownership of sponsors collected from 
REIT’s first fiscal business reports (6 months from IPO, on average). Sponsor reputation is measured as the 
natural log of main sponsor’s total shareholders’ fund (for size) and as the natural log of total number of 
calendar years between the IPO and the main sponsor founding year (for age). T-statistics are calculated 
under the assumption of an equal variance. ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level respectively. All variables are defined in Table 3.4. 
 
 Underpricing (>0) Underpricing (≤0) T-statistics 
 Underpriced Overpriced  
Sponsor characteristics     
Sponsor reputation [size]# 3.134 2.705 -1.745** 
Sponsor reputation [age]# 1.541 1.408 -1.347* 
Sponsor ownership# 0.089 0.052 -2.682*** 
    
Offering characteristics    
Issue size 2.370 2.294 -0.822 
Underwriters reputation  0.043 0.048 0.631 
Stock volatility  0.014 0.013 -0.340 
First issue (0,1) 0.349 0.143 -2.104** 
Office (0,1) 0.116 0.343 2.474*** 
Institutional holdings 0.485 0.402 -2.023** 
Lag market return 0.010 0.002 -0.722 
Premarket demand# 0.021 0.012 -1.141 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
hand suggest that a positive upward revision implies that pre-IPO shareholders are experiencing increase in 
wealth much higher than they have anticipated, hence, they are more willing to tolerate for a higher level of 
underpricing than following an downward revision in the final offer price. Both these models predict a 
positive relationship between underpricing and premarket demand. We attempt to disentangle these theories 
in a subsequent section.   
12 To the best of our knowledge, the REIT IPO literature generally does not include proxy for premarket 
demand as one of the explanatory variable to underpricing. One exception is a working paper by Highfield, 
Roskelley and Steele (2008) in which the authors find that the degree of underpricing of US REIT IPOs is 
positively related to the premarket demand. 
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Premarket demand (0,1)# 0.821 0.536 -2.600*** 
No of observations 43 35  
         # there is missing value problems associated with these variables. 
 
3.4.2 2SLS Estimation Results  
We next examine the impact of sponsors on IPO underpricing in a multivariate framework. We 
estimate IPO underpricing and sponsor ownership jointly using a 2SLS simultaneous equation 
model. Following Riddiough and Wu (2009), we pool all non-endogenous variables as 
instruments for the endogenous variables. This approach is conservative because it can increase 
the standard errors of the endogenous variables (Riddiough and Wu, 2009).13 We test the main 
proposition of a positive association between the degree of underpricing and the fraction of shares 
held by the sponsor in the new issue as theorized in signaling model. This produces the following 








In the first equation, the dependent variable is the level of underpricing and the two key 
independent variables are Sponsor reputation and Sponsor ownership. For the signaling 
hypotheses to hold, we would expect to find β1   and β2 to be positive and significant. On the 
contrary, negative and significant signs for these estimated coefficients would support the 
                                                             
13 Similar to Riddiough and Wu (2009), we also reproduce our 2SLS results using an iterated 2SLS 
procedure which iterates over the estimated disturbance covariance matrix and parameter estimates until the 
parameter estimates converge. This procedure minimizes the sum of squared errors. Our results are robust 
to this estimation procedure (results not produced here but are available upon request from the author). 
Underpricing=α + β1Log(1+Sponsor ownership) + β2Log(Sponsor reputation) +  β3Log(Issue 
size) + β4Underwriter reputation + β5Stock volatility + β6First issue + β7Office + 
β8Institutional holdings + β9Lag market return + β10Premarket demand + β11-13 Country 
dummies + ε                                                                                                                               (1)       
Log(1+Sponsor ownership) = α + β1Underpricing + β2Stock volatility + β3Institutional 
holdings + β4Premarket demand + β5Developer IPOs + β6Log(Firm size) +  β7Growth 
opportunity + β8-10Country dummies + ε                                                                                  (2)                                                           
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certification hypothesis. Other control variables used in the underpricing equation are similar in 
spirit to Ling and Ryngaert (1997). As motivated by Hanley (1993), we use the absolute revision 
in offer price (Premarket demand) as a proxy for premarket interest in the IPO. This variable is 
measured as the percentage difference between the midpoint of the filling range and offer price. 
In the second equation, the dependent variable is the Sponsor ownership and the key 
independent variables are the level of underpricing and the Developer IPO dummy which is equal 
one if the main sponsor is a property developer. We hypothesize that developer sponsors hold 
more shares in the REIT to compensate investors for potential moral hazard issues.14 Kahn and 
Winton (1996) on the other hand model pre-IPO shareholders retention as a function of growth 
opportunities. Their model predicts a negative relationship between growth opportunities and the 
original owners’ share retention; that is, high growth firms tend to sell more shares to finance 
their growth. We use market-to-book ratio as proxy for growth opportunity. 
We also control for Premarket demand in the sponsor ownership equation because 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) document that sponsors adjust their share retention ratio so that the 
wealth gain from premarket demand (positive revision in offer price) exceeds the dilution effect 
from underpricing.15 This critical level is, in turn, dependent on the difference between IPO offer 
price and midpoint of book-building price range, IPOs with zero or positive price revision (offer 
price ≥ midpoint) tend to have lower critical value than IPOs with negative price revision (offer 
                                                             
14 Although not reported here, we document a positive and significant (at the 5% level) relation between 
growth opportunity (market-to-book ratio) and developer IPOs after controlling for factors such as cash 
flow, firm size, institutional holdings, sponsor ownership, leverage, property and country dummies. 
 
15 To illustrate wealth gain and dilution costs of underpricing, consider CapitaRetail China Trust’s 
December, 8, 2006 offering that had 191.23 million shares retained by its sponsor, i.e. CapitaLand, 193.3 
million newly issued shares (no secondary shares sold by pre-IPO shareholders) in its offering at $1.13. 
The first closing market price was $1.80, and the midpoint of the file price range was $1.04. So for the 
191.23 million shares retained, the revaluation of $0.76 ($1.80-$1.04) per share resulted in a wealth gain of 
$145.33 million (191.23 million x $0.76). Thus the total wealth change was $145.53 million for the 
sponsors, as contrasted with the $112.29 million left on the table [($1.80-1.13) x 193.3=129.51] x 86.7% 
owned shares by the sponsors before going public]. Although the sponsor left $112.29 million on the table, 
the wealth gain of $145.53 million more than offsets the dilution costs from underpricing, providing a net 
wealth gain of $33.2 million.   
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price < midpoint). This leads to a negative relationship between Premarket demand and the 
number of shares retained by pre-IPO shareholders. 
Other control variables in second equation include firm size and risk (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985). We use the natural log of individual REIT market capitalization at IPO as a proxy for size 
(Firm size), and the daily stock return volatility from day 2 to day 60 after the IPO as proxy for 
risks (Stock volatility). We also control for institutional ownership because IPOs with a stronger 
governance structure (high sponsor ownership) may attract more institutional ownership (Hartzell, 
Kallberg and Liu, 2004).  
We report our 2SLS estimation results in Table 3.7.16 Note that for Models 1 and 3 in 
Table 3.7, we omit the Premarket demand as there are missing values associated with this 
variable, reducing the overall sample size from 73 to 64.  
 
3.4.2.1 Joint Decisions of Underpricing and Sponsor Ownership 
The estimated coefficients on Underpricing and Sponsor ownership are of considerable interest. 
We find evidence that the decision to underprice is interrelated with the decision to retain shares 
in the REIT as theorized in Grinblatt and Hwang’s (1989) signaling model. The estimated 
coefficients on Underpricing and Sponsor ownership are both positive and significant at the 1%-5% 




                                                             
16 The endogenous variables, Underpricing and Sponsor ownership,  are estimated in the first stage. From 
the estimates, we obtain reduced form fitted values for each of the endogenous variables. The second stage 
estimates involve the substitution of reduced form fitted values for the endogenous variables appearing on 
the right-hand side of equations (1) and (2) and then estimating these equations using OLS. 
 
17 Our results are robust to smaller sample size of 64 (after omitting observations without Premarket 
demand data). In this case, Sponsor ownership coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level in 
Model 1 while Underpricing coefficient is positive and significant at the 10% level in Model 3. The 
coefficients and signs for other control variables in Model 1 and 3 of Table 3.7 are robust to this alternative 
specification.   
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3.4.2.2 The Determinants of Underpricing  
The results from our estimation of the Underpricing equation reported in Panel A in Table 3.7 
reject the notion of first-party certification; the coefficient on Sponsor reputation cannot be 
distinguished from zero. The coefficient on Premarket demand is positive and significant, 
indicating that IPOs offered at the upper end of book-building range are more likely to register 
positive initial-day returns.18 Other control variables behave as predicted. For example, the 
estimated coefficients on First issue and Stock volatility are positive, which is consistent with a 
trade-off between risk and returns. Underwriter reputation is negatively and statistically 
significant once we control for Premarket demand. This is consistent with the certification role of 
leading underwriters. The coefficient on Institutional holdings is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, therefore, we do find support for winner’s curse hypothesis. The 
coefficient on Office type dummy variable cannot be distinguished from zero. 
 
3.4.2.3 The Determinants of Sponsor Ownership  
The sponsor ownership equation results are reported in Panel B in Table 3.7. In line with the 
commitment hypothesis, the estimated coefficient on Developer IPOs is positive and significant, 
implying that developer sponsors that are subject to potential moral hazard problems align their 
interest with other REIT shareholders by holding more shares in the REIT. The coefficients on 
Growth opportunity are negative and significant, consistent with Kahn and Winton’s (1996) 
prediction that high growth firms that rely heavily on outside financing tend to sell more IPO 
shares to finance their growth. 
                                                             
18 We also check for the asymmetric component in Premarket demand by creating a dummy variable, 
Premarket demand (0,1), equal to one if the offer price is at the upper end (maximum) of the filling range, 
and zero otherwise. Premarket demand (0,1) itself is positively significant at the 1% level in the 
underpricing equation (negative, and significant at the 5% level in sponsor ownership equation) and did not 
change the other coefficients. 
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Models 3 and 4 also reveal that both Underpricing and Developer IPOs have an 
independent impact on Sponsor ownership; that is, developers hold a larger share (captured by 
Developer IPOs) to signal their commitment apart from the intention to signal sponsor quality 
type (captured by Underpricing).  This result supports the commitment hypothesis. 
Although Stock volatility is not significantly related to Sponsor ownership, we find that 
Firm size is significant and positively related to Sponsor ownership, which is contrary to the 
findings in Demsetz and Lehn’s (1985). This finding is, however, consistent with the institutional 
structure of Asian REITs where large REITs tend to be sponsored by large firms that take 
concentrated equity position in the REIT post-IPO. In addition, Institutional holdings decrease 
with Sponsor ownership. This result is somewhat inconsistent with Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu 
(2004) who show that firms with stronger governance (in the form of greater managerial 
ownership) have a larger percentage of institutional ownership. The negative coefficient on 
Institutional holdings, however, supports the idea that REITs with greater Institutional holdings 
tend to face greater pressure and intense monitoring. This, in turn, reduces the potential moral 
hazard problem post-IPO, hence reducing the level of Sponsor ownership required to convince 
market of their credibility at the IPO stage. Lastly, higher Premarket demand has a significant 
negative impact on Sponsor ownership. This is consistent with Loughran and Ritter’s (2002) 
argument that IPOs that experience positive price revision from the midpoint tend to have a lower 
share retention ratio. 
To ensure that our results are robust, we also included in the underpricing regressions 
(Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.7) proxies that capture IPOs booms since the literature has shown that 
IPOs issued during hot markets tend to be underprice exesssively (Ritter, 1984). We use two 
proxies to capture the hot market phenomenon. First, we create a binary variable that takes the 
value of one for years 2005 and 2006 when the volume of IPOs in Asia is at its peak. Second, we 
take the logarithm of the volume of all IPOs that came to the market in a year. Neither of these 
hot-market issues dummies are significantly related to underpricing. Moreover, all other 
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coefficient estimates remain intact after the incorporation of these dummy variables.19 We also 
examine the impact of debt ratio and dividend spread on underpricing and conclude that the level 
of initial returns is not affected by these variables.  
In summary, the evidence presented in Table 3.7 suggests that sponsors’ decisions to 
underprice and to retain shares in the IPO are jointly determined. Prior studies have often ignored 
this simultaneity issue and thus may have produced biased and inconsistent estimates of the 
relationship. We further document the role of sponsor business profiles in determining the 
number of shares they hold at IPO. We find that developer sponsors that are exposed to better 
growth opportunities tend to take concentrated ownership in the REIT, possibly to compensate 




























                                                             
19 Our results are also robust to incorporation of year dummy variables in Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.7. 
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Table 3.7: 2SLS simultaneous estimation results for Underpricing and Sponsor ownership equations 
The dependent variable for Panel A is Underpricing measured as the IPO closing price minus the offering 
price divided by the offering price. The Dependent variable for Panel B is Sponsor ownership equal to the 
natural log of one plus the aggregate stock ownership of sponsors collected from REIT’s first fiscal 
business reports (6 months from IPO, on average). All non-endogenous variables are pooled and used as 
instrument in the first stage estimation. . ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 












































 Panel A: 
Underpricing equation 
Panel B: 
Sponsor ownership equation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -0.123 -2.327*** 0.044 0.531*** 
 (-0.97) (-4.31) (0.95) (3.34) 
Underpricing   0.198** 0.133*** 
   (2.36) (2.09) 
Sponsor ownership 1.656** 2.118***   
 (2.27) (2.87)   
Sponsor reputation 0.014 0.000   
 (0.87) (0.01)   
Issue size -0.046 -0.037   
 (-0.72) (-0.63)   
Underwriter reputation -0.630 -1.115**   
 (-1.10) (-2.03)   
Stock volatility  6.660*** 8.289*** -1.183 -1.106 
 (2.87) (3.46) (-1.33) (-1.46) 
First issue (0,1) 0.055 0.076*   
 (1.46) (1.97)   
Office (0,1) -0.049 -0.047   
 (-1.34) (-1.29)   
Institutional holdings 0.293** 0.252** -0.148*** -0.110*** 
 (2.10) (2.10) (-5.49) (-4.65) 
Lag market return -0.027 0.066   
 (-0.09) (0.23)   
Premarket demand  2.181***  -0.505*** 
  (4.12)  (-3.39) 
Developer IPO (0,1)   0.022** 0.021** 
   (2.06) (2.37) 
Firm size   0.033** 0.037*** 
   (2.04) (2.75) 
Growth opportunity   -0.032* -0.027** 
   (-1.89) (-2.06) 
     
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.24 0.43 0.66 0.72 
No of Obs  73 64 73 64 
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3.4.3 OLS Estimation Results 
An important aspect of 2SLS simultaneous estimates is the assumption that Sponsor ownership 
and Underpricing are determined simultaneously. Although 2SLS is valid, it makes sense to 
compare the estimates produced using OLS. Finding a bidirectional between Underpricing and 
Sponsor ownership in OLS would further amplify our conjecture that these two variables are 
interrelated. In Table 3.8, we re-estimate our model using single stage estimates under the 
assumption that Sponsor ownership and Underpricing are exogenous. Effectively, the fitted 
values of the endogenous variables in Table 3.7 are replaced by actual values in Table 3.8.  
Consistent with 2SLS, we find a strong relation between Underpricing and Sponsor 
ownership. The coefficients for these variables are positive and significant at the 5% level. Other 
control variable coefficient estimates are similar those in the 2SLS regressions with few 
exceptions; Sponsor reputation, Underwriter reputation, First issue and Office in underpricing 
equation become statistically significant if we fail to account for simultaneity in Model 5. On the 
other hand, Institutional holdings in the underpricing equation is insignificant using OLS 
estimation in Model 5. Similar to 2SLS estimations, the above results are robust to controls such 
as debt ratio, dividend spread, time and hot market dummies in the underpricing equations. None 
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Table 3.8: Single equation estimates ignoring endogeneity  
The dependent variable for Panel A is Underpricing measured as the IPO closing price minus the offering 
price divided by the offering price. The Dependent variable for Panel B is Sponsor ownership measured as 
the aggregate stock ownership of sponsors collected from REIT’s first fiscal business reports (6 months 
from IPO, on average). Standard errors robust have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 















































 Panel A: 
Underpricing equation 
Panel B:  
Sponsor ownership equation 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept -0.127 -1.973*** 0.007 0.378 
 (-1.51) (-3.24) (0.14) (1.64) 
Underpricing   0.088** 0.087** 
   (2.54) (2.14) 
Sponsor ownership 0.629** 1.098**   
 (2.27) (2.61)   
Sponsor reputation 0.022** 0.007   
 (2.02) (0.63)   
Issue size -0.012 -0.008   
 (-0.28) (-0.17)   
Underwriter reputation -0.671* -1.117*   
 (-1.73) (-1.91)   
Stock volatility  6.985* 7.917** -0.389 -0.518 
 (1.91) (2.25) (-0.44) (-0.70) 
First issue (0,1) 0.056* 0.077**   
 (1.95) (2.25)   
Office (0,1) -0.061** -0.044   
 (-2.11) (1.57)   
Institutional holdings 0.139 0.140* -0.134*** -0.106*** 
 (1.55) (1.76) (-5.08) (-4.88) 
Lag market return -0.050 0.008   
 (-0.17) (0.03)   
Premarket demand  1.830***  -0.370 
  (2.92)  (-1.65) 
Developer IPO (0,1)   0.028** 0.028** 
   (2.26) (2.38) 
Firm size   0.040** 0.040** 
   (2.11) (2.20) 
Growth opportunity   -0.028** -0.031** 
   (-2.30) (-2.42) 
     
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.24 0.43 0.66 0.68 
No of Obs  73 64 78 67 
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3.5 Robustness Tests 
Although our finding of a positive link between Underpricing and Sponsor ownership is 
consistent with the signaling model, a positive link is also consistent with the share dilution 
hypothesis. The share dilution hypothesis conjectures that pre-IPO shareholders who sell fewer 
shares during the IPO suffer only marginally from underpricing, and hence, are less sensitive to 
the underpricing. We perform two sets of robustness tests to examine this hypothesis. Our first 
test is designed to test the assumption that our proxies for quality (Sponsor reputation, Sponsor 
ownership, Underpricing) are positively related to firm value (firm long-term performance). This 
would allow us to interpret our findings as arising from quality sponsors deliberately underpricing 
and retaining shares to signal their quality types. In the second robustness test, we create a new 
variable, Wealth change, which measures sponsor wealth change during the interval between 
when the file price range is set and the close of trading on the day of first issue. We argue that 
controlling for the benefits of retaining shares, the residual impact of retention on underpricing 
represents a cost to the issuers that in the context of this paper, constitutes signaling costs. 
  
3.5.1 Further Tests on Signaling Hypothesis 
We define successful sponsors as those who maintain their ownership in the REIT and asset 
management company during the study period. Failed sponsors are defined as sponsors who 
liquidate or dispose of their interest in the REIT and asset management companies within the first 
three years of IPO.20 Prior literature has shown that the presence of shareholders with longer 
investment horizons leads to greater investment efficiency and can mitigate the incentive for 
myopic investment decisions (James, 1999; Stein, 1988, 1989). We therefore posit that REITs 
that have witnessed a change in sponsor after their IPO tend to be associated with poor financial 
                                                             
20 Sponsor turnover is a material event due to the intimate relationship between the REIT and its sponsors. 
Change in sponsors often leads to the change in REIT name and the disposal of IPO sponsor’s shares in the 
advisory company and the REIT to a new sponsor. 
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performance either at the sponsor or the REIT level. Our data confirm this assertion. Table 3.9 
shows that of the 8 incidences of sponsor turnover (10% of sample IPOs), four sponsors filed for 
bankruptcy, one sponsor was suspended from trading, one REIT filed for bankruptcy. In addition, 
two REITs reported a downgrade in their debt rating prior to the sponsor change event.   
 
Table 3.9: Sponsor turnover  




Reasons to sponsor turnover 
1 eAsset Investment (now known as 
la Salle japan) 
1.5 year (JREIT) N.A. 
2 Creed Office Investment (now 
known as Japan Office Investment 
Corporation) 
2.8 years (JREIT) Sponsor (Creed Corporation) filed for 
bankruptcy 
3 Re-Plus Residential Investment 
(now known as Japan Rental 
Investment) 
2.3 years (JREIT) Sponsor (Re-Plus Inc) filed for 
bankruptcy 
4 Nippon Commercial Investment 2.5 years (JREIT) Sponsor (Pacific Holdings) filed for 
bankruptcy. Delisted on November 26, 
2010, and merged with United Urban 
Investment Corporation on December 
1, 2010. 
5 Blife Investment 2.7 years (JREIT) Main sponsor (Morimoto Co Ltd) filed 
for bankruptcy.  
6 Allco (now known as Fraser 
Commercial REIT) 
2.4 years (SREIT) Sponsor’s (Allco Finance Group) 
shares were suspended from trading in 
Australia. Interest in Allco REIT was 
sold to repay debts. 
 
7 Macquarie Prime REIT (now 
known as Starhill Global REIT) 
3.2 years (SREIT) Debt ratings were downgraded by 
Moody’s two months prior to the 
completion of sponsor turnover on 
account of its weak financials 
8 Macarthurcook Industrial REIT 
(now known as AIMS-AMP 
Capital Industrial REIT) 
2.7 years (SREIT) Debt ratings were downgraded by 
Moody’s five months prior to the 
completion of sponsor turnover on 
account of its weak financials 
 
We appeal to a logistic regression model (reported in Table 3.10) where the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that is set equal to one if the REIT maintain its sponsor for three 
years after IPO, and zero otherwise. The sample size is reduced to 68 in Model 9 after eliminating 
IPOs with less than 3 years of operating history as of May 2010. The key explanatory variables 
are proxies for quality, i.e. Underpricing, Sponsor ownership and Sponsor reputation. As 
motivated by Gompers and Lerner (1999), we include the natural logarithm of Issue size, BM 
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(book-to-market) ratio and Premarket demand. Gompers and Lerner (1999) argue that the 
insignificant of Issue size and BM ratio would imply that size and book-to-market portfolio have 





Results from Model 9 support the signaling hypothesis. All proxies for quality have the 
expected positive and significant signs, suggesting that high quality firms (firms that do not 
change their sponsor) are associated with high quality signals.21, 22 We interpret these results as 
evidence that high quality firms are able to signal their quality type via Underpricing, Sponsor 
ownership and Sponsor reputation during the IPO stage. These results are analogous to the 
finding of Cai, Duxbury and Keasey (2007) who find that the level of underpricing and the 
percentage of equity retained by issuers are positively and significantly associated with the 
likelihood of successful firms (firms that do not delisted from the exchange). The estimated 
coefficient on Sponsor ownership, however, becomes insignificant once we control for Premarket 
demand (Model 10). 
To further test the signaling hypothesis, we evaluate whether issuers (sponsors) that 
underprice more tend to return to the capital market for additional issuance of securities 
(conducting SEOs within the first 3-years after IPO) or tend to be a repeat player (sponsoring 
more than one REIT in our study period). Signaling-based models hypothesize that IPO issuers 
have incentive to “leave a good taste in the investor mouths” because of the possibility of coming 
                                                             
21 Our results do not change when we exclude the underpricing variable from the regression models. 
 
22 We also carried additional tests by examining the sponsors’ stock price performance (buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns) after the first trading day of their sponsored IPOs. We find that more underpriced IPOs 
are associated with higher abnormal returns (1-, 2- and 3-year windows after the IPO date). This is 
consistent with the signaling hypothesis that high quality sponsors are more willing to underprice their IPO.    
 
Sponsor turnover=α + β1Underpricing + β2Log(Sponsor reputation) +  β3Log(1+ Sponsor 
ownership) + β4Log(Issue size) + β5Underwriter reputation + β6BM ratio + β7JREIT + 
β8Premarket demand + ε                                                                                                      (3)                   
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back to the market to sell securities on more favorable terms. The findings (not reported here but 
available upon request) reveal that there is no significant relationship between these variables and 
underpricing.  
 
Table 3.10: Logit analysis of sponsor commitment in the first three years after IPO 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one for REITs that maintain their sponsor for three 
years after IPO and zero otherwise. Standard errors robust have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 




































Sponsor commitment in 
the first three years after 
IPO (0,1) 
 
Model 9 Model 10 
Intercept 3.707 26.946 
 
(1.40) (1.15) 
Underpricing 8.779* 11.859* 
 
(1.65) (1.66) 
Sponsor reputation  0.614** 0.922*** 
 
(2.16) (2.57) 
Sponsor ownership 10.222* 9.068 
 
(1.89) (1.33) 
Issue size -1.540 -1.356 
 
(-1.39) (-1.02) 
Underwriter reputation -1.664 -11.103 
 
(-0.13) (-0.82) 
BM ratio -0.785 -0.579 
 
(-0.91) (-0.41) 
JREIT (0,1) 1.266 1.799 
 
(1.20) (1.42) 
Premarket demand  -25.262 
 
 (-1.12) 
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.24 
Number of Obs  68 60 
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3.5.2 Wealth Gain from Retaining IPO Shares   
Barry (1989) is the first to explicitly show that the cost of underpricing to the issuer declines as 
share retention rises. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Bradley and Jordan (2002) subsequently 
provide empirical evidence showing that there is a positive relationship between number of shares 
retained by the pre-IPO shareholders and underpricing. The intuition is that owners who sell 
fewer shares during IPO suffer only marginally from underpricing. These studies, however, do 
not control for the potential benefits of retaining shares that could offset the cost of underpricing. 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) eventually filled this gap using prospect theory, which predicts that 
issuers offset the wealth loss from leaving money on the table (underpricing) with larger wealth 
gains on the retained shares from a price jump (partial adjustment phenomena). The key 
implication from Loughran and Ritter’s (2002) model is the positive covariance of money left on 
the table and wealth changes.23  
Consistent with Loughran and Ritter (2002), we construct a variable, Wealth change, to 
capture the sponsors’ unexpected wealth gain following a positive price revision in the final offer 
price. Wealth change is measured as the sponsor ownership multiplied by the change in the value 
per share from the midpoint of filling price range to the closing market price and is expected to be 
positively related to underpricing. It therefore controls for the sponsors’ willingness to underprice 
in order to generate strong premarket demand that would more than offset their loss from 
underpricing. We argue that controlling for these unexpected wealth gains from retaining shares, 
the residual impact from holding shares represents the signaling cost to be borne by the sponsor. 
Results from Table 3.11 shows that the positive interrelationship between Underpricing 
and Sponsor ownership is maintained even after controlling for sponsor’s potential wealth gain 
from retaining IPO shares. The significant and positive coefficient on Wealth change further 
                                                             
23 While Loughran and Ritter (2002) provide descriptive statistics to back their claim that pre-IPO 
shareholders’ wealth change are positively related to underpricing, they do not conduct a multivariate 
regression on the determinants of underpricing with pre-IPO shareholders’ wealth change as one of the 
independent variable.  
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sheds light on why sponsors leave money on the table. In line with Loughran and Ritter (2002), 
our results suggest that sponsors who suffered share dilution from underpricing are 
simultaneously compensated by the good news in the form of unanticipated wealth increases. 
Note that we do not include Premarket demand in the regression models in Table 3.11 since this 








































                                                             
24 Our results are robust to the incorporation of Premarket demand into the regression models in Table 3.11. 
The coefficients for Premarket demand however turn insignificant once we control for Wealth change, 
suggesting that the positive link between Premarket demand and Underpricing is mainly driven by 
Loughran and Ritter’s (2002) wealth gain story. 
 
Chapter Three  IPO 
81 
 
Table 3.11: Further test of dilution hypothesis  
Wealth change is measured as the number of shares retained by the sponsors multiplied by the change in 
the value per share from the midpoint of the filling price range to the closing market price on the first day 
of trading. This variable is proxies for the change in sponsors’ wealth during the interval between when the 
file price range is set and the close of trading on the first day of issue. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Definition for other 















































 Panel A: 2SLS Panel B: OLS 




 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Intercept -0.137 0.045 -0.135* 0.022 
 (-1.23) (1.06) (-1.70) (0.50) 
Underpricing  0.204***  0.130*** 
  (2.77)  (3.01) 
Sponsor ownership 2.185***  1.176***  
 (3.21)  (3.06)  
Sponsor reputation 0.005  0.011  
 (0.34)  (1.16)  
Issue size -0.034  -0.006  
 (-0.63)  (-0.14)  
Underwriter reputation -0.428  -0.533  
 (-0.86)  (-1.37)  
Stock volatility  5.122** -0.932 5.131* -0.244 
 (2.27) (-1.28) (1.68) (-0.34) 
First issue (0,1) 0.038  0.045  
 (1.07)  (1.29)  
Office (0,1) -0.031  -0.030  
 (-0.93)  (-1.27)  
Institutional holdings 0.258** -0.111*** 0.147** -0.106*** 
 (2.33) (-4.75) (2.24) (-4.79) 
Lag market return -0.085  -0.122  
 (-0.32)  (-0.54)  
Wealth change 0.003*** -0.001*** 0.003*** -0.001*** 
 (5.46) (-3.65) (3.17) (-2.71) 
Developer IPO (0,1)  0.022**  0.027** 
  (2.46)  (-2.71) 
Firm size  0.022  0.029* 
  (1.61)  (1.68) 
Growth opportunity  -0.023*  -0.025** 
  (-1.82)  (-2.44) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs  64 64 64 67 
R2 0.53 0.82 0.49 0.71 
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3.6 Conclusions  
Despite the economic importance and growth opportunities contributed by the sponsor, little is 
known about the role played by the sponsor in the pricing of IPOs. Our study addresses this gap 
in the empirical literature by investigating hypotheses relating to how sponsor certification, 
signaling, and moral hazard considerations affect the level of underpricing and the IPO ownership 
structure. The IPO literature tends to examine these issues using a single equation approach 
which assumes that both underpricing and the number of shares retained by the sponsor are 
exogenously determined. The unique contribution of our study is the modeling of pricing and 
share retention decisions within a simultaneuos framework.  
Our results suggest a positive association between underpricing and sponsor ownership. 
This is consistent with Grinblatt and Hwang’s (1989) signaling model in which firms use both 
underpricing and share ownership to signal their quality types. Importantly, this bidirectional 
relationship is robust to controlling for the wealth gain reaped by the sponsor from retaining 
shares. This allows us to attribute the positive link between sponsor ownership and underpricing 
as signaling costs borne by the sponsor. Consistent with the commitment hypothesis, we find that 
developer sponsors tend to hold more IPO shares, possibly to compensate investors for potential 













RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS, WEALTH EXPROPRIATION AND FIRM 
VALUATION: EVIDENCE FROM REITS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
From an agency cost perspective, related party transactions (RPTs) are often viewed negatively, 
because they provide direct opportunities for the related parties to expropriate wealth from 
minority shareholders. For example, a related party may sell its assets and/-or services to a listed 
REITs at an inflated price. In the corporate finance literature, such activities are commonly 
referred to as “tunneling”. RPTs can also alter the reliability of financial statements, thereby 
reducing the effectiveness of contracts designed to reduce agency conflicts (Kohlbeck and 
Mayhew, 2004). Classic anecdotal examples include Enron, which used special purpose entities 
where its CFO was the general partner to manipulate income, and Adelphia, which provided 
extensive loans to executives with the intention of deceiving investors and stealing company cash 
to line their own pockets. Most studies of tunneling focus on the corporate experience in Asia. 
Academic studies by Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2006), Berkman, Cole and Fu (2009), Cheung 
et al. (2009) and Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010) also conclude that RPTs are harmful to shareholders. 
Despite the large number of prior studies of RPTs, none has specifically examined the 
occurrence of RPTs within the REIT context. It is worthwhile focusing on the REIT markets in 
Asia for the following reasons. First, the Asian business landscape provides fertile ground for 
studying issues related to RPTs. In its 2009 report, the OECD stated that abusive RPTs, where a 
party in control of a company enters into a transaction to the detriment of non-controlling 
shareholders, are one of the biggest corporate governance challenges facing Asian businesses.
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Second, REITs in Asia are not subject to the 5-50 ownership rule that is applicable in the US.1 As 
a result, sponsors tend to retain a higher percentage of newly listed REITs. On average, REIT 
sponsors in Asia retained 35.7% of their shares in newly listed REITs, compared to only 17.2% in 
the case of US REIT IPOs (see Hartzell, Kallberg, and Liu, 2004). This higher concentration of 
ownership, in turn, leads to the managerial entrenchment of the sponsors and the expropriation of 
the wealth of minority shareholders. Third, unlike in the US where internal management is the 
dominant model, REIT regimes in Asia tend to adopt the external-management model, whereby 
the external advisor is a wholly owned subsidiary of the sponsor. This leads to a captive situation 
where the interests of minority shareholders are heavily controlled by the sponsors. In particular, 
under external management, the sponsor continues to sell its assets and management services to 
the listed REIT, creating potential sponsor-shareholder conflict. 
A few studies, such as Capozza and Seguin (2000), have found that externally-managed 
REITs are more prone to abuse by their external advisors through the excessive use of debt to 
finance asset growth. Capozza and Seguin (2000) argue that the compensation contracts of 
external managers that are pegged to the size of the asset under management incentivize 
managers to enlarge their asset base by issuing more debt, even at terms that are less than optimal. 
Hsieh and Sirmans (1991) cite real cases of abusive related party transactions in the US REIT 
sector, where the captive REITs pay too much in buying properties from the sponsor and provide 
financing to parties related to the sponsors at a cost lower than the market rate. Empirically, they 
find that the financial performance of captive REITs is inferior to that of non-captive REITs.  
There are, nevertheless, stringent rules to protect minority shareholders. For example, 
RPTs must be disclosed through a circular to the shareholders2 and if the transaction value is 
                                                             
1Under the 5-50 rule, no more than five shareholders are allowed to hold more than a 50% share of a REIT. 
Note that after the enactment of the “look-through” provision in 1993, institutional holdings are no longer 
regarded as a single entity (Bianco, Ghosh and Sirmans, 2007).  
 
2 The threshold to immediately inform a stock exchange of RPTs varies from 0.25% in the case of Malaysia, 
to 1% and 3% for Hong Kong and Singapore, respectively. REITs may seek a general mandate from the 
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more than 5% of the firm’s net asset value, prior approval from shareholders is required. In the 
case of the acquisition of properties from related parties, a valuation report and written 
confirmation from the trustee (supported by a report from an independent financial advisor) that 
the transaction is on normal commercial terms and not prejudicial to the REIT shareholders are 
required. Material RPTs may also require prior approval from an independent audit committee. 
Moreover, monitoring activities by independent directors, institutional investors, debt providers 
and analysts may discourage wealth expropriation by related parties. The general conclusion of 
prior studies on the corporate governance of REITs, such as Hartzell, Sun and Titman (2006), 
Bianco, Chinmoy and Sirmans (2007) and Bauer, Eichholtz and Kok (2010), is that REITs are 
unique and corporate governance mechanisms are less critical because of the strict rules 
regulating REITs. Thus, it is unclear whether RPTs are indeed detrimental to the minority 
shareholders of REITs.  
Our empirical investigation is carried out in two stages. First, we examine the frequency 
and nature of the RPTs undertaken by a sample of REITs listed in three markets in Asia. Second, 
we analyse the economic consequences of the RPTs for minority shareholders. In contrast to prior 
studies on tunneling by firms in East Asia, which focused primarily on the expropriation of 
wealth by the controlling individuals through dubious channels such as inter-corporate loans 
(Jiang, Lee and Yue, 2010) and loan guarantees (Berkman, Cole and Fu, 2009), RPTs conducted 
by the REITs in our study sample tend to be transactions between the sponsors, who are also the 
majority shareholders, and the listed REITs.3 Specifically, we find that procurements from related 
parties are by far the most common type of RPT engaged in by REITs. They may be in the form 
of recurrent management services or the ad-hoc acquisition of assets from the sponsor. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
shareholders to waive the requirement for immediate announcements as well as approval for material 
recurring RPTs. Nevertheless, REITs still have to disclose the RPTs in their annual reports.  
 
3 We do not make any distinction between sponsor and non-sponsor RPTs in our empirical tests in Section 
5, as some REITs in our sample do not provide the identity of the related parties in their annual reports. 
Nevertheless, based on observations with data on the identity of the related parties, we find that, on average, 
sponsors contributed to 85.6% (median: 97.5%) of the total dollar value of RPTs during the study period.   
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regression results indicate that RPTs are generally not harmful to REIT shareholders. On the 
contrary, we find that property acquisitions from related parties are beneficial to firm valuations, 
except during the financial crisis of 2008-09.  
We believe that this is due to the “growth” story which is prized in the stock market, 
thereby resulting in the REITs with pipelines of assets on standby for future acquisition being 
favored. Our results are robust after controlling for firms’ corporate governance characteristics. In 
sum, this chapter makes two main contributions to the literature. First, we highlight the incidence 
and the main channels of the RPTs conducted by REITs. Second, we highlight a special case 
where RPTs, particularly REITs’ acquisition of properties from related parties, are not 
detrimental to minority shareholders.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the related literature and outlines 
our main hypothesis. Section 4.3 describes the research design and data. The basic regression 
model is presented in Section 4.4, followed by a discussion of the estimation results. Section 4.5 
examines how investors price the ‘pipeline story’ of RPTs into the stock pricing of IPOs. Section 
4.6 summarizes the key findings. 
 
4.2 Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
The roots of the research on RPTs can be traced back to the studies of the agency costs that 
originate from the agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
These agency conflicts are of particular significance in companies with concentrated ownership 
because the controlling shareholders have the ability and incentive to expropriate resources out of 
the firm at the expense of minority shareholders. Baek, Kang and Park (2004) find that firms with 
concentrated ownership by business groups (chaebols) experienced the largest value losses during 
the crisis in Korea. Their evidence indicates that the agency costs imposed by concentrated 
ownership are reflected in the value of the stocks during crisis periods. Other studies show that 
firms where the controlling shareholders are in a better position to expropriate shareholders trade 
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at a lower value (Claesens et al., 2002), register a lower operating profits (Joh, 2003), make lower 
dividend payouts (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000), and are subject to 
higher liquidity costs (Brockman and Chung, 2003).  
However, as noted by Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2006) these studies at best provide 
indirect evidence of expropriation, as there is no direct evidence that the value of minority 
shareholdings has declined as a result of specific acts of expropriation. Focusing on a sample 
RPTs between listed firms in Hong Kong and their controlling shareholders, the authors show 
that RPTs that are a priori likely to result in expropriation (e.g., asset acquisitions, asset sales, 
equity sales, and trading relationships) result in considerable shareholder value being destroyed 
during and after the 12-months following the announcement of these events. Cheung et al. (2009) 
subsequently reconfirm these negative announcement effects on transactions that involve 
significant flows of funds between Chinese listed firms and their controlling shareholders such as 
asset acquisitions, asset sales, asset swaps, trading relationships and cash payments. Xiao (2009) 
further shows that the abnormal returns of Chinese listed firms following the announcement of 
RPTs are negatively related to agency costs, as measured by the divergence of control and cash 
flow rights. In other words, firms prone to agency issues (a high control to cash flow ratio) are 
more likely to engage in value-destroying RPTs.  
This view of RPTs as involving conflicts of interest is echoed by Chien and Hsu (2010), 
Lin, Liu and Keng (2010), Ryngaert and Thomas (2007), Gordon, Henry and Palia (2004), and 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004) using a cross-sectional regression approach. Chien and Hsu (2010) 
find an inverse relationship between RPTs (sales, interest income and interest expenses) and firm 
profitability as measured by return on assets in a sample of Taiwanese listed firms. Ryngaert and 
Thomas (2007) and Gordon, Henry and Palia (2004) both examine data from the US and 
conclude that RPTs are associated with reduced shareholder wealth. Lin, Liu and Keng (2010) 
and Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004) find support for the dual effects of RPTs where certain types 
of RTPs are value-enhancing, while others are value-destroying. For instance, Lin, Liu and Keng 
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(2010) find that while related party purchases and sales are, on average, beneficial to shareholders, 
related party sales and purchases with unfavorable credit terms and excessive loan guarantees are 
harmful as they result in the expropriation of minority shareholders’ interests. Moreover, these 
types of RPTs are negatively related to firm value (as measured by Tobin’s Q and earning per 
share). Kohlbeck and Mayhey (2004) find that future stock returns are marginally higher for 
companies engaging in investment type RPTs while simple RPTs, such as loans guarantees, 
borrowings, consulting, legal services and leases, are associated with lower future returns.        
Cheung et al. (2009) extend the literature on RPTs by showing exactly how expropriation 
can occur. They observe that firms listed in Hong Kong enter into deals with related parties with 
unfavorable prices compared to similar arm’s length deals. In a similar vein, Berkman, Cole and 
Fu (2009) show that the issuance of related guarantees by Chinese firms has a negative impact on 
firm value and financial performance. Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010) document how controlling 
shareholders abused inter-corporate loans to siphon billons of RMB from hundreds of Chinese 
listed companies. 
While the existing studies tend to support the notion that RPTs are abusive, RPTs may be 
harmless or beneficial to shareholders when they arise as an efficient contracting arrangement 
between a firm and its related parties. Ryngaert and Thomas (2007) argue that it makes business 
sense for a firm to enter into a contract with a related supplier or franchisee due to better 
coordination and communication between the two parties. This practice also mitigates potential 
losses due to holdup problems in the contracting process or to the break-up of contractual 
relationships. For example, Ryngaert and Thomas (2007) contend that “when a subsidiary of a 
parent company is spun off to shareholders, it makes sense to have the former parent (and 
significant shareholder) continue to provide back-office support functions (as long as the former 
parent is the lowest cost provider).” Thus, one prediction of the “efficient contracting” 
hypothesis is that RPT announcements are good news and should be associated with a positive 
stock price reaction.  
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In addition to the efficient contracting hypothesis, there is an alternative hypothesis that 
describes the backing of controlling shareholders in the form of earnings management through the 
propping up of the firm’s earnings. Jian and Wong (2010) find that Chinese companies prop up 
their earnings via related party sales to their controlling shareholders. These related party sales 
are used by firms to meet securities regulators’ earning targets to maintain their listing status or to 
qualify for right issues. Similarly, Aharony, Wang and Yuan (2008) document that Chinese listed 
firms use related party sales to upwardly manage their earnings during the pre-IPO period.     
To the best of my knowledge, no study has examined RPTs in a REIT setting. The two 
papers that are closest to the present study are Ooi, Ong and Neo (2011) and Lecomte and Ooi 
(2010). Using an event study methodology, Ooi, Ong and Neo (2011) show that the related party 
acquisitions made by Singapore and Japan REITs during 2002-2007 do not have significant 
impact on announcement returns. Lecomte and Ooi (2010), on the other hand, use the disclosure 
quality of RPTs as one of the governance factors to construct a corporate governance index for 
Singapore REITs. Although they show that the sub-scores for the disclosure quality of RPTs are 
not significantly related to stock performance, the results are inconclusive as they do not evaluate 
the materiality of RPTs and its relation with either firm value or firm performance.  
It is worthwhile extending the above studies in the following ways. First, by 
incorporating both recurring and one-off related party transactions to ascertain which type of RPT 
is more prone to agency issues. Second, by uncovering the time series variation of RPTs and its 
impact on firm value during different economic conditions, as RPTs may be prone to 
expropriation during periods of economic distress. Third, by exploring how the market values the 
future RPTs incurred by a REIT during the IPO stage. Specifically, if the market views RPTs as a 
potential growth opportunity in the form of a pipeline of properties for future acquisition, we 
would expect the dollar value of the related party acquisitions conducted by the REIT after the 
IPO to be positively related to IPO underpricing.   
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The foregoing literature review leads to the null hypothesis that, “RPTs are not related to 
firm value”. In other words, the null hypothesis is that RPTs do not affect firm value and, hence, 
we do not expect to see a significant regression coefficient for RPTs. However, if the market 
believes that the presence of RPTs is associated with decreased shareholder wealth, as predicted 
by the wealth expropriation hypothesis, then firm value will be negatively associated with RPTs. 
Conversely, if the stock market thinks that RPTs are beneficial to shareholder wealth, as predicted 
by the contract efficiency hypothesis, then there will be a positive relationship between firm value 
and RPTs. 
 
4.3 Data and Research Design  
4.3.1 Data  
The main source of information on RPTs is the annual reports of the individual REITs, which are 
extracted from their websites.4 Related persons include a listed REIT’s substantial shareholders, 
sponsors, directors, chief executive officer, manager and trustee. Under the listing regulations, 
there is a minimum threshold for the disclosure of RPTs, which varies from S$100,000 in 
Singapore and RM 250,000 in Malaysia to HK$1 million in Hong Kong.5 Information disclosures 
in the annual report are characterized according to the party or parties involved, the type of 
transaction, and the amounts of transactions. To synchronize the reporting periods of the firms, 
we classify a financial statement to be of a particular year if its year-end falls between June of 
that year and May of the subsequent year. The final sample consists of 127 firm-year observations 
covering 38 REITs from 2003 to 2009.  
                                                             
4 RPTs are described under the section entitled “Related/Interested Party Transactions” for Singapore 
REITs, “Transaction with a Company Related to the Manager” for Malaysia REITs, and “Connected 
Party Transactions and Significant Related Party Transactions and Balances” for Hong Kong REITs. 
 
5 In comparison, the threshold value is USD120,000 in the US. Whilst REITs in Asia have a standard and 
formal policy for review, approval and disclosure of RPTs, the practices in the US are less consistent. Our 
cursory investigation shows that US REITs may not announce their RPTs immediately to the stock 
exchange and only report them in the financial reports. In contrast, REITs in Asia are required to make 
immediate announcement to the stock exchange for material RPTs, which are defined as 1%, 3% and 0.25% 
of total assets, in Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia, respectively. 
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We note that all the REITs have engaged in some form of RPT. We also find that the 
average size of RPTs recorded annually by REITs listed in the Asian markets (5.4% of total 
assets) is much higher than the 2.86% recorded by industrial firms in the US (Ryngaert and 
Thomas, 2007). The annual size of the RPTs ranges from a minimum of 0.1% to a maximum of 
47.0% of the total assets of a REIT. The magnitude of the RPTs also varies from year to year. 
Figure 4.1 shows that the three main channels for RPTs by REITs are the acquisition of real 
estate assets from related parties (57.8%), income earned from related parties (23.1%) and 
management fees paid to related parties (13.9%).6 The manager’s fees are paid to an external 
REIT manager, which is usually a wholly owned subsidiary of the sponsor. These fees are pegged 
to the size of the asset under management (AUM). Moreover, the REIT manager earns 
acquisitions fee equivalent to 1% of the value of the properties acquired. Property manager’s fees 
are paid as a separate management fees to the property manager for the day-to-day operation of 
the properties. The property manager is normally wholly owned by the sponsor. Rental income is 
generated from the leasing of properties to the related parties. It is common for the REIT sponsors 
to sign a sale and leaseback agreement with the REIT before disposing their properties to the 
REIT. 
Related party acquisitions deserve additional attention because they are the most common 
form of RPTs engaged in by the REITs. Moreover, the amounts involved are usually much larger 
than the other types of RPT and the transactions are mostly ad-hoc in nature. The main concern 
with related party acquisitions is the “fairness” of the price relative to the value of the assets 
being transferred from the controlling shareholders to the REIT. For example, Cheung et al. 
(2009) find that controlling shareholders appear to benefit directly at the expense of publicly 
listed firms in Hong Kong, by selling assets to the firms at above market prices and by acquiring 
                                                             
6 Other minor recurring RPTs include share service expenses, accounting services, IT service fees, debt 
advisory and arrangement fees and various consultancy fees. Other non-recurring RPTs include interest 
expenses (1.3%), interest income (0.2%), and fees related to the issuance of securities (0.2%) and banker 
guarantees (0.6%). Interest expenses are paid for loans granted to the REIT by the sponsor, which is not 
common.  
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assets from them at below market prices. To what extent this wealth expropriation problem 
applies to REITs is debatable, as they operate within a much more transparent and stringent 
corporate governance environment. Specifically, REITs acquiring properties from related parties 
need to obtain an independent valuation of the fair value of the property. The trustees are also 
required to submit written confirmation backed by a report from an independent financial advisor 
that the transaction is on normal commercial terms and not prejudicial to the REIT shareholders. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: RPTs by Asian REITs (% of total assets)  
 
 
4.3.2 Research Design 
Generally, there are two approaches to investigating the impact of RPTs on firm value. The first 
approach relies on extracting significant RPTs from the corporate announcement archives for 
individual REITs made available at the stock exchanges. An event study methodology is then 
employed to measure the wealth effects of the RPT announcements (Cheung et al., 2006, 2009). 
The second approach relies on the total dollar value of RPTs disclosed in the annual reports. An 
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dollar amount of RPTs and firm value or performance (Chien and Hsu, 2010; Lin, Liu and Keng, 
2010; Ryngaert and Thomas, 2007; Gordon, Henry and Palia, 2004; Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 
2004). While the event study approach allows us to capture the impact of material RPT 
announcements, the OLS approach allows us to investigate the time variation of RPTs while 
capturing one-off and continuous RPTs. We resort to the second approach. The results obtained 
using this OLS regression should be seen as complementing the findings discovered using the 
event study methodology. 
To test the relationship between RPTs and firm valuation, we conduct a regression 
analysis using firms’ Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable in the models. As noted by Ryngaert 
and Thomas (2007), Tobin’s Q ratios are frequently used as performance indicators, especially in 
studies of the effect of firm governance on firm value. Prior studies employing a similar 
methodology include Gordon, Henry and Palia (2004), Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004), Ryngaert 
and Thomas (2007), Chien and Hsu (2010) and Lin, Liu and Keng (2010). For robustness, we 
also repeat the estimations with ROA as the dependent variable. In addition, we follow Bauer, 
Eichholtz and Kok (2010) in using a time-fixed effects approach and adjust standard errors to 
account for serial correlation within the firm-cluster. The key variable on the right-hand side is 
the proxy for RPTs, which is represented by All RPTs. If RPTs are harmful, then we would see a 
negative and significant relationship between RPTs and Tobin’s Q. We also decompose the total 
RPTs into the major channels, namely related acquisitions, income RPTs, fee-based RPTs and 
miscellaneous RPTs.  
The control variables included in the right-hand side of the regression model include a set 
of firm characteristics and another set of dummy variables for property type and country. Firm 
characteristics include firm size, leverage and age. Finally, a time dummy is incorporated into the 
model to account for the credit crisis during 2008-09. Firm size is measured as the natural log of 
total assets. Firm valuation is expected to be higher in larger firms, as they are less exposed to 
expropriation from the controlling shareholders because large firms usually have better disclosure, 
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more liquid trading and receive more attention from analysts (Claessens et al., 2002). Firm size 
also serves as a control for economies of scale that boost firm value. Leverage, measured as the 
ratio of total debt to total assets, is used control to for financial distress and bankruptcy risk. We 
expect a negative relationship between Leverage and Tobin’s Q. Similar to Ryngaert and Thomas 
(2007), we also control for Firm age, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of months 
from IPO date. Younger firms are more likely to have greater growth options which lead to 
higher valuation, hence, we expect a negative relationship between this variable and firm value. 
We also control for Non-related party acquisitions measured as the total value of property 
acquisitions in a fiscal year minus the related party acquisitions in the corresponding period 
scaled by total assets. This is an important control as it allows us to attribute our findings of a 
relation between acquisitions and firm value to the roles of a related party. Descriptive statistics 
of the sample are presented in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics  
 
 






   
 
Tobin’s Q Market value of equity minus the book 
value of equity plus total assets divided by 
total assets 
0.902 0.224 0.490 1.651 
ROA Net income divided by total assets 0.054 0.073 -0.154 0.256 
Independent Variables     
RPTs      
All RPTs Total RPTs scaled by total assets 0.054 0.085 0.001 0.470 
Related Acquisitions Related party acquisitions scaled by total 
assets 
0.031 0.083 0.000 0.450 
Income RPTs Rental and interest income earned from 
related parties scaled by total assets 
0.012 0.022 0.000 0.107 
Fee-based RPTs  Manager, property manager and trustee’s 
fees scaled by total assets 
0.008 0.004 0.000 0.018 
Other RPTs Project management expenses, other 
miscellaneous RPTs & guarantees scaled by 
total assets 
0.003 0.007 0.000 0.071 
Firm characteristics      
Firm Size  
Total assets at the fiscal year ($M)* 1458.88 1605.06 52.64 7589.7
0 
Debt Ratio Total debts scaled by total assets 0.285 0.108 0.000 0.545 
Firm Age Number of months since IPO* 31.98 16.71 3.0 88.0 
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* natural logarithm 
 
 
 The mean REIT in our sample has assets of $1.459 billion. The average REIT has a debt 
ratio of 28.5% and is less than 3 years old. The Tobin’s Q ratio of the sampled firms ranges from 
0.49 to 1.651, with a mean value of 0.902. The average value of the profitability measure (ROA) 
is about 5.4%. 
 
4.4 Estimation Results 
4.4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 4.2 displays the correlation coefficients of the key variables in the regression analysis. For 
brevity, we do not report the correlation coefficients for other control variables. Nevertheless, the 
maximum variance inflation factors (VIF) between our key explanatory variables (RPTs variables) 
and the control variables is 3.00, which is much smaller than the acceptable cut-off point of 10, 
implying that the problems of multicollinearity are acceptable (Gujarati, 2003). The relationship 
between ROA and Tobin’s Q is positive and significant, implying that Tobin’s Q is a good 
indicator of firm performance (0.28). As expected the correlation between Credit crisis and 
Tobin’s Q is negative and significant when REIT valuation drops during the credit crisis periods 
(-0.55). The relation between All RPTs and Tobin’s Q is positive (0.17), but not statistically 
significant. The breakdown of RPTs by type is revealing. While we do not find significant 
relationships between Fees-based RPTs (0.01), Income RPTs (-0.04) and Other RPTs expenses (-
0.02) with Tobin’s Q, the relationship is positive and significant at the 5% level for Related 
acquisitions. This provides preliminary support for the claim that related party acquisitions are 
beneficial to shareholders. Similarly, Non-RPT acquisitions also exhibit a positive and significant 
relationship with Tobin’s Q (0.23). It is therefore important to control for non-RPT acquisitions in 
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our regression analysis, as the market may react in the same way to all acquisition announcements, 
irrespective of the identity of the property vendors.  
 
Table 4.2: Pearson correlation matrix of regression variables 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Tobin’s Q 1.00         
2. ROA 0.28* 1.00        
3. Credit Crisis (0,1) -0.55* -0.35* 1.00       
4. All RPTs 0.17 0.12 -0.16 1.00      
5. Fees-based RPTs 0.01 -0.16 -0.14 0.08 1.00     
6. Income RPTs -0.04 0.15 0.12 0.15 -0.33* 1.00    
7 Related acquisitions  0.18* 0.01 -0.17 0.97* 0.13 -0.09 1.00   
8 Non-Related 
acquisitions 
0.23* 0.10 -0.27* -0.08 0.16 -0.06 -0.06 1.00  
9. Other RPTs -0.02 0.00 -0.17 0.16 -0.08 -0.01 0.08 -0.12 1.00 
* indicating significance at the 5% level. 
 
4.4.2 The Wealth Effects of RPTs 
The estimation results are presented in Table 4.3. Note that all the regression models include 
fixed effects for country and property type. Model 1 is the base model to determine the 
relationship between RPTs and the dependent variable, namely Tobin’s Q. In Model 2, we 
decompose the single All RPTs into four separate components, namely Fees-Based RPTs, Income 
RPTs, Other RPTs and Related Acquisitions. As noted earlier, the first two items are recurring 
items, while the last item is non-recurring. The coefficients for the respective components will 
help to distinguish whether all or only selected components of RPTs are good. In Model 3, we 
test the robustness of the results by incorporating firm-specific attributes. In Model 4, we control 
for the effect of the global financial crisis by incorporating an additional binary variable, Credit 
Crisis, which equals to one for the period 2008-2009.7 In addition, we interact this new variable 
with Related Acquisitions and Non-Related Acquisitions to examine whether their effects on 
                                                             
7 There is a consensus that the global financial crisis began in September 2008 after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, which triggered a credit and liquidity crunch throughout the world. The conditions, however, 
began to ease at the beginning of 2Q 2009 with the announcements of stimulus packages and the injection 
of massive liquidity into the market by governments. 
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corporate value are consistent across different market conditions. The theoretical model of 
Johnson et al. (2000a) shows that periods of economic distress can result in more expropriation 
by managers, as the marginal cost for diverting resources away from firms is lower during crisis 
periods. Empirically, the authors document that during the Asian financial crisis, countries with 
weak corporate governance tended to experience severe deterioration in their exchange rates and 
stock market conditions, as investors reassessed and priced the potential agency costs into the 
stock prices.  
Under the null hypothesis that RPTs are not related to firm value, its coefficient would be 
zero. However, we find that the coefficient for All RPTs in Model 1 is positive and statistically 
significant. Thus, contrary to the null hypothesis, it appears that the firm value of REITs that 
engage in more RPTs is higher. The regression results of Model 2 clearly show that the benefits 
of RPTs flow primarily from Related Acquisitions. After controlling for firm attributes, the 
coefficient for Related Acquisitions is statistically insignificant in Model 3. Consistent with 
Ryngaert and Thomas (2007), the coefficient for Firm Size is positive and significant at the 10% 
level. The coefficient for Firm Age, on the other hand, is negative and significant at the 5% level. 
The combined results suggest that while the market values young firms for their potential growth 
opportunities, large firms are also prized for their size, probably due to scale economies and 
higher quality of disclosure.  
Not surprisingly, in Model 4, the coefficient for Credit Crisis is negative and strongly 
significant. The inclusion of this variable, plus the two interactive variables bumps the R2 up from 
0.30 to 0.55. As can be seen, the valuation effect of Related Acquisitions is dependent on the 
market conditions. Specifically, the coefficient for Related Acquisitions remains positive and 
statistically significant in Model 4, indicating that there is a direct relationship between Tobin’s Q 
and Related Acquisitions during good economic times. The coefficient for the interaction variable 
Credit Crisis*Related Acquisitions is, however, negative and statistically significant. This 
indicates that during a credit crisis, real estate acquisitions by REITs from related parties are 
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viewed negatively by the market. This, however, does not apply to acquisitions conducted on an 
arms-length basis during the crisis. 
 
Table 4.3: OLS regression of Tobin’s Q on related party transactions 
The dependent variables are Tobin’s Q, measured as the market value of equity minus the book value of 
equity plus total assets divided by total assets. Related party transactions (RPTs) variables are transactions 
reported in the corresponding fiscal year. All RPTs are scaled by total assets. The other control variables are 
defined as in Table 1. Coefficients for property type and country dummies are not reported. The total 
number of observations in each regression is 127. T-statistics are reported in parentheses with the standard 
errors adjusted for serial correlation within the firm-cluster. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  levels, respectively.  
 
We also run separate regressions on two subsamples according to the credit crisis period 
and non-credit crisis period. The estimation results are reported under Models 5 and 6 in Table 
4.4. Overall, the results confirm that the wealth effects of Related Acquisitions are not consistent 
over time. Specifically, its coefficient is negative and statistically significant during the credit 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.681*** 0.678*** 0.384 0405* 
 (12.69) (8.65) (1.10) (1.89) 
All RPTs  0.580*    
 (1.90)    
Fees-Based RPTs  -2.776 4.525 -2.278 
  (-0.34) (0.55) (0.42) 
Income RPTs  -0.585 -1.503 -1.676 
  (-0.41) (-0.99) (1.13) 
Other RPTs  1.671 -0.227 0.293 
  (0.72) (-0.09) (0.17) 
Related Acquisitions  0.644** 0.542 0.845** 
  (2.04) (1.59) (2.23) 
Non-Related Acquisitions  0.464*** 0.341** 0.261* 
  (3.61) (2.21) (1.85) 
Firm Size   0.211** 0.133** 
   (2.37) (2.03) 
Firm Age   -0.226** 0.045 
   (-2.26) (0.37) 
Leverage   -0.209 -0.179 
   (-1.03) (-1.11) 
Credit Crisis    -0.202*** 
    (-4.30) 
Credit Crisis*Related Acquisitions    -1.231*** 
    (-2.97) 
Credit Crisis*Non-Related Acquisitions    -0.274 
    (-1.22) 
R2 0.18 0.23 0.30 0.55 
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crisis period (Model 5), which is consistent with the wealth expropriation hypothesis. This 
finding is consistent with the results of Johnson et al. (2000a) and Lemmon and Lins (2003), who 
observe that controlling shareholders are more likely to expropriate from minority shareholders 
during an economic crisis. At other times, Related Acquisitions are beneficial to REIT 
shareholders (Model 6).  
 
Table 4.4: OLS regression of Tobin’s Q on related party acquisitions controlling for market 
conditions 
The dependent variables are Tobin’s Q, measured as the market value of equity minus the book value of 
equity plus total assets divided by total assets. Related party transactions (RPTs) variables are transactions 
reported in the corresponding fiscal year. All RPTs are scaled by total assets. The other control variables are 
defined as in Table 1. Credit Crisis is a binary variable equal to one for the fiscal years of 2008 and 2009. 
The coefficients for the property type and country dummies are not reported. The total number of 
observations is 76 for Model 5 (credit crisis sub-sample) and 51 for Model 6 (non-credit crisis sub-sample). 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses, with the standard errors adjusted for serial correlation within the 


















For robustness tests, we control for the number of properties held by REITs in the 
Tobin’s regression since the positive impact from acquisitions may signal other type of 
management structure given the existence of single asset REITs or small portfolio REITs in Asia. 
We also control for macro and fundamental effects by including stock market return (measured as 
the cumulative returns in the previous 2 quarters) and EBITDA coverage. Finally, we replace 
 Model 5 Model 6 
 (credit crisis) (non-crisis 
period) 
Intercept 0.045 0.418 
 (0.31) (1.31) 
Related Acquisitions -0.478*** 0.890** 
 (-2.93) (2.38) 
Non-Related Acquisitions 0.128 0.184 
 (0.48) (0.95) 
Firm Size 0.088 0.150 
 (1.42) (1.65) 
Firm Age 0.242* -0.123 
 (1.89) (-0.80) 
Leverage -0.069 -0.118 
 (-0.59) (-0.34) 
R2 0.34 0.46 
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Firm age, a proxy to growth option with total asset growth (y-o-y). Our results remain intact after 
incorporation of these additional controls.    
There are several possible explanations for the positive results. A recent study by Jian 
and Wong (2010) reveals that Chinese companies prop up their earnings via related party sales 
with their controlling shareholders. According to the authors, the firms use revenue from related 
party sales to meet regulators’ earning targets to either maintain their listing status or to qualify 
for rights issues. Earnings management is unlikely to be the explanation for our observed results 
because, as Figure 4.1 shows, most of the RPTs engaged in by Asian REITs involved cash 
outflow, rather than cash inflow.8 Moreover, the coefficient for Income RPTs is negative and 
statistically insignificant in Model 2 and Model 3. Another explanation suggested by Kohlbeck 
and Mayhew (2004) is that RPTs can be part of a firm’s compensation scheme. Firms that engage 
in RPTs may provide lower cash compensation to reflect the benefits to officers and directors of 
the RPTs. Although this may be applicable in the case of general firms, it does not explain why, 
in the case of REITs, only the coefficient for Related Acquisitions is significant and not the 
coefficient for Fee-based Income. Another possible reason as to why RPTs are beneficial is that 
they facilitate “efficient contracting” arrangements in situations involving incomplete information. 
Ryngaert and Thomas (2007) argue that the close business relationships formed between firms 
and their related parties are value-enhancing, as they mitigate holdup problems in the contracting 
process and reduce the likelihood of breaking the contractual relationship. 
In an event study on the wealth effects of property acquisitions by Asian REITs, Ooi, 
Ong and Neo (2011) observe that one-third of the assets acquired by REITs post-IPO are 
purchased from their sponsors. However, they do not find any significant abnormal returns 
associated with RPTs, indicating that the properties are sold by the sponsor to the REIT at a fair 
market value. Despite the lack of results in the short term, we believe that the real reason why 
                                                             
8 It should be noted that sponsors rarely provide financial assistance to REITs. In our sample, we only 
observe two REITs (Fraser Commercial Trust and K-REIT) receiving loans from their sponsors and one 
REIT (Indiabulls Properties Investment Trust) benefiting from the sponsor guaranteeing its loan.  
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acquisitions from related parties are beneficial to REIT shareholders in the long-run is due to the 
“growth” story favored by the market. As the REITs are newly listed, they possess little, if any, 
track record on growth. However, related acquisitions may offer the REITs a steady pipeline of 
properties to acquire in the future. Our data indeed shows that the year-on-year growth rate of 
REITs is faster for those that engage in a higher proportion of related acquisitions.9 This is not 
surprising as REITs that engage in a high frequency of related acquisitions tend to be linked to 
sponsors who are property developers.  
 
4.4.3 Further Test to Pipeline Story  
To probe deeper into the value creation related to sponsor pipeline support, we conduct further 
tests to determine the association between the financial strength of REIT sponsors and the 
incidence of related party acquisitions conducted by the REITs they are backing. All else being 
equal, we would expect that the REITs that are backed by sponsors with strong financial and 
superior growth prospects to register more related party acquisitions. To test this conjecture, we 
split our sample according to REITs with related party acquisitions versus those without. We 
define REITs with related party acquisitions as those with at least one related acquisition during 
2006-2007. We do not select years prior to 2006 because many REITs are only listed on the stock 
exchange from 2006 onwards. Our initial sample contains 27 REITs, 12 of which have related 
party acquisitions, while the remaining 15 are without related party acquisitions. We then tabulate 
the sponsors’ financial ratios using the 2007 financial year data. We delete four observations with 
missing sponsor financial data. We also exclude three REITs that are sponsored by financial 
institutions, as the capital structure of financial institutions is significantly different from other 
                                                             
 
9 Specifically, we split the sample into two sub-samples based on their level of RPTs. We then compute the 
total assets’ year-on-year growth rate for both sub-groups. We find that the correlation for the first group 
(engaged in more RPTs) is significantly higher than that for the second group (engaged in less of RPTs). 
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industrial firms. Our screens therefore produced a final usable sample of 20 REITs, 10 of which 
are REITs with related party acquisitions, while the remaining 10 are those without.  
Table 4.5 contains the means and corresponding T-test values for our 20 REITs 
characterized by the existence of related acquisitions during normal economic periods. As shown 
in Table 4.5, the mean sizes of sponsors (measured by total assets) between the two subsamples 
are not statistically significant. Although the observed asset growth rate over the preceding 3 
years (3-year asset growth) of the individual sponsors in the related party acquisitions subsample 
is higher, at 57%, than the respective growth rate for the subsample without related party 
acquisitions (49%), they are significantly indifferent. The dollar value of investment properties 
held by sponsors (scaled by total assets), another proxy for growth opportunities, is however 
revealing. The mean investment properties ratio of sponsors in REITs with related party 
acquisitions (0.42) is significantly higher than the mean investment properties ratio for REITs 
without related party acquisition (0.08), at the 1 percent level of significance. This suggests that 
REITs with greater amounts of related party acquisitions in our sample are indeed backed by 
sponsors with strong pipeline capacity, as these investment properties are transferrable to the 
REIT at the appropriate time.  
The sponsors’ mean leverage ratio (total debt/total assets) for the related party 
acquisitions subsample is 0.25, while the corresponding ratio for the subsample without related 
acquisitions is little different at 0.30. The sponsors’ profitability ratios, as measured by ROA and 
ROE, in the related party acquisitions subsample are greater than the corresponding ratios for the 
subsample without related party acquisitions at the 1% level. Similarly, the mean cash holdings 
ratio of sponsors in the related party acquisitions subsample is significantly higher than the cash 
holdings ratio for the subsample without related party acquisitions.   
In summary, the univariate statistics in Table 4.5 suggest that the growth prospects, 
profitability and liquidity of the sponsor differ significantly across our two REIT subsamples. 
REITs with related party acquisitions are backed by sponsors with strong financials and superior 
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growth prospects. This is consistent with the pipeline story we propose in this paper, which 
explains why the market attaches a higher value to REITs with higher levels of related party 
acquisitions. For robustness, we also replicate the univariate tests using data during the financial 
crisis. Table 4.6, however, shows limited univariate evidence to support the hypothesis that the 
financial characteristics of the sponsors in the related party acquisitions subsample differ 
significantly from subsample without related party acquisitions. The only notable difference is 
with respect to profitablity measured by ROA. We find that the REITs that initiated related 
acquisitions during the crisis period are backed by sponsors with significantly higher ROA than 
the REITs without related party acquisitions during the same period.  
Table 4.5: Sponsor financial characteristics by related party acquisitions during non-crisis periods 
The sample is divided according to whether a REIT engages in related party acquisitions during non-crisis 
periods in 2006-2007. We define REITs with related party acquisitions as those with at least one related 
party acquisition during 2006-2007. T-statistics are calculated under the assumption of an equal variance. 











Sponsor characteristics    
Firm size (in USD million) 10,857 14,112 0.624 
3-year asset growth 0.57 0.49 -0.4876 
Investment properties/Total assets 0.419 0.080 5.451*** 
Leverage 0.25 0.30 0.776 
ROA 0.122 0.070 -3.052*** 
ROE 0.213 0.128 -3.238*** 
Cash holdings/Total assets 0.155 0.101 -1.625* 


















Table 4.6: Sponsor financial characteristics by related party acquisitions during crisis periods 
The sample is divided according to whether a REIT engages in related party acquisitions during the crisis 
periods in 2008-2009. We define REITs with related party acquisitions as those with at least one related 
party acquisition during 2008-2009. T-statistics are calculated under the assumption of an equal variance. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 






Sponsor characteristics    
Firm size (in USD million) 13,817 11,628 -0.421 
3-year asset growth 0.315 0.467 1.012 
Investment Properties/Total assets 0.259 0.154 -1.181 
Leverage 0.229 0.289 0.903 
ROA 0.069 0.042 -1.436* 
ROE 0.098 0.121 0.3132 
Cash holdings/Total assets 0.140 0.135 -0.139 
No of observations 8 19  
 
 
4.4.4   Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
One criticism of the foregoing analysis is that it does not control for the other corporate 
governance characteristics of the individual REITs. For example, high ownership by the 
controlling shareholders may increase the ability of insiders to enter into transactions with less 
oversight (see Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2004). Thus, in this section, we expand our analysis by 
incorporating several corporate governance variables in the regression model. For each REIT, we 
managed to extract information on the board size, number of independent directors and 
percentages of shares owned by the sponsor, as well as the directors. Board size and Independent 
directors have been documented to have negative and positive impacts on Tobin’s Q, respectively, 
in the REIT literature, indicating that REITs with a stronger governance structure tend to have 
higher value.10 Sponsors and Directors ownership are both included in the regression to account 
for their positive impact on firm value, given the alignment benefit associated with increased 
                                                             
10 See Friday and Sirmans (1998) and Han (2006) for the significant positive effects of board independence 
on firm value, and see Hartzell, Sun and Titman (2006) for the significant negative effects of the board size 
on firm value. 
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ownership. Accordingly, the relationship between these ownership variables and Tobin’s Q is 
expected to be positive. We also include the square of Sponsor ownership, because Han (2006) 
documents a non-linear relation between Tobin’s Q and REIT insider ownership. The descriptive 
statistics of the sampled REITs are presented in Table 4.7. The mean number of directors on the 
board is 7.4, with 45.1% of the directors being independent directors. Table 4.8 presents the 
Pearson correlation matrix between all RPTs and the four corporate governance variables. Except 
for the level of sponsor ownership, none of the corporate governance variables are significantly 
related to RPTs.11  
 
Table 4.7: Corporate governance variables 
Variables Definition Mean Std Dev Min. Max. 
Board Size Number of directors on the board* 7.4 1.8 2 14 
Independent 
Directors 
Independent directors on the board (%) 
44.67 11.37 28.57 
0.82 
Director Ownership  Shares owned by directors (%) 0.005 0.022 0 0.185 
Sponsor Ownership  Shares owned by sponsors (%) 0.357 0.207 0 0.764 
* natural logarithm 
 
 
Table 4.8: Pearson correlation matrix of corporate governance variables 
Corporate governance All RPTs Board size Independent directors 
Director 
ownership 
Board size 0.03 1.00   
Independent directors -0.09 -0.11 1.00  
Director ownership -0.01 -0.00 -0.06 1.00 












                                                             
11 In a separate analysis, we divided the REITs in our sample into two groups based on the percentage of 
shares owned by the sponsors. We observe that REITs with concentrated ownership are more active in 
related acquisitions. They are also more likely to prop up the REITs’ income by providing some form of 
rental support. 
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Table 4.9: Controlling for corporate governance variables  
The dependent variables are Tobin’s Q measured as the market value of equity minus the book value of 
equity plus total assets divided by total assets. Related party transactions (RPTs) variables are transactions 
reported in the corresponding fiscal year. All RPTs are scaled by total assets. Sponsor (Director) Ownership 
is the natural log of one adds the percentage of Sponsor (Director) Ownership. Other control variables are 
defined as in Table 1. Coefficients for property type and country dummies are not reported. Total number 
of observations in each regression is 127. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses with the standard 
errors adjusted for serial correlation within the firm-cluster. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 












































The regression results are presented in Table 4.9. Our earlier results are robust even after 
controlling for acquisitions that are done at arms-length, as well as standard firm characteristics 
 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 0.233 0.318 
 (1.19) (1.30) 
Fees-Based RPTs  0.278 
  (0.04) 
Income RPTs  -1.175 
  (-0.68) 
Other RPTs  1.146 
  (0.56) 
Related Acquisitions 0.890** 0.903** 
 (2.44) (2.48) 
Non-Related Acquisitions 0.216 0.205 
 (1.47) (1.37) 
Firm Size 0.137* 0.148** 
 (1.99) (2.07) 
Firm Age 0.019 0.016 
 (0.15) (0.12) 
Leverage -0.183 -0.211 
 (-1.21) (-1.18) 
Credit Crisis -0.186*** -0.187*** 
 (-3.62) (-3.85) 
Credit Crisis*Related Acquisitions -1.327*** -1.336*** 
 (-3.13) (-3.30) 
Credit Crisis*Non-Related Acquisitions -0.313 -0.307 
 (-1.30) (-1.23) 
Board Size 0.257* 0.162 
 (1.17) (0.94) 
Independent Directors -0.026 -0.083 
 (-0.20) (-0.59) 
Director Ownership 0.031 -0.290 
 (0.03) (-0.23) 
Sponsor Ownership 0.418 0.255 
 (0.63) (0.32) 
Sponsor Ownership2 -3.455 -3.032 
 (-1.18) (-0.93) 
R2 0.57 0.57 
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and the corporate governance variables. Except for Board size in Model 7, none of the corporate 
governance variables in the model are statistically significant. The marginal positive effect of a 
large board is contrary to Hartzell, Sun and Titman’s (2006) finding of the negative effects of 
large boards using the US REIT dataset. The lack of significance of the other corporate 
governance related coefficients is nevertheless consistent with prior studies. Hartzell, Sun and 
Titman (2006), Bianco, Chinmoy and Sirmans (2007) and Bauer, Eichholtz and Kok (2010) also 
find that corporate governance structure does not have any explanatory power on firm value. This 
is due to the fact that the highly regulated environment in which REITs operate mitigates the need 
for strong internal corporate governance mechanisms. The general premise is that corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as the board, ownership and management structures, and 
institutional investors, are less critical in the case of REITs because of the strict rules regulating 
REITs. For example, the mandatory 90% payout distribution significantly reduces any potential 
free cash flow problems. REITs which engage in substantial asset acquisitions are also subject to 
close monitoring and disciplining by the capital markets because they have to raise funds 
externally to support the acquisitions.12   
 
4.4.5  Robustness Tests Using ROA as a Proxy for Firm Performance  
As a robustness test, we also examine the impact of RPTs on the operating profitability of REITs 
using return on assets (ROA). The regression specifications are similar to those used in the 
Tobin’s Q regressions in Table 4.9. As shown in Table 4.10, the relationship between Related 
acquisitions and firm performance ceases to be significant when we substitute Tobin’s Q with 
ROA. Interestingly, Fees –Based RPTs is significant and negatively related to ROA. Other control 
variables exhibit interesting patterns. The coefficients for Non-related acquisitions are positive 
and significant, supporting the operating efficiency gains from property acquisitions. The 
                                                             
12 We also regresses RPTs against all the corporate governance factors to address the concern of strong 
correlation between these variables where REITs with weak governance may tend to have higher level of 
RPTs. None of the corporate governance variables are significantly related to RPTs/related acquisitions. 
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negative relation between Leverage and ROA supports the financial distress hypothesis, which 
predicts an adverse impact of high leverage on firm performance. Our results are consistent with 
previous studies on the positive effects of board independence on the performance of US REITs 
(Friday and Sirmans, 1998; and Han, 2006), and reinforce the findings of these studies using 
Asian REIT data. We also document a non-linear relation between Tobin’s Q and Sponsor 
ownership. A low level of Sponsor ownership is associated with increased Tobin’s Q, which is in 
line with the alignment hypothesis. However, as Sponsor ownership rises, the Tobin’s Q ratio 
declines suggesting that the entrenchment hypothesis becomes dominant. 
Overall, the results suggest that RPT activity does not affect the REITs operationally. 
While this finding is difficult to reconcile with the Tobin’s Q’s results, the discrepancy is not 
uncommon in the corporate governance literature. For instance, Gompers, Ishhi and Metrick 
(2003) compare the impact of governance on various performance related-metrics and document 
a robust relationship between their G-Index (corporate governance index) and equity prices. 
However, they do not achieve the same consistent quality of regression when using three 
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Table 4.10: Robustness tests using ROA as a proxy for firm performance  
The dependent variable is ROA, measured as net income divided by total assets. Related party transactions 
(RPTs) variables are transactions reported in the corresponding fiscal year. All RPTs are scaled by total 
assets. Sponsor (Director) Ownership is the natural log of one plus the percentage of Sponsor (Director) 
Ownership. The other control variables are defined as in Table 1. The coefficients for the property type and 
country dummies are not reported. The total number of observations in each regression is 127. T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses, with the standard errors adjusted for serial correlation within the firm-cluster. 





























 Model 9 Model 10 
Intercept -0.039 -0.007 
 (-0.59) (-0.10) 
Fees-Based RPTs  -5.149** 
  (-2.69) 
Income RPTs  0.288 
  (0.71) 
Other RPTs  -0.771 
  (-1.02) 
Related Acquisitions 0.117 0.110 
 (0.97) (0.88) 
Non-Related Acquisitions 0.097 0.116* 
 (1.46) (1.82) 
Firm Size 0.003 -0.015 
 (0.16) (-0.66) 
Firm Age 0.044 0.057 
 (1.22) (1.54) 
Leverage -0.144* -0.146** 
 (-2.39) (-2.41) 
Credit Crisis -0.058** -0.063** 
 (-2.44) (-2.61) 
Credit Crisis*Related Acquisitions -0.082 -0.030 
 (-0.40) (-0.14) 
Credit Crisis*Non-Related Acquisitions -0.029 -0.051 
 (-0.31) (-0.60) 
Board Size -0.013 -0.028 
 (-0.21) (-0.40) 
Independent Directors 0.124** 0.139** 
 (2.16) (0.91) 
Director Ownership -0.164 0.406 
 (-0.43) (0.91) 
Sponsor Ownership 0.282 0.616** 
 (1.00) (2.28) 
Sponsor Ownership2 -1.192 -2.075* 
 (-1.07) (-1.87) 
R2 0.37 0.40 
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4.5 How do Investors Price the ‘Pipeline Story’ of RPTs into the Stock Pricing of IPOs?    
To understand how market values the ‘pipeline story’ at the IPO stage, we examine how the IPO 
underpricing of individual REITs is related to their RPT activity after public listing. Although 
beneficial, the better growth prospects resulting from the pipeline support through related party 
acquisitions could increase the severity of moral hazard problems and, hence, make investors 
demand greater underpricing of the IPO. The hypothesis is that IPOs with higher RPTs activity 
after listing are underpriced more at the time of the IPO. Consistent with the IPO literature, the 
dependent variable is underpricing, measured as the IPO closing price minus the offering price 
scaled by the offering price. RPTs are transactions reported in the annual report for the first 
financial year after IPO. The approach of using aftermarket variables that are not available at the 
IPO date to identify specific risk factors is not uncommon in the IPO literature. Miller and Reilly 
(1987) and Ritter (1984), for example, use trading volume and stock price volatility after IPO, 
respectively, as proxies to value uncertainty at the IPO stage. Following the third chapter of this 
thesis (the second essay), we control for Sponsor ownership, Issue size (proxied by the log of IPO 
proceeds), Underwriter reputation, Valuation uncertainty (proxied by the First issue of IPO type 
in a country of origin) and Institutional holdings. 13  We also control for country effects by 
including countries dummies in the regressions. 
The results of the multivariate regression models reported in Table 4.11 confirm the 
positive relation between RPT activity and IPO underpricing. The breakdown of RPTs by type in 
Model 12 reveals that the positive effects are driven by related party acquisitions, which is in line 
with our contention that the market factors the pipeline support from related party acquisitions 
into IPO pricing. Our results are consistent with the findings of Fan and Wong (2002) that 
investors mitigate the potential losses from agency issues by acquiring their shares at a discounted 
price. Thus, it appears that investors view, cautiously, the potential agency costs brought by 
                                                             
13 We acknowledge that the model could be extended with more control variables. However, we stay with 
these controls primarily due to the small sample size of the study.  
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related party acquisitions and factor this concern into the pricing of IPOs. Our results in the 
previous section, however, show that the concern over abusive RPTs does not materialize after 
the IPO.   
In Model 13, we include all the control variables that were found to have explanatory 
power for IPO underpricing. Our results are robust to the inclusion of these controls. The signs of 
these control variables are in line with expectations, though most of these variables are not 
statistically significant (except for First issue, which is significant at the 5% level). Underpricing 
is higher for IPOs with high valuation uncertainty (proxied by First issue). Similarly, higher 
Institutional holdings are associated with greater underpricing, which is in line with the winner’s 
curse prediction. The intuition is that issuers need to underprice more to attract uninformed 
investors to buy their IPO shares when the fraction of informed investors (institutional holdings) 
increases. The positive coefficient of Sponsor ownership is supportive of the signaling hypothesis, 
where quality firms (high sponsor ownership) deliberately underprice their IPOs to differentiate 
themselves from other low quality issuers. The negative sign for Underwriter reputation is 
consistent with the certification roles of reputable underwriters, which reduce the cost of 
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Table 4.11: The relation between RPTs and IPO underpricing 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the regression of underpricing on various control 
variables. The dependent variable is IPO underpricing, measured as the IPO closing price minus the 
offering price scaled by the offering price. RPTs are transactions reported in the annual report for the fiscal 
year after the IPO (at least 1 year from IPO date). Sponsor ownership is the natural log of one plus the 
percentage of sponsor ownership collected from REIT’s first fiscal business reports. Issue size represents 
the natural logarithm of offering size (offer price *number of shares offered). Underwriter reputation is the 
ratio of lead underwriters’ IPO proceeds to total IPO proceeds raised by all underwriters in the Asia Pacific 
region during the IPO year. First issue is a binary variable that takes one for the first issue of a REIT of its 
property type in its country of origin. Institutional holding is the percentage of shares placed to the 
institutional investors at IPO. T-statistics are reported in parentheses, with the standard errors adjusted for 


























   
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Intercept 0.011 0.034 -0.208 
 (0.24) (0.66) (-1.03) 
All RPTs 1.266***   
 (5.74)   
RP Fees  4.951 1.634 
  (0.87) (0.32) 
RP Income  -0.132 -1.124 
  (-0.18) (-1.24) 
RP property expenses  -1.432 -1.682 
  (-1.38) (-1.15) 
Related acquisitions  1.430*** 1.476*** 
  (11.69) (9.29) 
Non-Related acquisitions  0.080 0.073 
  (0.57) (0.43) 
Sponsor ownership   0.589 
   (1.69) 
Issue size    0.064 
   (0.76) 
Underwriter reputation   -0.518 
   (-0.69) 
First issue (0,1)    0.106** 
   (2.24) 
Institutional holdings   0.069 
   (0.51) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
                        No of Obs  36 36 36 
                        R2 0.35 0.49 0.60 
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4.6  Conclusions 
We find that the average size of RPTs recorded annually by REITs listed in the Asian markets is 
5.4% of total assets, which is much higher than the 2.86% recorded by industrial firms in the US. 
In addition, the three main channels for RPTs by REITs are the acquisition of real estate assets 
from related parties (57.4%), income earned from related parties (22.2%) and management fees 
paid to related parties (14.8%). The second and third channels are recurrent transactions, while 
the first channel is on an ad-hoc basis. The regression analysis shows that the RPTs of REITs are 
not detrimental to their minority shareholders and that the benefits seem to flow primarily from 
related party acquisitions. This suggests that the market favors the ‘pipeline story’ offered by 
related party acquisitions, which ensure that REITs have a sustainable pipeline of properties to 
acquire in the future. Further tests show that REITs with related party acquisitions are backed by 
strong sponsors with superior profitability, growth prospects and liquidity as compared to REITs 
without related party acquisitions. The positive relation between IPO underpricing and related 
party acquisitions supports the notion that investors are fully aware and cautious of the risk 
associated with this ‘pipeline story’ at the IPO stage. For robustness, we also investigate whether 
the effects of related party acquisitions are stable across time. However, the positive effect of 
related party acquisitions is qualified during periods of financial crisis.   
 




                                   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1  Background 
Although studies have examined the costs and benefits of close relationships from various 
perspectives, empirical evidence on the precise source of the value from a close relationship is 
still relatively scant. The main argument of this thesis is that close relationships are more valuable 
to financially constrained firms that rely heavily on external financing. Our research, therefore, 
focuses on REITs that are financially constrained by the mandated dividend payout requirements. 
Overall, this thesis has broadened our understanding of the value of relationships. The major 
contribution of the study has been the identification of the precise source of value from particular 
forms of close relationship. The three essays in this thesis represent, to the best of my knowledge, 
the first comprehensive study of the value of relationships in the context of REITs. 
 
5.2  Summary of Main Findings 
The first essay establishes the insurance value of banking relationships through access to bank 
lines of credit. The empirical work provides evidence that REITs are indeed able to draw down 
from their credit lines during a credit crisis. The insurance value is, however, qualified for smaller 
and more risky firms. These firms are more likely to be rationed in a credit crisis.  
The second essay provides, for the first time, empirical evidence highlighting the value of 
sponsors’ backing of REITs in relation to IPO underpricing. We find that high quality IPOs (IPOs 
with high sponsor ownership) tend to be more underpriced, which implies the existence of a 
signaling effect. When a sponsor is committed to retaining a large portion of IPO shares, it 
implies that they feel the company has not reached its full potential and are confident about the 
company’s future performance. Our results show that this is indeed the case in that IPOs backed
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by quality sponsors (high sponsor ownership and strong reputation) tend to have superior long-
term performance. The primary contribution of this paper is the modeling of the IPO pricing and 
share retention decisions within a simultaneous framework. Importantly, the signaling effect is 
robust to controlling for the wealth gains the sponsors reap from retaining IPO shares 
The third essay presents an empirical analysis of the value of the business relationships 
between IPO sponsors and REITs in relation to related party transactions (RPTs). The three main 
channels for RPTs by REITs are the acquisition of real estate assets from related parties (57.4%), 
income earned from related parties (22.2%) and management fees paid to related parties (14.8%). 
Contrary to the adverse view, that RPTs allow sponsors to expropriate wealth from minority 
shareholders, our analysis shows that the RPTs of REITs are beneficial to minority shareholders, 
with the benefits flowing primarily from related party acquisitions. The positive effect of related 
party acquisitions is, however, qualified during periods of financial crisis.    
 
5.3  Practical Implications 
The findings of the first essay imply that bank lines of credit provide only partial or contingent 
insurance for risky borrowers during credit crises. Although they are generally more dependent 
on banks lines of credit, small and more risky firms are more vulnerable to rationing during a 
credit crisis. This shows that the formation of banking relationships during the pre-crisis period 
does not shield these firms from a credit crisis. As small and more risky firms each make up 
around 10% of the firm-quarter observations, this implies that nearly 20% of REITs are rationed 
in a credit crisis. Therefore, we should not assume that this group of REITs as a whole do not 
matter to the economy. Thus, policy makers must remain alert to the credit rationing faced by 
small and more risky firms during credit crises. From the lender perspective, the selling of bank 
lines of credit is risky, because the bank is locked into lending to a borrower who might suffer a 
decline in creditworthiness that would otherwise dictate a higher interest rate or no loan at all 
(Avery and Berger, 1991). Our results suggest that offering bank lines of credit does not 
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necessary lead to an increase in the bank’s risk profile during a credit crisis, as the bank is 
generally able to deny loans to risky firms during crisis periods. 
Although the existing literature tends to support the certification effect of sponsor 
backing in reducing the cost of going public (underpricing), in the second essay we find that the 
signaling effect is dominant. These contrary research results are likely due to the fact that 
investors are suspicious of the credibility of first-party sponsor certifications in our sample. This 
means quality sponsors are willing to retain significant portions of IPO shares to signal their 
quality to the market. The finding of a positive relation between sponsor share retention and 
underpricing has significant implications, as investors can rely on these quality signals to fish out 
quality issues. This explains why, despite the captive management structure that researchers view 
as the worst-case scenario of agency conflict (Chan, Erickson and Wang, 2002), the REIT sector 
in Asia does not fall into Akerlof’s (1970) lemon market dilemma where only poor quality issues 
come to the market when investors are unable to differentiate good quality issues from the bad 
ones. Our results suggest that investors resolve the adverse selection problems at the IPO stage by 
choosing IPOs that are backed by quality sponsors (high sponsor ownership and high IPO 
underpricing).     
Contrary to previous studies that find related party transactions (RPTs) to be harmful, our 
results in the third essay suggest that RPTs are beneficial to minority shareholders. We can think 
of two practical implications of this finding. First, international investors who wish to invest in 
REIT stocks do not need to be too concerned about the agency costs associated with RPTs. This 
could be due to sponsors’ concentrated ownership structure in the REIT market, which aligns 
their interests with those of minority shareholders. Second, policy makers concerned about the 
wealth expropriation associated with RPTs could learn from the strict regulatory environment in 
which REITs operate. The introduction of REITs has generally improved the standard of 
corporate governance practices amongst real estate corporations in Asia, with the REITs taking 
the lead role.   
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5.4  Limitations and Future Research  
No research is without limitations and this study is no exception. This section highlights the 
limitations of each of the essays, together with our recommendation for further research.    
As mentioned in the introduction, we assume the existence of bank lines of credit as the 
formalization of a banking relationship. However, the strength of the relationship can vary 
between REITs in a manner that is, in turn, systematically related to their ability to draw down on 
credit lines during credit crisis periods. Specifically, a stronger relationship with a bank may 
facilitate a firm’s usage of bank lines of credit during credit crisis periods. The unavailability of 
lender related variables, such as the duration and scope of a relationship in the SNL database, 
limits our ability to model the strength of banking relationships in our empirical tests. 
Another qualification to the first essay is that our empirical models are designed to focus 
on the demand side (firm) of bank lines of credit, without controlling for supply side (bank) 
related variables. Data limitation prevented us from extending our investigation to include bank 
related variables, such as bank size, bank market share, and the financial health of a bank. Bank 
size could have an impact on the types of loans offered by a bank. Stein (2002) argues that large 
banks are less efficient at making relationship loans, i.e. loans which depend on soft information. 
Besides, the deterioration in the financial condition of banks can lead to tight lending standards 
that reduce the number of loan originations. For future consideration, it would be interesting to 
expand the current research to cover the characteristics of the lender and the strength of banking 
relationships.  
We have deliberately restricted the scope of the second essay to the backing of IPO 
sponsors to facilitate a detailed investigation of their role in IPOs. In practice, the parties involved 
in IPOs, including institutional investors and underwriters, may jointly determine the pricing of 
IPO shares. Therefore, an interesting extension to the current study would be to explore the 
interaction effects of IPO sponsors, underwriters and institutional investors at the level of 
underpricing. For example, it is possible that sponsors with concentrated ownership in REITs 
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have lesser need to go to reputable underwriters for quality certification. Similarly, it is also 
plausible for IPOs with high sponsor ownership to attract more institutional interest during the 
IPO stage.  
Although we establish the value-enhancing characteristics of related party acquisitions in 
the third essay, we do not provide direct evidence of the sources of the value derived from related 
party acquisitions. Future research could probe deeper into the reasons why related party 
acquisitions are valued highly by the market. For example, to examine whether related party 
acquisitions are sold at a discount, or whether the market favors the sponsor pipeline support 
story, where the existence of related party acquisitions indicates sustainable growth opportunities. 
Another weakness of this essay is the small sample size. It would be interesting to expand the 
sample to cover Japanese REITs or to conduct an independent study of the conduct of related 
party transactions by US REITs. We leave these challenging thoughts for future research. 
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APPENDIX 
Sample of US Equity REITs in Chapter Two 
1 Acadia Realty Trust 31 BNP Residential Properties, Inc. 
2 Aegis Realty, Inc. 32 Boston Properties, Inc. 
3 Agree Realty Corporation 33 Boykin Lodging Company 
4 Alexander's, Inc. 34 Bradley Real Estate, Inc. 
5 Alexandria Real Estate Equities, Inc. 35 Brandywine Realty Trust 
6 AMB Property Corporation 36 BRE Properties, Inc. 
7 Ambassador Apartments, Inc. 37 Burnham Pacific Properties, Inc. 
8 America First Apartment Investors, Inc. 38 Cabot Industrial Trust 
9 American Campus Communities, Inc. 39 California Jockey Club 
10 American Fincial Realty Trust 40 Camden Property Trust 
11 American Health Properties, Inc. 41 Capital Automotive REIT 
12 American Industrial Properties REIT 42 Capstone Capital Corporation 
13 American Land Lease, Inc. 43 Captec Net Lease Realty, Inc. 
14 AmeriVest Properties Inc. 44 CarrAmerica Realty Corporation 
15 AMLI Residential Properties Trust 45 Catellus Development Corporation 
16 AmREIT 46 CBL & Associates Properties, Inc. 
17 Apartment Investment and Management 
Company 
47 Cedar Shopping Centers, Inc. 
18 Arbor Property Trust 48 Center Trust, Inc. 
19 Archstone-Smith Trust 49 CenterPoint Properties Trust 
20 Arden Realty Inc. 50 CentraCore Properties Trust 
21 Ashford Hospitality Trust, Inc. 51 Charles E. Smith Residential 
Realty, Inc. 
22 ASR Investments Corporation 52 Chateau Communities, Inc. 
23 Associated Estates Realty Corporation 53 Chelsea Property Group, Inc. 
24 Avalon Properties, Inc. 54 Chicago Dock and Cal Trust 
25 AvalonBay Communities, Inc. 55 Cogdell Spencer Inc. 
26 Banyan Strategic Land Fund II 56 Colonial Properties Trust 
27 Beacon Properties Corporation 57 Columbia Equity Trust, Inc. 
28 Bedford Property Investors, Inc. 58 Columbus Realty Trust 
29 Berkshire Realty Company, Inc. 59 Commercial Assets Inc. 







  Appendix 
129 
Sample of US Equity REITs in Chapter Two (continue) 
61 Copley Properties, Inc. 91 Federal Realty Investment Trust 
62 Cornerstone Properties, Inc. 92 FelCor Lodging Trust Incorporated 
63 Cornerstone Realty Income Trust Inc. 93 Feldman Mall Properties, Inc. 
64 Corporate Office Properties Trust 94 First Industrial Realty Trust, Inc. 
65 Cousins Properties Incorporated 95 First Potomac Realty Trust 
66 Crescent Real Estate Equities 
Company 
96 First Washington Realty Trust, Inc. 
67 Crocker Realty Trust, Inc. 97 Franchise Fince Corporation of America 
68 Crown American Realty Trust 98 Franklin Advantage Real Estate Income 
Fund 
69 CRT Properties, Inc. 99 Franklin Real Estate Income Fund 
70 DCT Industrial Trust Inc. 100 Franklin Street Properties Corporation 
71 DeBartolo Realty Corporation 101 G&L Realty Corp. 
72 Developers Diversified Realty 
Corporation 
102 Gables Residential Trust 
73 DiamondRock Hospitality Company 103 General Growth Properties, Inc. 
74 Digital Realty Trust, Inc. 104 Getty Realty Corp. 
75 Douglas Emmett, Inc. 105 Gladstone Commercial Corporation 
76 Duke Realty Corporation 106 Glenborough Realty Trust Incorporated 
77 Eagle Hospitality Properties Trust, 
Inc. 
107 Glimcher Realty Trust 
78 EastGroup Properties, Inc. 108 Global Sigl Inc. 
79 Education Realty Trust, Inc. 109 GMH Communities Trust 
80 ElderTrust 110 Golf Trust of America, Inc. 
81 Entertainment Properties Trust 111 Government Properties Trust, Inc. 
82 Equity Inns, Inc. 112 Great Lakes REIT 
83 Equity Lifestyle Properties, Inc. 113 Grove Property Trust 
84 Equity Office Properties Trust 114 HCP, Inc. 
85 Equity One, Inc. 115 Health Care REIT, Inc. 
86 Equity Residential 116 Healthcare Realty Trust, Inc. 
87 Essex Property Trust, Inc. 117 Heritage Property Investment Trust, Inc. 
88 Evans Withycombe Residential, Inc. 118 Hersha Hospitality Trust 
89 Excel Realty Trust, Inc. 119 Highland Hospitality Corporation 
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Sample of US Equity REITs in Chapter Two (continue) 
121 HMG/Courtland Properties, Inc. 151 Maguire Properties, Inc. 
122 Home Properties, Inc. 152 Malan Realty Investors, Inc. 
123 Horizon Group, Inc. 153 Maxus Realty Trust, Inc. 
124 Hospitality Properties Trust 154 Medical Properties Trust, Inc. 
125 Host Hotels & Resorts, Inc. 155 Meridian Industrial Trust, Inc. 
126 HRPT Properties Trust 156 Meridian Point Realty Trust IV Co. 
127 Inland Real Estate Corporation 157 Meridian Point Realty Trust VI Co. 
128 Innkeepers USA Trust 158 Meridian Point Realty Trust VII Co. 
129 Insignia Properties Trust 159 Meridian Point Realty Trust VIII Co. 
130 Investors Real Estate Trust 160 MeriStar Hospitality Corporation 
131 IRT Property Company 161 Merry Land & Investment Company, Inc. 
132 Irvine Apartment Communities, 
Inc. 
162 MGI Properties 
133 JDN Realty Corporation 163 MHI Hospitality Corporation 
134 JP Realty, Inc. 164 Mid-America Apartment Communities, Inc. 
135 Keystone Property Trust 165 Mid-America Realty Investments, Inc. 
136 Kilroy Realty Corporation 166 Mid-Atlantic Realty Trust 
137 Kimco Realty Corporation 167 Mills Corporation 
138 Kimsouth Realty, Inc. 168 MIP Properties, Inc. 
139 Kite Realty Group Trust 169 Mission West Properties, Inc. 
140 Kramont Realty Trust 170 Monmouth Real Estate Investment 
Corporation 
141 Kranzco Realty Trust 171 National Golf Properties, Inc. 
142 Landsing Pacific Fund, Inc. 172 National Health Realty, Inc. 
143 LaSalle Hotel Properties 173 National Income Realty Trust 
144 Lexford Residential Trust 174 National Retail Properties, Inc. 
145 Lexington Realty Trust 175 Nationwide Health Properties, Inc. 
146 Liberty Property Trust 176 New Plan Excel Realty Trust, Inc. 
147 Longview Fibre Company 177 Newkirk Realty Trust, Inc. 
148 LTC Properties, Inc. 178 North American Trust, Inc. 
149 Macerich Company 179 Oasis Residential, Inc. 
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Sample of US Equity REITs in Chapter Two (continue) 
181 Pacific Gulf Properties, Inc. 211 Ramco-Gershenson Properties Trust 
182 Pacific Office Properties Trust, Inc. 212 Real Estate Investment Trust of 
California 
183 Pan Pacific Retail Properties, Inc. 213 Realty Income Corporation 
184 Paragon Group, Inc. 214 Reckson Associates Realty 
Corporation 
185 Parkway Properties, Inc. 215 Regency Centers Corporation 
186 Partners Preferred Yield II, Inc. 216 Republic Property Trust 
187 Partners Preferred Yield III, Inc. 217 RFS Hotel Investors, Inc. 
188 Partners Preferred Yield, Inc. 218 Roberts Realty Investors, Inc. 
189 Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment 
Trust 
219 ROC Communities, Inc. 
190 Plum Creek Timber Company, Inc. 220 Rouse Company 
191 Post Properties, Inc. 221 Santa Anita Realty Enterprises, Inc. 
192 Potlatch Corporation 222 Saul Centers, Inc. 
193 Prentiss Properties Trust 223 Security Capital Atlantic Incorporated 
194 Price Legacy Corporation 224 Senior Housing Properties Trust 
195 Price REIT, Inc. 225 Shelbourne Properties I, Inc. 
196 Prime Group Realty Trust 226 Shelbourne Properties II, Inc. 
197 Prison Realty Trust Inc. 227 Shelbourne Properties III, Inc. 
198 ProLogis 228 Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. 
199 PS Business Parks, Inc. 229 Simon Property Group Inc. 
200 Public Storage 230 Sizeler Property Investors, Inc. 
201 Public Storage Properties IX, Inc. 231 SL Green Realty Corp. 
202 Public Storage Properties X, Inc. 232 South West Property Trust, Inc. 
203 Public Storage Properties XII, Inc. 233 Sovran Self Storage, Inc. 
204 Public Storage Properties XIV, Inc. 234 Spieker Properties, Inc. 
205 Public Storage Properties XIX, Inc. 235 Spirit Fince Corporation 
206 Public Storage Properties XV, Inc. 236 Storage Properties, Inc. 
207 Public Storage Properties XVI, Inc. 237 Storage Trust Realty 
208 Public Storage Properties XVII, Inc. 238 Storage USA, Inc. 
209 Public Storage Properties XVIII, Inc. 239 Strategic Hotels & Resorts, Inc. 
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Sample of US Equity REITs in Chapter Two (continue) 
241 Sun Communities, Inc. 
242 Sunstone Hotel Investors, Inc. 
243 Supertel Hospitality, Inc. 
244 Tanger Factory Outlet Centers, Inc. 
245 Taubman Centers, Inc. 
246 Tower Realty Trust, Inc. 
247 Town and Country Trust 
248 TriNet Corporate Realty Trust, Inc. 
249 Trizec Properties, Inc. 
250 Tucker Properties Corporation 
251 U.S. Restaurant Properties, Inc. 
252 UDR, Inc.  
253 UMH Properties, Inc. 
254 United Investors Realty Trust 
255 Universal Health Realty Income Trust 
256 Urban Shopping Centers, Inc. 
257 Urstadt Biddle Properties Inc. 
258 USP Real Estate Investment Trust 
259 U-Store-It Trust 
260 Value Property Trust 
261 Vanguard Real Estate Fund I 
262 Ventas, Inc. 
263 Vordo Realty Trust 
264 Walden Residential Properties, Inc. 
265 Washington Real Estate Investment 
Trust 
266 Weeks Corporation 
267 Weingarten Realty Investors 
268 Wellsford Residential Property Trust 
269 Western Properties Trust 
270 Westfield America, Inc. 
271 Windrose Medical Properties Trust 
272 Winston Hotels, Inc. 
273 Winthrop Realty Trust 
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Sample of Asian Equity REITs in Chapter Three 
 REIT Main Sponsor 
1 The Link REIT Hong Kong Housing Authority 
2 Prosperity REIT Cheung Kong 
3 GZI REIT GZI Group 
4 Champion REIT Great Eagle 
5 Sunlight REIT Henderson Land Development 
6 Regal REIT Regal Hotels International 
7 RREEF CCT REIT Deutsche Bank  
8 Nippon Building Fund Mitsui Fudosan 
9 Japan Real Estate Investment Mitsubishi Estate Corporation 
10 Japan Retail Fund Investment Mitsubishi Corporation 
11 ORIX JREIT Orix Corporation 
12 Japan Prime Realty Investment Tokyo Tatemono Co 
13 Premier Investment company Ken Corporation 
14 TOKYU REIT Tokyu Group 
15 Global One  Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group Inc & 3 others 
16 Nomura Real Estate Office Nomura Real Estate Development Company 
17 United Urban Trinity Investment  
18 Mori Trust Sogo Mori Trust Co Ltd 
19 Nippon Residential Investment Pacific Management Corporation 
20 TGR Investment Tokyo REIT Co Ltd 
21 Frontier Real Estate Investment Japan Tobacco Inc 
22 Crescendo Investment Kanaru KK 
23 Japan Logistics Fund Mitsui & Co Ltd 
24 Fukuoka REIT Fukuoka Jisho 
25 Prospect Residential Investment KK Prospect  
26 Japan Single-Residential 
Investment 
Darwin Inc, Creed Corp, Lehman Brothers 
27 Kenedix Realty Investment Kenedix Group 
28 Joint REIT Investment Joint Corporation 
29 La Salle Japan REIT eBank Corporation 
30 FC Residential Investment Fund Creation 
31 DA Office Investment KK DaVinci Advisor 
32 Hankyu REIT Hankyu Corporation Group 
33 Advance Residence Investment Itochu Corp  
34 Starts Proceed Investment Starts Corporation 
35 LCP Investment LCP group L.P.  
36 Japan Hotel & Resort Goldman Sachs Group 
37 Top REIT The Sumatomo Trust & Banking  
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Sample of Asian Equity REITs in Chapter Three (continue) 
38 Japan Office Investment 
Corporation 
Creed Group 
39 Blife Investment Morimoto Co Ltd 
40 Nippon Hotel Fund Investment Creative Renovation Group Japan Inc 
41 Japan Rental Housing Investment Re-Plus Inc 
42 Japan Excellent Inc Kowa Real Estate 
43 Nippon Accommodation Fund Mitsui Fudosan Co 
44 Mid REIT MID Urban Development Co Ltd 
45 Nippon Commercial Investment Pacific Management Corp 
46 Mori Hills REIT Investment Mori Building 
47 Nomura Real Estate Residential 
Fund 
Nomura Real Estate Development Company  
48 Industrial & Infrastructure Fund Mitsubishi Corp 
49 New City Residence CB Richard Ellis Investors 
50 Capitamall Trust Capitaland 
51 Ascendas REIT JTC Corporation (parent for Ascendas Land) 
52 Fortune REIT Cheung Kong 
53 Suntec REIT Cheung Kong 
54 Mapletree Logistics Trust Mapletree Investments 
55 Starhill Global REIT Macquarie Bank Group 
56 Frasers Commercial REIT Allco Financial Group 
57 Frasers Centrepoint Trust Fraser & Neave Group 
58 CDL Hospitality Trust Millennium & Copthorne Hotel 
59 Cambridge Industrial Trust CREIM  
60 Capitaretail China Trust Capitaland 
61 First Real Estate Investment Trust PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk 
62 Macarthurcook Industrial REIT Macarthurcook 
63 Ascendas India Trust JTC Corporation (parent for Ascendas Land) 
64 Parkway Life REIT Parkway Holdings 
65 Saizen REIT Japan Regional Assets Manager 
66 Lippo-Mapletree Indonesia Retail 
Trust 
PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk 
67 Indiabulls Properties investment 
Trust 
Indiabulls Real Estate 
68 Axis REIT Axis Development 
69 Starhill REIT YTL Group 
70 UOA REIT UOA Holdings 
71 Tower REIT GuocoLand 
72 Al-Aqar KPJ REIT KPJ Group 
73 Hektar REIT Hektar Group 
74 Amfirst REIT AmBank Group (parent for Aminvest Group) 
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Sample of Asian Equity REITs in Chapter Three (continue) 
 
75 Quill Capita Trust Quill Group/Capitaland 
76 Al-Hadharah Boustead REIT Boustead group 
77 Amanahraya REIT Amanahraya Bhd 
78 Atrium REIT Glory Blizt Industries 
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Asian REITs Included in the Study Sample in Chapter Four 
No REIT 
1 Capitamall Trust  
2 Ascendas REIT  
3 Fortune REIT 
4 CapitaCommercial Trust 
5 Suntec REIT 
6 Mapletree Logistics Trust 
7 Starhill Global REIT 
8 Fraser Commercial REIT 
9 Ascott Residence Trust 
10 K-REIT Asia 
11 Fraser Centrepoint Trust 
12 CDL Hospitality Trust 
13 Cambridge Industrial Trust 
14 CapitaRetail China Trust 
15 First REIT 
16 AIMS AMP Capital Industrial REIT 
17 Ascendas India Trust 
18 Parkway Life REIT 
19 Saizen REIT 
20 Lippo-Mapletree Indonesia Retail Trust 
21 Axis-REIT 
22 Starhill REIT 
23 UOA REIT 
24 Tower REIT 
25 Al-Aqar KPJ REIT 
26 Hektar REIT 
27 Amfirst REIT 
28 Quill Capita Trust 
29 Al-Hadharah Boustead REIT 
30 Amanaraya REIT 
31 Atrium REIT 
32 The Link REIT  
33 Prosperity REIT 
34 GZI REIT 
35 Champion REIT 
36 Sunlight REIT 
37 Regal REIT 
38 RREEF CCT REIT 
 
